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1 LYHENNELMÄ 
 
Tämä taktiikan tutkimus keskittyy tietokoneavusteisen simuloinnin laskennallisiin menetelmiin, 
joita voidaan käyttää taktisen tason sotapeleissä. Työn tärkeimmät tuotokset ovat laskennalliset 
mallit todennäköisyyspohjaisen analyysin mahdollistaviin taktisen tason 
taistelusimulaattoreihin, joita voidaan käyttää vertailevaan analyysiin joukkue-prikaatitason 
tarkastelutilanteissa. Laskentamallit keskittyvät vaikuttamiseen. Mallit liittyvät vahingoittavan 
osuman todennäköisyyteen, jonka perusteella vaikutus joukossa on mallinnettu tilakoneina ja 
Markovin ketjuina. Edelleen näiden tulokset siirretään tapahtumapuuanalyysiin operaation 
onnistumisen todennäköisyyden osalta.  
 
Pienimmän laskentayksikön mallinnustaso on joukkue- tai ryhmätasolla, jotta laskenta-aika 
prikaatitason sotapelitarkasteluissa pysyisi riittävän lyhyenä samalla, kun tulokset ovat riittävän 
tarkkoja suomalaiseen maastoon. Joukkueiden mies- ja asejärjestelmävahvuudet ovat 
jakaumamuodossa, eivätkä yksittäisiä lukuja. Simuloinnin integroinnissa voidaan käyttää 
asejärjestelmäkohtaisia predictor-corrector –parametreja, mikä mahdollistaa aika-askelta 
lyhytaikaisempien taistelukentän ilmiöiden mallintamisen. Asemallien pohjana ovat aiemmat 
tutkimukset ja kenttäkokeet, joista osa kuuluu tähän väitöstutkimukseen.  
 
Laskentamallien ohjelmoitavuus ja käytettävyys osana simulointityökalua on osoitettu tekijän 
johtaman tutkijaryhmän ohjelmoiman ”Sandis”- taistelusimulointiohjelmiston avulla, jota on 
kehitetty ja käytetty Puolustusvoimien Teknillisessä Tutkimuslaitoksessa. Sandikseen on 
ohjelmoitu karttakäyttöliittymä ja taistelun kulkua simuloivia laskennallisia malleja. Käyttäjä tai 
käyttäjäryhmä tekee taktiset päätökset ja syöttää nämä karttakäyttöliittymän avulla simulointiin, 
jonka tuloksena saadaan kunkin joukkuetason peliyksikön tappioiden jakauma, keskimääräisten 
tappioiden osalta kunkin asejärjestelmän aiheuttamat tappiot kuhunkin maaliin, ammuskulutus 
ja radioyhteydet ja niiden tila sekä haavoittuneiden evakuointi-tilanne joukkuetasolta 
evakuointisairaalaan asti. 
 
Tutkimuksen keskeisiä tuloksia (kontribuutio) ovat 1) uusi prikaatitason sotapelitilanteiden 
laskentamalli, jonka pienin yksikkö on joukkue tai ryhmä; 2) joukon murtumispisteen määritys 
tappioiden ja haavoittuneiden evakuointiin sitoutuvien taistelijoiden avulla; 3) 
todennäköisyyspohjaisen riskianalyysin käyttömahdollisuus vertailevassa tutkimuksessa sekä 4) 
kokeellisesti testatut tulen vaikutusmallit ja 5) toimivat integrointiratkaisut. 
 
Työ rajataan maavoimien taistelun joukkuetason todennäköisyysjakaumat luovaan 
laskentamalliin, kenttälääkinnän malliin ja epäsuoran tulen malliin integrointimenetelmineen 
sekä niiden antamien tulosten sovellettavuuteen. Ilmasta ja mereltä maahan -asevaikutusta 
voidaan tarkastella, mutta ei ilma- ja meritaistelua. Menetelmiä soveltavan Sandis -ohjelmiston 
malleja, käyttötapaa ja ohjelmistotekniikkaa kehitetään edelleen. Merkittäviä 
jatkotutkimuskohteita mallinnukseen osalta ovat muun muassa kaupunkitaistelu, vaunujen 
kaksintaistelu ja maaston vaikutus tykistön tuleen sekä materiaalikulutuksen arviointi.   
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2 ABSTRACT 
 
Tactical level war gaming using computational simulation is used in military analysis. In this 
study, computational methods have been developed in order to simulate brigade level scenarios 
for comparative studies. The brigade level does not allow analysis of all individual soldiers, 
because of increased number of entities and small time stepping (one second or less). Thus 
minute-level time stepping was selected, with a platoon or squad as the smallest entity or agent.  
 
The computational models of a platoon level unit use Markov chains and state machines. The 
platoon level unit is considered as a distribution of unit strengths in order to model the 
stochastic nature of war. Probabilistic risk analysis is possible as fault tree analysis combines 
platoon level success probabilities with overall operation success probability. Weapon system 
effects in the simulation are based on earlier studies adjusted for platoon level targets. Adaptive 
integration is used in the artillery model and the weapon selective predictor-corrector method to 
model phenomena within the selected longer time step. Field tests were also used to study the 
goodness of models and parameters.  
 
The computational models were tested and their usability as part of the simulation tool was 
proved by programming them in the Sandis software. The coding team was led by the author at 
the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Center (PVTT). The Sandis tool is used for 
comparative combat analysis from platoon to brigade level. The input comprises weapon and 
communication characteristics, units and their weapons, fault logic for units and operation 
success, map and user actions for units at the platoon level. The output is the operation success 
probability, probability of each unit being defeated, unit strength distributions, average combat 
losses and the killer-victim scoreboard, ammunition consumption, radio network availability 
and medical evacuation logistics and treatment capacity analysis. During the game, the man in 
the loop is responsible for tactical decisions. 
 
The contribution of this dissertation is a novel war gaming model including a success 
probability tree for brigade level scenarios and the computational models needed for platoon 
level units. The integration methods for the artillery model and predictor-corrector method are 
improvements to previous methods used in Finland. Infantry loss models have been created and 
a field test conducted. The state machines model the action of soldiers under fire and the 
secondary effects of combat casualties are studied using the resources needed during the 
evacuation of casualties. These are used in break point analysis instead of a (constant) break 
point loss percentage.    
 
The study is limited to computational models for creating the probabilistic values for platoon 
level units and their probabilistic use. Air and naval warfare are not part of the study. As another 
limitation, only open sources are used. Future studies could examine urban warfare, vehicle duel 
models and analysis of logistics.   
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PREFACE 
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1   INTRODUCTION  
 
During the last 50 years, computer-aided simulation, simulators and computational methods 
have become part of military studies and industrial planning. With constantly increasing 
computing speed and the concurrent improvement of algorithms, new methods and models have 
become available for computational simulations in both industry and the military community.  
 
In the study, computational models are created for combat simulations. Thus the subfield of 
military tactical studies considered in the study is computer-aided simulations as a tool for the 
optimization of the use of combat resources. The aim of the study is to create methods for 
combat simulation tools for brigade level land warfare scenarios. In an agent-based simulation, 
the used entity (agent) is a platoon or group level unit. As the smallest entity is usually a platoon 
or squad, battalion or brigade level gaming becomes possible as the number of simulated 
entities is reasonable.  
 
The work combines methods of mathematical modeling, stochastic processes and probabilistic 
risk analysis, all applied to battle simulation models suitable in the Finnish combat environment. 
The results are needed for military planning, acquisition processes and cost-effectiveness 
calculations.  
  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Army tactics, organization and equipment development process by Major General 
Räty used in war gaming and simulations. (Räty, 2009) The computational models and a 
simulation tool like Sandis can be used in the highlighted steps. 
 
The fact that there is a need for this kind of a tactical simulation tool in the army development 
process has clearly been recognized in the Finnish Defence Forces, as evidenced by the diagram 
shown in Figure 1.1, which was presented by a high-ranking author (Räty, 2009). 
 
Nation wide starting 
situation and troops 
Create troop placement 
and plans by using 
operational concepts 
War gaming  of the 
situation  and first 
simulations 
War gaming using 
different course of action 
and different organization 
and different equipment 
alternatives 
Recalculate in different 
terrain and environment 
War gaming of the best 
option(s) in detail in 
battalion level 
Test with real units using 
combat training 
simulators (KASI-system) 
Retest different terrain or 
different option 
Decide the organization, 
write field manuals and 
purchase equipment 
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The work on a brigade level operational analysis tool and computational models started at 
the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre in 2002. During the first years, different 
alternatives were studied, and the need for novel simulation models was discovered. Figure 1.2 
shows the situation in the Finnish combat simulation environment. Neither computational 
models nor software were available : for the gaps left by score point methods like QJM/TNDM 
and entity-level constructive simulations like FLAMES or the KESI officer training simulator.  
 
Scenario level
Armycore
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
Division
SANDIS
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
Brigade
SANDIS SANDIS
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
Battle group
KESI SANDIS SANDIS SANDIS
QJM/ 
TNDM
QJM/ 
TNDM
Battalion
FLAMES KESI SANDIS SANDIS
QJM/ 
TNDM
Company FLAMES KESI SANDIS SANDIS
Platoon FLAMES FLAMES KESI SANDIS SANDIS
Group FLAMES FLAMES
Patrol/ half gruop FLAMES FLAMES
duel between platforms FLAMES FLAMES
tecnical 
details
Platform / 
single 
soldier or 
vehicle
patrol /  
combat 
vehicle
group platoon company batallion
battle 
group
brigade
The smallest 
unit or "size of 
an agent" on 
the simulated 
environment 
or map
 
Figure 1.2 Combat simulation models in the Finnish environment. The highlighted cells show 
the area for which the proposed simulation software is the most suitable. The FLAMES, KESI 
and score point method QJM/TNDM leave a gap. The computational methods of this study are 
used to fill the gap. 
 
This study concentrates on platoon or group level models suitable for battalion to brigade 
simulations. The platoon was modeled to be the operational entity for brigade level analysis 
instead of a single vehicle or soldier. This level was selected, because it was considered to be 
the largest unit, which can use practically all its weapon systems against other same size units in 
Finnish terrain. In guerilla type warfare, the smallest unit must be a small squad or an individual 
soldier.  
 
The computational models developed in this study enabled the creation of the Sandis tool, 
which can be used to evaluate alternatives in acquisition or tactical optimization problems.  
As the models have been implemented in the Sandis tool, they can be used in evaluating the 
outcome of a battle and the probability of success of an operation or a specific task performed 
by forces up to a brigade in strength (or an equivalent unit) as well as Red and Blue combat 
losses in different tactical alternatives [P1]. Sandis also has a user interface for entering and 
editing the military scenarios and combat model [P1]. 
 
The computational models and sub-models for the tactical combat environment were treated as 
mathematical modeling tasks. Consequently, the most important research methods used were 
standard mathematical modeling procedures. 
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Figure 1.3 Mathematical modeling   
 
The computational models for tactical simulations are the main contribution of this thesis. The 
models can be used in order to have the platoon level as the smallest unit level in comparative 
studies up to brigade level. The computational models have been tested in Sandis, a novel 
military operation analysis tool [P1]. Sandis clearly shows that a tactical simulator with platoon 
level analysis based on a Markovian approach (Kangas & Lappi, An Example of Markovian 
Combat Modeling, 2004) can be programmed as a usable software tool. Also, adequate 
parameters of the model can be obtained from literature and field tests [P5, P6, P7, and P8].  
 
The results of the combat loss models involved can be used in probabilistic risk analysis [P9, 
P10]. The medical model combines platoon level combat effectiveness with the goodness of the 
medical evacuation process during combat. It includes a novel calculation method for platoon 
combat effectiveness after battle casualties [P3] and a model for the subsequent evacuation 
process [P4]. A better mathematical method for simulations is introduced [P2] and automatic 
optimization of platoon level targeting [P11] helps the operators of the Sandis tool. 
 
The software engineering of the Sandis tool lies outside the scope of this dissertation, but it was 
essential for testing and using the methods to address the research questions. The Sandis tool is 
being upgraded constantly. The comments on the tool and test simulations refer to the public 
version of Sandis used at the end of the 3rd International Sandis Workshop, held from August 
31 to September 4, 2009, in Valkeakoski. (Hämäläinen, Lappi, & Åkesson, 3rd International 
Sandis Workshop, 2009) 
 
 As another limitation, only unclassified sources are used.   
Studying the 
topic 
Modeling
Testing and 
parameterization 
Coding and 
software 
engineering
Use of the   
software
Problem
Testing successful
Idea of the structure
Mathematical algorithm
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2. A REVIEW OF COMPUTATIONAL COMBAT 
ANALYSES IN THE FINNISH ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.1 Some computational combat models for land warfare in the 
Finnish environment  
 
When the study started, no battalion to brigade level Finnish combat simulation software was 
available on the open market. However, there are numerous international combat simulators and 
methods available. The simulators known to be in use in Finland are Kesi (GESI), employed for 
training staff officers at the National Defence University (MPKK) (Kuokkanen, 2003), and 
FLAMES, which is used by the Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (PVTT), but they 
are not intended for use in brigade level scenarios in order to research different technical or 
tactical alternatives.  
 
Colonel Dupoy’s QJM type score point calculations are used by both the National Defence 
University (MPKK) and the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (PVTT). A 
Finnish Defence Forces Scientific Board (MATINE) funded a project in which Ilkka Karanka 
developed a stochastic way of using a score point method like QJM (Karanta, 2005), but such 
methods are unusable for detailed analysis of technical and tactical alternatives. 
 
At the Norwegian FFI, Tony Kråkenes et al (Kråkenes, Ljøgodt, & Malerud, 
SIMULERINGSMETODER INNEN OPERASJONSANALYSE -En oversiktsstudie, 2007) 
made a survey of available combat models. Kråkenes’ review did not include any commercial 
ready to use models, which could handle brigade level scenarios by using platoon/group level 
units in stochastic environment. This also indicated the need for a novel tool.  
 
Mika Hyytiäinen considered computational combat models created for and applied in the 
Finnish environment in both his doctoral thesis (Hyytiäinen, Paikkatietoylivoima digitaalisella 
taistelukentällä, 2003) and a separate book about combat models (Hyytiäinen, 
Maasodankäynnin taistelumallit ja taktiset simulaattorit, 2004). The main contribution of his 
thesis was the use of geographical information systems (GIS) in combat modeling, but it also 
provides basic information about combat simulations. 
 
In his brief study Taistelun ja logistiikan simulointi (Simulating combat and logistics), Capt. 
(eng) Jyri Lempiäinen collected information about Finnish combat models and actors such as 
universities and companies in the field of computational operational analysis (Lempiäinen, 
2005). In his book Kvantitatiiviset tutkimusmenetelmät operaatiotaidon ja taktiikan 
tutkimuksessa (Quantitative research methods in operational and tactical studies) principal 
scientist Jussi Metteri described the state of the art in combat modeling from the point of view 
of the National Defense University (Metteri, 2006).  
 
At the 2004 Nordic Military Operation Analysis symposium, the QJM strength score point 
method was presented as part of a study on the evaluation of the operational performance of 
electronic warfare systems (Lappi, A method to evaluate operational performance of electric 
warfare systems, 2004). However, the strength point calculation – which is the core element of 
the QJM and TNDM (Dupuy, 1990) analysis methods – was found to be too coarse for more 
detailed analyses. The idea of platoon level stochastic analysis was consequently introduced by 
Kangas and Lappi. (Kangas & Lappi, An Example of Markovian Combat Modeling, 2004)  
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At the Nordic Military Operation Analysis Symposium of 2004, Tony Kråkenes (Kråkenes, 
Synthetic decision-making in the land combat model Dynacom., 2004) from the Norwegian 
Forsvarets Forskninginstitut (Defence Research Institute; FFI) gave a presentation of Dynacom, 
a Norwegian tactical simulator. Dynacom was rather similar to FLAMES, so it could not handle 
brigade level scenarios as the number of different entities became too large for practical 
analysis.  
 
Figure 1.2 does not present an exhaustive overview of contemporary Finnish research and 
interest in combat simulations, but it does describe the usability of the simulation software in 
use. Other methods have been discussed for example in the seminar proceedings published by 
PVTT and the National Defence University (Hämäläinen, Lanchester and beyond, 2006) 
(Lehtinen, Calculating Combat, 2007). Studies have been published on special topics like 
helicopter warfare (Aherto, Saarelainen, Loikkanen, & Hynynen, 2002) and specific weapon 
system evaluations (Jormakka & Tuovinen, 2004). A short tutorial on combat modeling and 
Lanchester's combat equations is included in (Lehtinen, Operaatioanalyysiä sotilaille, 2003), 
and an analysis of the KESI simulator from the artillery point of view in (Lehtinen, On 
hexagonal grids in combat simulation, 2005). The stochastic forms of Lanchester-type combat 
models were also studied by Tuomas Hytönen (Hytönen, 2005), but the results are not directly 
usable for combat simulations. 
 
Keijo Jaakola studied QJM and some direct fire models (Jaakola, 2005). This work was 
continued by Eiri Valanto with a focus on software engineering and user interface topics. 
Valanto created a demonstrator of a combat simulation in the commercial ARCGIS environment 
(Valanto, 2005). The demonstrator used the method presented in (Kangas & Lappi, An Example 
of Markovian Combat Modeling, 2004). Teemu Murtola carried out the Matlab programming of 
the model and the research group of PVTT supported the work. Jaakola’s and Valanto’s theses 
focused on strength ratio analysis for operational planning. 
 
The PVTT research group created Sandis, which uses the computational models of this 
dissertation. Apart from this dissertation, other publications have also dealt with Sandis and 
combat simulation. Three master’s theses have been published: Lauri Kangas studied a further 
simulation method published at the Nordic Military Operation Analysis Symposium 2004 in his 
master’s thesis (Kangas, Taistelun stokastinen mallinnus, 2005) and Risto Bruun (Bruun, 2009) 
developed further the weapon selective predictor corrector method [P2] and implemented it into 
the Sandis software. Juho Rutila studied the software engineering of the next upgrade of Sandis 
(Rutila, 2009). 
 
Lappi and Kaasinen studied optimal parameters for a platoon state machine (Lappi & Kaasinen, 
Genetic optimization of tactical parameters in Sandis Combat simulator, 2008);  Tony Kråkenes 
from the Norwegian FFI had a presentation on a similar problem at the Military operation 
analysis symposium in Helsinki 2004 (1st NMORS), in which optimal target selection was 
studied by using genetic algorithms (Kråkenes, Synthetic decision-making in the land combat 
model Dynacom., 2004). 
 
A cooperation between PVTT computational model research group and FFI started from 1st 
NMORS and an official cooperation agreement was signed in August 2006. Many of Norwegian 
tactical simulator DYNACOM’s features were later designated as user requirements for the user 
action and data collection methods of Sandis. The results of the cooperation in the construction 
of the electronic warfare component for tactical simulators were published in 2008 at the 2nd 
Nordic Military OA Symposium (Pajukanta, Åsen, Sainio, Åkesson, & Lappi, 2008). 
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Jussi Kangaspunta (Kangaspunta, Portfolioanalyysi asejärjestelmien kustannustehokkuuden 
arvioinnissa, 2009) showed how simulated data can be used to optimize weapon systems using 
portfolio analysis. The Sandis simulator can be used in this type of analysis (Kangaspunta, 
Lappi, Liesiö, & Salo, 2008). 
 
2.2 Probabilistic approach  
 
That war has a probabilistic nature was already observed by Carl Clausewitz in his classic book 
Von Krige (Clausewitz, 1832 / 1998)  p. 25. There are many random effects on the battlefield. 
This makes probabilistic risk analysis a reasonable approach in analyzing combat. In the 
appendix of his PhD thesis, Mika Hyytiäinen referred to Vainio’s work (Vainio, 2001) and 
wrote that the analysis of the probability of success is one of the user requirements of a military 
operation analysis tool (Hyytiäinen, Paikkatietoylivoima digitaalisella taistelukentällä, 2003), 
Appendix 4, p. 13. For these reasons, probabilistic risk analysis – a well-established practice in 
fields such as fire protection engineering – was selected as a core part of a tactical simulator. 
 
Combat simulation is an accepted method of military analysis and there are established 
engineering practices for the use of tactical simulations. International conferences and 
publications have addressed the topic of simulation practices for decades. Martin Gilljam from 
the Norwegian Forsfarets Forskninginstitut (FFI) has compiled a Nordic view of operation 
analysis and listed conferences, journals and organizations in the field of military simulations 
and operation analysis (Gilljam, 2005). The use of simulation in a military environment and its 
problems has been recently discussed by many authors. Good examples are the articles by 
Sanchez in the Wintersim 2006 Proceedings about the complexity of the models (Sanchez, 
2006) and by Matsupoulos on the creation of a simulation framework (Matsupoulos, 2007).  
 
There are also many good agent-based software tools available, like MANA from New Zealand 
and Pythagoras from the United States, but they do not feature built-in stochastic treatment of 
platoon losses.  
 
The methods of fire risk analysis have analogies with combat analysis as elaborated in [P9]. 
Engineering practice is also described in works such as Björkman’s dissertation (Björkman, 
Risk assessment methods in system approach to fire safety, 2005). The approach of combining 
physical calculations with stochastic values is common in fire risk analysis. For example, fire 
can spread from one room to another located above it through windows. In this case, the 
probability of the fire spreading is estimated using physical simulation and the results can be 
used in stochastic analysis (Lappi, Hietaniemi, & Kokkala, Ikkunan kautta julkisivulle leviävän 
palon todennäköisyyspohjainen riskitarkastelu, 2002) 
 
The event tree method from fire protection engineering; see for example 
(Björkman;Baroudi;Hietaniemi;Lappi;& Kokkala, 2001), can also be used in probabilistic 
combat analysis. The analogies between fire protection engineering and stochastic combat 
modeling are described in Table 2.1.1. 
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Fire risk analysis Combat analysis 
     
Simulation 
Numerical fire simulation, 
for example mass and heat 
transfer calculations. 
Technical combat simulation, 
for example fragmentation of 
indirect fire ammunition. 
Risk analysis 
System risk analysis and 
probability of successful 
countermeasures or system 
failure. 
Military organization analysis 
and probability of successful 
operation or failure. 
Cost-benefit analysis 
Cost of different end results 
(price of investments, 
losses in different 
scenarios, insurance costs). 
Goodness of different end 
states in combat simulation, 
costs of weapon system 
alternatives and different uses 
of firepower. 
Decision making 
Which combination of fire 
protection systems, 
redundant process systems 
and different layout is 
selected. 
Which combination of 
weapon system, firepower 
and tactical alternatives is 
selected. 
 
Table 2.2.1 Fire risk analysis and combat simulation 
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3. COMBAT MODELING FOR A SIMULATION TOOL 
 
3.1 Stochastic model of unit strengths 
3.1.1 Introduction to models 
 
The creation of computational models for combat simulation is a typical mathematical modeling 
task. In addition to this modeling, the software team created a software tool using the combat 
models. The usefulness of created models cannot be readily shown if they are not implemented. 
Thus software for performing the calculations is essential in order to test the usefulness of the 
models.  
 
The accuracy of simulated and modeled issues can start from physical analysis of sensors or 
fragments flying and hitting targets to platform level entities (soldier, vehicle) and end up with 
aggregated objects like a battalion at corps level. When creating a tool for brigade level combat 
environments, the limits for too accurate or too crude simulations become evident.   
 
If each soldier is treated separately in a simulated combat environment and accurate maps are 
used with sophisticated weapon and sensor models, the results at the technical level can be 
useful, but war gaming and simulation time at the brigade level become too long as the number 
of separate entities in the game can exceed 10,000. In order to do fast war gaming for brigade 
level scenarios, the effects of the weapons should be combined and some average results with 
distributions should be used without losing the effects of the weapon parameters in the results. 
 
At another end, traditional or improved Lanchester-Osipov equations with parameters calculated 
from simulated weapon data could be used for brigade level combat. In this case, the aggregated 
units might be battalion level, and the time span days or weeks. For the basic methods of 
mathematical military operation analysis, the reader can refer to basic textbooks, e.g., the article 
collections published by the Military Operation Research Society (Bracken, Kress, & Rosenthal, 
1995) and Przemienicki’s textbook Mathematical Defense Analysis (Przemienicki, 2000).  
 
These Lanchester-Osipov type models give average solutions rather easily if the combat loss 
parameters have been calculated from simulated or tested data. But a brigade is located in a 
large area with variable terrain, which means that the number of possible tactics and uses of 
weapon systems are practically infinite. If these tactical alternatives and weapon systems effects 
should be studied, the simulated units must be smaller than a brigade or battalion.   
 
Thus it was necessary to arrive at a compromise between accurate simulation of weapon 
systems and their effects on each of the separate targets and the use of a large enough unit size 
in order to avoid too many entities in the game. In (Hyytiäinen, Paikkatietoylivoima 
digitaalisella taistelukentällä, 2003) p. 102, the platoon level was estimated to be the largest unit 
size for detailed analysis in Finnish (forest) terrain. Experiences from military service and 
participation in Major Sormunen’s research exercises (Sormunen, 2010) had given the same 
result, so the platoon level was selected as the smallest unit level needed for the analysis. 
However, the model can work at squad level, too, which is needed for example in guerilla type 
warfare. 
 
The need to use risk analysis methods made the stochastic approach the natural choice. For 
example, Bhat includes the topic “military modeling” in his book Elements of Applied 
Stochastic Models (Bhat, 1984). Thus stochastic processes and Markovian modeling are known 
basic mathematical methods and there is a solid established mathematical background for the 
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use of stochastic analysis for platoon or group level units. In order to determine the 
probability values, a well-established Markovian approach was selected. The probability 
distribution of unit strength can be obtained as the combat losses are modeled as state transitions 
between the unit strength before and after the event. For the mathematics involved, one basic 
starting reference is the textbook by Goodman (Goodman, 1988). 
 
3.1.2 The platoon or squad level solution for simulation tools 
 
In the thesis, we concentrate on methods of stochastic analysis for platoon level duels and use of 
weapon systems by and against platoons applicable in brigade level simulation scenarios. We do 
not try to elaborate analytical mathematical Lanchester-type duel models; instead, we aim at 
computational combat simulation models. 
 
We will start with a brief review of Markov models. Markov chains are basic tools for certain 
stochastic processes and they are also used in combat analysis (Bhat, 1984); (Goodman, 1988). 
When using Markov chains, the phenomena are studied by using a discrete presentation of the 
world called “states”. For example, an industrial machine can be operational or under repair 
(two states model) or a queue in a shop can have a value ranging from 0 persons to N persons (N 
+ 1 states model).  
 
In mathematical form, the discrete system can be written as a matrix equation. The following 
example presents a two state machine, in which the probabilities of a machine being operational 
or under repair are studied.  
 
We denote the probability of an event by p(event), e.g., p(one gets hit) is the numerical value of 
the probability that exactly one object will get hit during the time interval under consideration. 
A vector P is used if more than one probability value is used simultaneously in matrix 
calculations. 
 
Let P(day T) be a vector with probability components p(machine operational T) and p(machine 
under repair T) during the day T. 
 
(3.1) P(T) =     
                        
                
  
 
Let us assume that we have statistical data indicating that if the machine is working, it will stay 
operational until the next day with probability p(stay operational) and if the machine is under 
repair, it will still be under repair on the next day with probability p(still under repair). In this 
case, we have a matrix equation 
 
(3.2) P(T+1) =  
                                          
                                          
  ·P(T) 
 
The probability vector P(T) is multiplied with a matrix in formula 3.2. The matrix is called the 
state transition matrix. In Markov chain modeling, the first step is to create the state 
representation of the studied problem and the second is to estimate the state transition 
probabilities. In the third step, the behavior of the system can be studied using analytical or 
numerical methods.  
 
In discrete Markov models, the state transitions occur between the discrete steps (difference 
equation), and the continuous time models are systems of differential equations. If a continuous 
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time model is calculated numerically using for example Euler’s method, it can also be 
considered a discrete system with time stepping.  
 
In classical form, the unit strengths of both Blue and Red are adjusted as single fighters are 
destroyed. The state transitions are usually modeled to be single soldiers or platforms at a short 
enough time step, so the change is from value N to N –1. See, e.g.,  (Hytönen, 2005) (Goodman, 
1988) (Bhat, 1984). During a simulation of the combat, or in some special cases even in an 
analytical solution of the combat equations, the result is the probability distributions of Red and 
Blue strengths as a function of time.  
 
In traditional models such as those in (Hytönen, 2005) the different distributions of soldiers in 
the area are not considered, neither are different actions taken by the soldiers. Secondly, the 
combat environment is changing and a single artillery shot can easily destroy many soldiers at 
the same time. Thus state transitions with only one soldier lost in a time step were rejected. 
 
Kangas and Lappi (Kangas & Lappi, An Example of Markovian Combat Modeling, 2004) 
presented a way of Markovian modeling that can be used to create a stochastic Markov model 
from any combat simulation model or test shooting statistics giving average losses during a time 
step. The idea is rather simple. If the losses of the unit are p% during a time step, we assume 
that the probability of a hit on a single solder of the unit is p%. The unit strength after the losses 
becomes a binomial distribution, which gives state transition probabilities for the Markov 
model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Examples of state transitions of the Markovian combat simulation models with three 
soldier units. An arrow from 3 to 2 represents the same difference in the strength of the unit. 
The example on the left shows only one event at a time, while the example on the right is a 
binomial model. When state transition probabilities are included, the numerical values can be 
calculated.   
 
As a result, we have for each time step a state transition matrix A for all unit strengths. The 
matrix calculation for probability strength vector π(t) is  
 
(3.3) A ∙ π(ti) = π(ti+1). 
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Let p be the probability of a single soldier getting hit during the time step and let q = 1 – p. 
To illustrate the states let us first consider two soldiers or other entities in the same platoon as 
the targets. The states for this case are: two operational (π2), one operational but the other not 
(π1) and both not operational (π0). The state transition can happen from two to two, two to one 
and two to zero, from one to one and one to zero and from zero to zero. In this simplified case, 
the state transition matrix A and probability vector π for unit strengths are 
 
(3.4)    
    
     
    
   
 
(3.5)        
     
     
     
  
 
When we elaborate this example to unit size n, we get a larger matrix. With unit strength n, the 
vector has n +1 probability values and the state transition matrix is a (n + 1) × (n + 1) square 
matrix.  
 
The columns of n +1 state matrix A have binomial distribution values with hit probability p(n) 
with n target entities.  
 
Thus the values in the first column show state transitions from an unharmed unit with n target 
entities and hit probability p for each entity: 
 
(3.6a)  P(no one gets hit)  =       A(1,1)  =       (1–p(n))n ;  
(3.6b)  P(one gets hit)   =       A(1,2) =      
 
  p(n) (1–p(n))n–1 
(3.6c)  P(two get hit)   =       A(1,3) =      
 
  p(n) 2 (1–p(n))n–2 
… 
(3.6d)  P(m gets hit)   =       A(1,m+1) =      
 
  p(n) m (1–p(n))n–m 
… 
(3.6e)  P(all n get hit)  =        A(1,n+1) =           p(n) n 
 
The next column with one entity hit at the beginning of the time step is rather similar, but it has 
a different average hit probability p(n–1). The average hit probability is not the same as with n 
targets, because for example fewer targets can increase the number of aimed shots per target. In 
this column, the first probability is obviously zero, because shooting at an entity does not 
increase the strength of the unit. Of course unit strength can increase during the battle, but the 
recovery process is treated separately, not as a part of the weapon effect calculation model. As a 
result, the second probability vector (row) in the state transition matrix becomes  
 
(3.7a)  P(unit strength increases)  =        A(2,1)  =       0  
 
(3.7b)  P(no one gets hit)   =        A(2,2)  =       (1–p(n–1))n–1 ;  
 
(3.7c)  P(one gets hit)    =       A(2,3) =        
 
  p(n–1) (1–p(n–1))n–1–1 
 
(3.7d) P(two get hit)    =       A(2,4) =        
 
  p(n–1) 2 (1–p(n–1))n–1–2 
… 
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(3.7e)  P(m gets hit)   =     A(2,m+2) =        
 
  p(n–1) m (1–p(n–1))n–1–m 
… 
(3.7f)  P(all n–1 get hit) =        A(2,n+1) =           p(n–1) n–1 
 
With all the n+1 columns, the same kind of formula appears, so the matrix A needed for 
probabilistic strength analysis has been created. There are zeros in the upper right triangle, and a 
binomial distribution in the lower left. Let q =1–p. 
 
(3.8)  A = 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
  
 
                                  
  
 
                       
 
                           
      
  
   
                       
 
                        
 
                         
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
When the state probability vector π is multiplied with the state transition matrix A, the 
probabilities of the states with higher losses increase. In mathematical terminology, the state “all 
entities have been hit” is an absorbing state. 
 
These formulas apply in cases when the number of bullets shot is greater than the number of 
targets and the hit probability is not near 1.  
 
If a weapon system with high accuracy is used, an adjusted model can be employed. If for 
example we shoot one anti–tank missile with 90% accuracy, the average losses are 0.9 tanks. If 
a platoon has three tanks, the average casualty percentage is 30%. In this case the binomial 
distribution is not accurate, since it incorporates positive probabilities for the loss of more than 
one tank, which would be impossible when only one missile is used. In this case, a more direct 
accurate probability formula for state transitions has to be used. Its basics are described in the 
following example.  
 
In this simplified case of one missile shot, the state transition matrix becomes 
 
(3.9)    
      
        
        
      
   
 
In a general case, there are several different alternatives.  
 
Let us first assume that more than one weapon is shot at the target. If we assume that no weapon 
is shot at the same target as another, the row of the state transition matrix becomes a binomial 
distribution from n to n – m.  
 
If there are more targets than accurate shots, there are more alternatives. If the next shots are 
used to shoot targets that survived the first shots, we end up with a binomial distribution with 
more hits than targets set to state transition n to zero. In the case of three tanks and three 
missiles, the state transition matrix would become   
 
(3.10a)    
       
                
                         
                                        
 , 
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or in another form  
 
(3.10b)    
       
                
                         
                              
 . 
 
If in this case five targets would be shot at with three missiles, the distribution would become 
 
(3.11)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
                  
                           
                              
                              
                             
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
As another alternative, we have some fixed targets that are shot twice (or are hit one more time 
than the others) if there are more weapons than targets. In this case the state transition matrix 
would be 
 
(3.12) A =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
                  
                           
                              
                                         
                          
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
In general, another option is to assume that all targeting is independent. Let the hit probability of 
a single shot be p and the miss probability q = (1 – p). In this way, with m accurate shots all 
miss with probability qm, which is the state transition probability from n units to n units. 
 
The probability for one hit is the binomial distribution with  
 
(3.13a) p(one hit) =    
 
  p qn––1 
 
and k hits 
 
(3.13b) p(k hits ) =    
 
  pk qn--k 
 
In this case with n targets and m weapons shots, we first calculate the probability that the second 
shot hits the same target as the first one. With n targets 
 
(3.14) p(second hit on the same target as the first one) = 1:n. 
 
The probability for one target being hit at least once by m accurate shots is determined as a sum 
of probabilities 
 
(3.15)  p(1 target) = P(1 hit) + P(2 hits)∙(1:n)+P(3 hits)∙(1:n)2+…P(m hits) )∙(1:n)m–1 
 
To get two targets we must have two hits on different targets, or three or more hits on two 
definite targets. 
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(3.16) p(2 targets) = P(2 hits) ∙[(n–1):n]+P(3 hits) ∙P(3 shots hit 2 targets)+… 
 
A way to bypass the resulting long and clumsy formulas is to use the state transition matrix 
technique again. During the shooting process, the number of targets decreases, so for each 
accurate weapon we have state transitions from n to n–1 targets by assumption with probability 
p, and from n–k to n–k–1 with probability 
 
(3.17) p(from n to n–k–1) =  p∙[(n–k):n] 
 
Thus the state transition matrix P for shooting first at n targets with random targeting is 
 
 (3.18)  P  =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
     
 
 
     
   
   
 
    
 
 
    
       
        
   
 
  
        
 
 
    
   
 
 
       
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Assuming n targets at the beginning, we have a state probability vector s with 1 at the top and 
others zeros. The state transition matrix from n targets shot with m accurate weapons is formed 
through matrix multiplication. 
 
(3.19)  s(t+∆t)  = Pm ∙ s(t) 
 
From this result we can get the state transition matrix A. If we create P using (3.18) for all unit 
strengths, we get the state transition matrix A for accurate weapon fire with each column having 
zeros in the upper triangle and in column i in lower triangle Pm s from (3.19).   
We have thus constructed both an average loss model and an accurate single shot hit probability 
model to create state transition matrix A for a single platoon as the target of a single weapon 
system. 
 
If two platoons are in a firefight, the state probability matrix is needed for all number of Red 
shooters, because the average loss is dependent of the number of shooters. The end probability 
is the sum of all state probabilities multiplied with all probabilities of each fighting 
combination. If only one unit is shooting at the target platoon, the result is  
 
 (3.20) π(t) =  [∑ p(i shooters) ∙ A(i shooters)]∙ π(t–∆t)  
 
If a unit is the target of more than one weapon system or unit, the cumulative effects of different 
firing systems are calculated by multiplication of different state transition matrices.  
 
Let the target unit have state transition matrix A(“unit 1” shooting, i), when the shooting “unit 
1”  has strength i. Then by taking the sum of products from formula 3.20 the state transition 
matrix for unit one becomes  
 
(3.21) A(unit 1 shooting) =[∑ p(unit 1 has i shooters) ∙ A( unit 1 with i shooters)]. 
 
Let π(t) be the target unit’s strength vector. Let there be n shooting units and let the strength 
distribution after time step be π(t+∆t). Then as the final result we get 
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(3.22) π(t+∆t) = A(total) ∙ π(t–∆t),  
 
where the state transition matrix A(total) is a product 
 
(3.23) A(total) = A(unit 1 shooting) ∙ A(unit 2 shooting) ∙ … ∙ A(unit n–1 shooting).     
 
In formulas 3.1 – 3.23, the computational bases of the simulation are presented. 
The Markov chains have no memory, and all information on earlier events is included in the 
states of the model. During the simulation the parameters of the state transitions are upgraded at 
each time step and rich enough states are used, and thus the lack of memory did not become an 
issue during the simulations. 
 
3.1.3 Soldier state machine 
 
Lappi [P3 2006] combined a soldier state machine with the model. It enabled the study of 
medical effectiveness and the secondary effects of combat losses. The soldiers committed to the 
evacuation process of the wounded were included in the analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A simplified state machine for soldiers at the platoon level [P1, 2008].  
 
The operational strength of the fighting unit is its nominal strength minus the personnel giving 
first aid to the wounded. This approach was selected during Major Jari Sormunen’s field 
research studies after discussions with Mr. Kari Stenius from the military medical 
establishment, who also took part in Sormunen’s research exercises.   
 
In this way a new break point calculation was obtained: the unit is considered defeated if the  
operational strength of the platoon is less than one. Within a reasonable simulation time, the 
model gives a break point after 25-60% losses depending on the medical evacuation parameters, 
which does not conflict with the literature, see e.g.  (Hembolt, 1971)  pages 35-37. 
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The unit strength distribution calculation needs the average hit probability for each soldier 
in each operation state, which can be obtained from any deterministic or stochastic calculation 
or other source. Thus the model changes deterministic basic values to distribution form. The 
soldier state machines account for the different types of targets at the platoon level, avoiding an 
overly crude model with equal hit probabilities for all the entities of the platoon.  
 
These two state machines are the core of the probabilistic approach to combat simulation. They 
still simplify the real situation, as the state probabilities of two fighting platoons are considered 
independent, such that the Blue platoon strength does not correlate with that of Red in these 
calculations. In real life we could assume that, for example, in a duel between a Blue and Red 
platoon, large losses from the first bullets in the Red target platoon would correlate with low 
losses for the Blue platoon. These kinds of correlation effects are not automatically considered 
in the mathematical model.     
3.2 Indirect fire model  
 
Artillery and mortars are used to suppress the enemy and to cause damage to units, equipment 
and fortifications. A single gun can shoot a single shot at a single target, but artillery is usually 
used to shoot at target areas with tens or hundreds of shells. In the stochastic model, the average 
hit probabilities of artillery fire are needed in order to determine the values for the state 
transition matrix for losses and soldier states. 
 
Indirect artillery fire causes damage by fragments, pressure and heat. The fragments fly from 
different directions from the exploding ammunition, thereby leading to different effects as a 
function of angle and height of burst. Different ammunitions have different fragment mass 
distributions, fragment shapes, initial velocities, and fragment fan angle properties, thus leading 
to differences in losses.  
In the target area, single shell hits can be treated as random processes. The deviations for the 
shells hitting the target area can be estimated from field tests and experience. Thus in the 
artillery model we have two separate random processes: hitting distribution of the ammunition 
and probability of effective hits with ammunition explosions and fragments.  
 
A good overview of artillery fire effects was published in Tiede ja Ase 26 by Major M 
Koskimaa. (Koskimaa, 1968)  
 
The fragments cause the most damage to targets. Surprisingly, artillery calculations in many 
simulations do not use an accurate fragmentation model. Other possible approaches are also 
available, such as mass of shells per area tables (Evans), “cookie cutter” model and exponential 
decay (Stanag 4654 Indirect Fire Appreciation Modelling, 2007) and test-based tables like in 
(Keinonen, 1954). These would give reasonable enough results for combat analysis if their 
parameters were to be adjusted for all different situations. As an extremely simple method 
(Evans) shows the observed real combat effectiveness of WW2 artillery weapons; if adjusted 
with some new effects, this method would be fast and rather accurate, also.  
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Figure 3.2.1 Artillery effects: fragments, heat, pressure and smoke. Fragments also fan forward 
and backward.    
 
. 
  
Many software tools like “Pythagoras” give two options for artillery models (“cookie cutter” 
and exponential Carlton)  (Bitinas, Henschield, & Truong, 2003), p.53. Some parameters are 
also available for these models, but they do not use any real model for damaging the target 
 
Heat
pressure
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Figure 3.2.2 Probability of a hit as a function of distance (in meters) for the “Cookie cutter” 
and exponential Carlton models  (Bitinas, Henschield, & Truong, 2003), p. 53. 
 
In order to be able to calculate the different effects associated with angles of impact, fragment 
distribution and initial velocity as well as pressure threshold limits, a more accurate model was 
selected and coded. It is rather detailed compared to other alternatives used in simulations. The 
artillery model calculates the probability of a single entity getting a hit as a target of indirect fire 
and the results can be expanded to platoon level combat losses [P5].  
 
The model and calculation methods are described in [P1], and the effectiveness and the 
goodness of the model were validated for mortar fire and a procedure for other ammunition was 
created in [P5] and [P8]. Artillery fire tests were conducted in October 2008 by a research team 
led by the author in cooperation with Karjalan Prikaati.  
 
The model combines the vulnerable areas and pressure threshold levels of targets with the 
properties of ammunition. A protection level is specified for the vulnerable area in RHA steel 
plating equivalents. The target is damaged if the fragments penetrate its plating or the pressure 
thresholds are met.  
 
The accuracy of shooting guns and ammunition are used to set the distribution of hitting point 
probability. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3 Probability of hitting a target is an (infinite) sum of two products P(x) and P(hit|x). 
 
 
  P(hit point x) from artillery deviation information 
 
 
  P(hit the target | ammunition hitting point x) 
  Target 
  
0 , 0 0   % 
2 0 , 0 0   % 
4 0 , 0 0   % 
6 0 , 0 0   % 
8 0 , 0 0   % 
1 0 0 , 0 0   % 
1 2 0 , 0 0   % 
1 4 7 1 0 1 3 1 6 1 9 2 2 2 5 2 8 3 1 3 4 3 7 4 0 4 3 4 6 4 9  (m) 
C a r l t o n 
C o o k i e 
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The probability of the target being hit is calculated using the area around the target. The 
ammunition has a probability of hitting each point around the target and from each hitting point 
there is a probability of fragments hitting the target. The probability of a single round of 
ammunition hitting the target is a sum of all products: 
 
(3.24) P(hit with a single shot) =  
∑ [P(ammunition hits place xi) ∙ P(fragment hits the target | hit in place xi)      
 
Integration is done from the point of view of the target: the target has a radius for vulnerability 
to fragments or pressure impacts. Only the vulnerable area around each target is integrated to 
get the p(hit point x) values, which are multiplied with fragmentation model hitting 
probabilities. 
 
The parameters for this model are available: the shooting tables give the angle of impact, the 
mass of explosives is known and there is public data about fragment size and distribution. More 
accurate classified data is available, as the fragmentation of single rounds of ammunition has 
been tested. The results have been studied and the needed test data for the fragment angle and 
size distribution has been calculated by Army material command (MAAVMATLE). 
 
3.3. Medical evacuation model 
 
The medical model was constructed in order to gain some insight into the indirect effects of 
combat losses on fighting capability and the evacuation process. The medical model covers both 
the platoon level effects on combat effectiveness [P3 2006] and the evacuation chain from the 
platoon level to the evacuation hospitals [P4 2008]. 
 
The action inside a platoon was expected to be as follows: if a soldier gets hit, the other soldiers 
move him away from fire and the wounded soldier receives first aid from another soldier. After 
first aid, the wounded soldier is transported to a casualty collection point by other soldiers, who 
then return to continue the firefight. During the medical evacuation process, the soldiers who 
help the wounded, transport them to the casualty collection point and finally return to the 
combat formation are not effective in combat action. The wounded will be transported from 
platoon and company level treatment and collection points to the field hospitals. 
 
In principle, there is nothing new in the simulation of the evacuation process of combat losses. 
For example, evacuation has been studied in the Naval Postgraduate School by Buoma (Bouma, 
2005) and a model was created at the Helsinki University of Technology by using Arena, a 
commercial simulation tool (Jaakkola, Iso-Mustajärvi, Jalkanen, & Myllylä, 2005). In this 
context, the used model should fit the probabilistic approach and platoon level unit state 
machines. Thus a computationally fast and accurate enough model was required. 
 
In publication [P3] a state machine representation of the evacuation was presented. The soldier 
state machine was introduced in Figure 3.2, in which the states are active, wounded, helping and 
evacuating the wounded and returning to the combat formation. The model and parameters are 
based on observations during the field exercise and study led by Major Jari Sormunen 
(Komppanian hyökkäyksen menestystekijät). Because both the field data and simulated data 
from Arena seemed to be close enough to the data from the simple model in [P3], it was 
selected for platoon combat efficiency calculations instead of more complex models. The 
parameters and model accuracy should be reconsidered if new data becomes available. 
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In the second phase of the evacuation process described in [P4], the wounded persons are 
categorized in four classes: mild wounds (triage III), intermediate (triage II), serious (triage I) 
and lethal including dead or those who are likely to die regardless of the care they might be 
given (triage IV). 
 
The evacuation of the wounded from platoon level to company level and onwards is handled by 
two types of units: the evacuation unit and the treatment facility, which can be located at any 
unit level.  
 
The evacuation unit is used to transport the wounded between different levels of treatment units. 
At each treatment facility there are three basic states: “waiting for treatment”, “in treatment” 
and “waiting for transportation or return to the combat formation”. Each state is further divided 
into four variables, one for each category of severity. If treatment is delayed or the waiting times 
become very long, the condition of the wounded deteriorates. 
 
The calculation is similar to the unit state machine; the state transition matrix is multiplied with 
the original state probability vector. In this case, there are state transitions among the wounded 
to both better and worse conditions.  
 
In this study, we concentrate only on the simulation model. Accurate numerical data on patient 
state transition probabilities are studied by the military medical establishment.   
 
3.4 Predictor-corrector method 
 
In the land combat environment, most of the time the units are moving or are in stationary 
positions waiting for combat or in rather stationary firefight positions. However, there are sharp 
changes when units first come in contact and open fire or become targets of direct or indirect 
fire. These incidents happen in a one-second time scale, but after the first bullets, the firefight 
and medical evacuation process has a time stepping of one minute or longer.  
 
There is a trade-off between simulation time and simulation accuracy. The need for faster 
simulations requires time steps that are as long as possible, but overly long time steps cause 
unrealistic results. In platoon level land warfare, a minute is a reasonable time considering 
movement and combat actions. In most cases, we can assume that the parameters and unit action 
remain constant during a time step of this size; however, this time step is too long for many 
situations, especially when shooting starts. For example in an artillery fire or ambush situation, 
the unit states are not constants during the time step, thus leading to different hit probabilities 
within the time step. This leads to cumulative errors in simulation.  
 
The problem with sharp changes in the combat environment can be solved by much shorter or 
adaptive time stepping or advanced mathematical modeling. In [P2], an advanced mathematical 
model is presented.  
 
We start with a mathematical formulation of the problem. Simulation with time steps can be 
considered as a numerical solution of a differential equation. Euler’s method for solving 
differential equations is practically the same as a simulation with time stepping and using 
constant values for simulated entities during the time step. However, the constant values during 
the time step can cause errors if the situation evolves faster. 
 
The formula for Euler’s method is  
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(3.25) y(ti+1) = y(ti) + (ti+1 – ti) ∙ dy(t1) /dt. 
 
In the formula y(t) is the situation (the values of all calculated functions) at time t, subtraction 
(ti+1 – ti ) is the time step, and the derivate dy(t1)/dt is the difference of the values with respect to 
the time. In this case, the derivate is considered constant for the time step.  
 
As an example, let us consider a duel between two infantry units, one soldier against a full 
platoon. The platoon is ambushed and the soldiers are not in cover. Then a component of dy/dt 
is for example the loss rate of the target platoon soldiers. The constant derivate is in this case the 
same, as the target soldiers just stand as targets during the entire time step. When the next time 
step begins, the unit has suffered severe losses. 
 
After the time step, the unit is taking cover and starting to evacuate its losses, so the combat 
effectiveness can be near zero and the unit does not shoot back at the enemy. Thus, the number 
of shots against the lone enemy soldier will be less than in a real case, and in fact the 
culmination point of the battle could be reached just from the error caused by the too long time 
step.      
 
Traditional ways of increasing accuracy and avoiding cumulative errors have been to use either 
shorter time steps with adaptive integration or better integration methods, for example Heun’s or 
Runge-Kutta methods. In these methods, a prediction step is calculated first and then the results 
are corrected using the calculated values; for this reason, these are referred to as predictor-
corrector methods. These well-known methods have even been presented in some high school 
level textbooks, see for example  (Hemmo, Lappi, & Lundahl, 2003).   
 
There are problems with these traditional mathematical methods in this case. The theoretically 
better results with, e.g., Runge-Kutta methods have mathematical assumptions for the function: 
it is supposed to be differentiable. But in situations when shooting starts or ends, the combat 
loss functions are not even continuous. With a human in the loop taking tactical decisions, the 
shorter time step not only decreases the speed of simulation, but also easily increases the 
workload of the operators.  
 
The mathematical solution to the problem is a novel calculation model for the combat 
environment. In the weapon selective predictor-corrector method, each time step is calculated 
twice [P2].  
 
A calculation is first done with the starting values of the unit and then with its end values. The 
first step is a normal Euler’s method calculation, so let ye be the result of the Euler step 
calculated using the formula (3.25). Then we have two situations y(ti) and ye(t2), and the 
derivates for the calculations are calculated for both cases. The end state y(ti+1) has the formula 
 
(3.26) y(ti+1) = y(ti) + (ti+1 – ti) ∙[w1 dy(t1) /dt +w2 dye(t2)/dt)]; w1+w2 =1 
 
The positive weights w1 and w2 are not fixed to w1=w2=½ like in Heun’s method, but are 
weapon selective. In this case we have a state transition within the time step, and the unit action 
parameters change depending on the weapon system used against it.  
 
Let us study the different methods using the traditional example  
 
(3.27) dy/dt = y; y(0)=1, 
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The analytical solution y = et, where e is Neper’s number (e≈2.7). The results from Euler’s 
method with time step 1 and ½, Heun’s method with time step 1 and ½ and function selective 
results with time step 1 and w1 = 3 – e and w2 = e – 2 are presented in Table 3.1. 
  
 
 
Table 3.1 Solutions of equation 3.27 using different methods 
 
The parameters w1 = 3 – e and w2 = e – 2 were adjusted to give the right answer for y(1). The 
weights depend on step size, so the values for step size 1 should be adjusted for other values. In 
this simple mathematical situation, the weights could be adjusted to fit the situation exactly, but 
in general the weapon parameters are only estimates. 
 
In combat simulations, the parameters w1 and w2 can be fitted by for example using field test 
data or heuristic analysis of the unit soldier actions during the time step. The parameters for the 
weapon selective predictor-corrector method can also be estimated by using simulated results of 
more accurate simulators like FLAMES.   
 
For example, we have two alternatives: six guns shoot one round each or one gun fires six times 
during a one-minute time step. With the first alternative, we have predictor values weighted as 
1, because all the rounds hit the target simultaneously. In the second case, the soldiers of the 
target unit will take cover after the first hit, so as a first estimate the predictor step has a weight 
of 17% and the corrector 83%.  
 
To give a numeric example, let the hit probability of a single shot be p for first shot and ⅕?p for 
soldiers taking cover. So direct calculation using elementary probabilities gives the hit 
probability for one minute with simultaneous impact 1 – ( 1 – p)6 and for single shots 1 – ( 1 – 
p) ( 1 – ⅕?p)5. If p = 0.1, the hit probability for six guns shooting simultaneously should be 47% 
and for one gun firing six times 19%.  
 
The direct predictor-corrector method gives values of 47% for the predictor step and 11.4% for 
the corrector step. The result with the weapon selective predictor-corrector method would be 
17% with weights of w1 = 17% and w2 = 83%. 
 
As a result we can see that the weapon selective predictor-corrector method improves the 
results. There is no need to use shorter time steps if the weapon models include the parameters 
for weights w1 and w2. 
    
time 0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Analytical solution y(t) 1 1,648721 2,71828183 4,481689 7,389056
Euler's method, timestep 1 y(t) 1 2 4
Euler's method, timestep ½ y(t) 1 1,5 2,25 3,375 5,0625
Heun's Method, timestep 1 y(t) 1 2,5 6,25
Heun's Method, timestep ½ y(t) 1 1,625 2,640625 4,291016 6,9729
Function selective Heun, timestep 1 y(t) 1 2,71828183 7,389056
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Computational models 
 
In order to ensure that the simulation would be fast enough, the unit aggregation level was set to 
a platoon, but also squad level can be used. As a result of this work, computational models for a 
platoon entity needed for a novel military operation analysis tool have been created. The 
stochastic calculation model enables probabilistic success analysis and gives wider insight into 
the situation, as it demonstrates random effects on the battlefield. The models have been coded 
as software, making them available for tactical studies [P1]. 
 
The weapon selective predictor-corrector method improves accuracy and enables longer time 
steps [P2]. The medical evacuation model shows the secondary consequences of combat losses 
and the need for medical evacuation resources during evacuation from the platoon level to an 
evacuation hospital [P3] [P4]. The artillery model gives losses to platoon size units from 
indirect fire, including all weapons with explosives and fragments. It uses powerful adaptive 
integration and simplified physical models for fragmentation and pressure [P5], thus leading to 
better accuracy than traditional cookie cutter or exponential decay models. Field testing 
increases the accuracy of parameter data and validates both indirect and infantry fire models 
[P6] [P7] [P8].  
 
The results are in probability distribution form and can thus be used in probabilistic risk analysis 
[P9] [P10]. Automatic target selection helps the persons running the simulation to use the 
Sandis software [P11] and documents the calculation procedure used in combat simulations. 
     
4.2. Calculation examples of the basic models 
 
4.2.1. The Sandis software for brigade level war gaming  
 
In [P1] there is an overall description of the models and the Sandis software using them for 
comparative analysis. The platoon level models are tested in Chapter 4.2, and an overview of 
published larger level war gaming examples is presented in Chapter 4.3. Some parts and models 
of the Sandis software are used in the war gaming, although they are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 
For brigade level war gaming, the Sandis calculates the radio communication environment, 
combat losses, ammunition consumption and medical evacuation process at the platoon level, as 
the man in the loop is responsible for tactical decisions. The results from Sandis simulations are 
the strength distributions of the units and operation success probability as well as a killer–victim 
scoreboard and medical situation values. 
 
The platoon level unit model in brigade level scenarios is the most important difference between 
Sandis and the other tools available. The computational models use Markovian combat 
modeling as described by (Kangas & Lappi, An Example of Markovian Combat Modeling, 
2004), which gives reasonable loss distributions compared to the field tests and literature [P5] 
[P6] [P7] [P8]. The weapon system parameters fit the model, as the integration parameters are 
also adjusted to fit the reality [P2]. Automatic target selection [P11] is needed for practical 
simulation work in order to perform brigade level analysis in a reasonable time.   
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The difference in the combat effectiveness of a platoon after casualties with different 
evacuation procedures can be studied using the medical evacuation model [P3] [P4]. Also the 
break point analysis is connected in medical evacuation [P3].  
By employing these models, the Sandis tool can be used in probabilistic risk analysis [P9] 
[P10]. The use of other tools and system analysis may be needed before running Sandis 
simulations, but the basic state transition computations create the needed probability distribution 
of any combat model with average losses.   
 
The probability of success gives an advantage for decision-making procedures. The problem 
with probabilistic analysis is the number of different paths and simulated cases, which increase 
to infinity. Thus only the most important different alternatives can be studied with Sandis 
combined with event tree analysis [P10].  
 
4.2.2 Platoon level game 
 
In the simulated game, two identical platoons meet in an open forest environment. The 
simulation was made using the September 2009 version of the Sandis software, and the units 
were set on a white map. 
 
In the first game, only infantry light weapons are used and in the second a mortar unit is also 
used. The mission for both platoons is to advance and shoot at the enemy, if possible. No 
tactical maneuvers take place, so the platoons keep fighting until they are “defeated”. A unit is 
considered “defeated” if its losses become so severe that all operational fighters are evacuating 
the wounded. In this case the platoon is given the order to move backward and try to avoid 
further combat. 
 
If the unit can advance, it will do so. Enemy fire forces the soldiers to take cover, so the 
advancing speed of a unit in a firefight is extremely slow if the unit is under effective fire.   
The tactics are simplified in order to see the effects of the computational methods. The 
parametric data in this game is collected from field tests and from the mortar point of view from 
public sources. 
 
The hit probabilities of the platoons are constructed by Lappi and Pottonen [P6, 2006] and the 
field tests by Lappi et al. [P7, 2008]. The difference between the platoons is from field tests. 
The first platoon has the hit probabilities of the best unit: Group 1, 28 March 07 at 13:20 and 
13:35, in the test and the Red platoon has average values [P6, 2008]. 
 
The hit probabilities have the same functional form, which was extrapolated from (Keinonen, 
1954) by using weighted averages with a weight of 2 for a semiautomatic rifle (7.62x53R) and a 
weight of 1 for a 9 mm Suomi submachine gun as reference. The level of hitting probability was 
calculated with field tests, which were in good correspondence with results directly from 
(Keinonen, 1954) transformed to the needed parameters by using methods in [P6, 2008].  
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  Approximation [1954] Average shooters [P6] Good shooters [P6] 
distance (m) Basic hit probability Basic hit probability Basic hit probability 
0 3.89% 4.53% 9.33% 
50 3.82% 4.45% 9.17% 
100 2.66% 3.10% 6.40% 
200 0.94% 1.10% 2.26% 
300 0.68% 0.79% 1.63% 
400 0.57% 0.67% 1.38% 
 
Table 4.2.1 Basic hit probabilities for open terrain 
 
Mortar ammunition data is also needed. The data needed is fragment size and mass distributions 
and the initial velocity of the fragments; furthermore, the angle of hit is needed.  
 
The amount of explosive is 1.72 kg in TNT equivalent. Fragment initial velocity was 1200 m/s, 
height of explosion 0.25 meters and the mass distribution with angles is shown in Table 4.3.2. 
start angle 
(degree) 
end angle 
(degree) 
average mass 
(kg) 
number of 
fragments 
remarks 
0 5 0.03 1 
one big fragment 
forward 
0 10 0.00163 1046 fan of small forward 
65 115 0.00163 5580 effective fan to sides 
170 180 0.00163 349 backward fan 
 
Table 4.2.2 Fragmentation data   
 
The mortar data is the same as used in [P5, 2008]. As we can see from page P5-9 to P5-10, the 
simulated losses from mortar fire have good correspondence with the actual field experiments 
described in the model description and test reports [P5 2008],[P8 2008]. 
 
4.2.3 Gaming in detail 
 
The game starts with two platoons 1 km from each other. The starting situation is shown in 
Figure 4.2.1. The platoons are given orders to advance, which can be seen as a gray line starting 
from the center of the platoons. In a simplified model programmed in this version of Sandis, the 
unit is a circle or, to be exact, seven integration points located in the center and corners of a 
hexagon. Any other configuration of integration points is also possible. 
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Figure 4.2.1 Starting situation 
 
The units start the firefight 16 minutes after starting time. After three minutes of firefight, the 
results are visible. In the second scenario, at this point Red uses mortars against the Blue unit. In 
the first firing, good shooters gain an advantage, as seen in the unit circles: the white area 
represents average losses. 
   
 
 
Figure 4.2.2 Situation after 20 minutes. The mortar is used at right-hand side.   
 
When the game continues, both units suffer losses. The mortar fire is aimed a little behind the 
nearest units to avoid friendly fire casualties on the Red side. Thus the indirect fire affects the 
firefight after some time when the nearest units need their backup.  
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Because the fighting units are distributions, the cumulative results represent the conditional 
probability of shooting by those parts of the distribution that have not been defeated. To do an 
accurate probabilistic risk analysis, different alternatives must be selected as described in P9 and 
P10. In Figure 4.2.3, the basic simulation is conducted to the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3 Game on the map after 30, 40 and 50 minutes. The basic case is on the left. In the 
case on the right, Red carries out a mortar strike. 
 
The simulation results can be seen as average curves as a function of time and as distributions 
for all time steps. In Figure 4.2.4 we can see the unit strength distributions. Actual strength is 
the number of unwounded soldiers and effective strength is the number of soldiers who are not 
wounded or taking care of the wounded. The average actual strength of the good shooter platoon 
is only 9% better, but in effective strengths the difference is 74%. 
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Figure 4.2.4 Strength distributions of both platoons when Red used mortars after 30 minutes 
 
Also, the stochastic nature of the combat becomes visible. The distributions vary from 15 to 25 
soldiers simply due to the random nature of combat. Firing for one minute with two mortars 
turns the tide a bit better for average shooters at this stage.   
 
The average values are also interesting and available as a function of time. In this form,  
different state distributions of the units also become visible. Figure 4.2.5 presents average 
strength as a function of time. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.5 Average values as a function of time (the mortar case). 
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When the shooting starts, the loss rate is highest during the first minutes. For this reason, 
the predictor-corrector method is useful, because it makes possible state transitions to the state 
“take cover” in less than one minute of time. From the results, we can see the effect of mortar 
fire at the 20 minute-point as a sharp edge in the actual strength curve. The expected actual Blue 
strength goes down by 16% due to the combined effect of mortar and rifle fire, but the Blue 
firing strength drops more than 50% as the larger portion of soldiers take cover instead of 
shooting.  
 
From the lower curve we can see the cumulative effect of losses. The Red platoon loses an 
average of 3.6 soldiers (12%) due to accurate fire from the Blue fighters. Medical evacuation 
and first aid double the effect, and almost all the fighters of the rest of the platoon take cover 
during most of the time steps. In the simulation only 10% of the firepower is used against the 
enemy because of suppression and evacuation after casualties. Still the Red firepower forces the 
Blue platoon to also take cover, so according to this model firing back at the enemy is essential.  
To see the probabilities for Blue and Red operation success, failure curves are needed. These are 
used for probabilistic risk analysis and operation success calculations as described in [P10]. 
Fault tree gaming and cluster success analysis are not visible in a game with only one 
operational unit. The failure probability curve shows the probability of being defeated if the 
fight continues. It is a conditional probability, and to get real failure and success values the 
game must be cut to different branches of an event tree. 
  
  
 
Figure 4.2.6 Failure probability curve 
 
When the results are interpreted correctly, after 27 minutes there is a significant probability of 
Red losing the fight. At that moment the game is split into two options: Red escapes and is 
considered defeated. The probability distribution uses values with Red defeated. If Red is not 
defeated, the probabilities in the probability distribution are adjusted to those with Red not 
defeated [P10 p. 51].  
 
The end results with and without mortars are shown in Tables 4.2.3a and 4.2.3b   
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The results show the need to study conditional probabilities and split the game into event 
trees. The computational models can be used to get reasonable probability values for the platoon 
level. When these platoon level results are combined to company level, companies can be used 
in battalion level clusters for failure or success analysis. The overall probability of operation or 
unit mission success becomes available when these sub-clusters are combined. This kind of total 
success probability is considered to be a useful measure of goodness for comparing alternatives, 
not an accurate estimate of the actual success probability. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.3a Probability distribution of end results of the game with infantry weapons only 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.3b Probability distribution of end results of the game with mortar fire 
 
There is an option for probability clusters in Sandis, so the software and models can be used in 
probabilistic success analysis. The leaves of the probability tree are platoon level probabilities, 
which create a total success analysis by combining company level success with platoon level 
clusters. Company level clusters are used at the battalion level and battalion level clusters for 
operation success analysis.  
 
Platoon effectiveness after combat casualties is available in Figures 4.2.4 – 4.2.5. Medical 
evacuation data shows the situation in medical evacuation and treatment units. The current 
situation is available for each simulated minute, as is the cumulative amount of casualties 
treated in all the medical posts during the scenario. The patient queue shows the number of 
casualties waiting for treatment. If the queue is long, the status of the casualties weakens and 
some might even die. This indicates insufficient medical resources supporting the fighting units.      
Time Good shooter platoon Average shooter platoon Time Cumulative probabilities
Probability | fight continues Probability | fight continues Fight continues Good shooters win Average shooters win Both units beaten
27 Beaten 0 % 23,90 %
Operational 100 % 76 % 27 76 % 24 % 0 % 0 %
Game continues with 76% probability
30 Become beaten 25,20 % 58,10 %
Beaten (cumulative) 25,20 % 44,94 %
Operational 74,80 % 55,06 % 30 31,34 % 49,48 % 10,56 % 8,62 %
Game continues with 31% probability
33 Become beaten 51,40 % 83,60 %
Beaten (cumulative) 35,03 % 70,21 %
Operational 64,97 % 29,79 % 33 6,07 % 63,78 % 13,83 % 16,33 %
Game continues with 5,45% probability
36 Become beaten 85,20 % 97,00 %
Beaten (cumulative) 77,22 % 89,93 %
Operational 22,78 % 10,07 % 36 0,14 % 65,02 % 14,30 % 20,54 %
40 Become beaten 94,10 % 99,10 %
Beaten (cumulative) 74,10 % 91,06 % 40
Operational 25,90 % 8,94 % 0,00 % 65,05 % 14,31 % 20,63 %
Time Good shooter platoon Average shooter platoon Time Cumulative probabilities
Probability | fight continues Probability | fight continues Fight continues Good shooters win Average shooters win Both units beaten
27 Beaten 0 % 0 % 23 %
Operational 100 % 77 % 27 77 % 23 % 0 % 0 %
Game continues with 76% probability
30 Become beaten 66,20 % 47,10 %
Beaten (cumulative) 66,20 % 31,03 %
Operational 33,80 % 68,97 % 30 17,88 % 31,34 % 35,02 % 15,76 %
Game continues with 31% probability
33 Become beaten 81,40 % 76,00 %
Beaten (cumulative) 44,97 % 65,20 %
Operational 55,03 % 34,80 % 33 3,42 % 37,76 % 37,82 % 21,00 %
Game continues with 5,45% probability
36 Become beaten 89,90 % 90,90 %
Beaten (cumulative) 81,65 % 73,85 %
Operational 18,35 % 26,15 % 36 0,16 % 38,22 % 38,55 % 23,06 %
40 Become beaten 96,40 % 98,70 %
Beaten (cumulative) 80,39 % 95,03 % 40
Operational 19,61 % 4,97 % 0,00 % 38,25 % 38,56 % 23,19 %
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Figure 4.2.7 Medical treatment unit data. Queues on the right and treatment numbers on the 
left.  
 
In addition to the results directly available from Sandis, a killer-victim scoreboard is also 
created. It includes average losses for all shooter–target pairs and it can be exported to other 
software like a spreadsheet for further analysis. The killer-victim scoreboard is used to see the 
difference between different weapon systems. The effects of friendly fire and the most 
important weapon systems can be seen from the scoreboard.  
 
Firing 
side 
 Firing unit 
 Firing weapon 
class 
 Target 
side 
 Target unit 
 Target weapon 
class 
 Loss 
Red 
 Average shooter 
platoon 
Infantry  Blue  Good shooter platoon  Infantry 18,69 
Red 120 mm mortar WpnSys  Blue  Good shooter platoon  Infantry 2,74 
Blue  Good shooter platoon Infantry  Red 
 Average shooter 
platoon 
 Infantry 22,73 
Red 120 mm mortar WpnSys  Red 
 Average shooter 
platoon 
 Infantry  0.0 
Red 120 mm mortar WpnSys  Blue  Mortar Platoon  Weapon system  0.0 
 
Table 4.2.4 Killer-victim scoreboard. Mortar fire caused average losses of 2.74. The 0.0 losses 
from Red mortar fire indicated that there was a theoretical risk of friendly fire casualties or 
casualties to Blue mortar platoon, but average losses were less than the threshold limit.   
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4.3. Usability of computational models in brigade level 
scenarios - the Sandis software  
 
4.3.1 Miscellaneous publications 
 
There are several publications on the use of Sandis. Sandis was used to gain artillery success 
data for portfolio analysis (Kangaspunta, Lappi, Liesiö, & Salo, 2008) on the basis of Janne 
Laitonen’s simulations (Laitonen, 2008), in which a battle group with a strong battalion with 
supporting artillery attacked a mechanized battalion. There were variations in weapon types and 
numbers, and the results could be used in portfolio analysis.     
 
During the International Date Farming Workshop (IDFW) 18 arranged by Naval Postgraduate 
School, Sandis was used in a civilian crisis situation. (Heath, Dolk, Lappi, Sheldon, & Yu, 
2009). Medical evacuation after a train accident was studied, and the medical evacuation model 
was found useful in evacuation logistics analysis. 
 
Another type of study was written by Capt. Pekka Puotiainen in staff officers’ course EUK 61. 
In his thesis (Puotiainen, 2009) discussed the use of the Sandis tool as part of operational 
planning. As a result, Puotiainen considers that Sandis can be used in brigade level operation 
analysis, but software engineering and documentation are still under construction. 
 
4.3.2 The 3rd International Sandis workshop  
The third international Sandis workshop was held in September 2009 in Valkeakoski. During 
the workshop, four different cases were calculated. The following is based on workshop 
proceedings (Hämäläinen, Lappi, & Åkesson, 3rd International Sandis Workshop, 2009). Four 
different cases were simulated. The first case was static analysis, because the target unit did not 
shoot back at the shooting units. The other three cases were dynamic, in which a fight between 
Red and Blue units was simulated in a war gaming situation. Thus the results depend on the 
tactics selected by the players.  
 
Case 1. Static Analysis of Artillery Alternatives. 
By Bernt Åkesson 
 
Dr. Bernt Åkesson studied the effectiveness of artillery weapons in his workshop tutorial and 
presented the use of indirect fire models in statistical analysis. In his study, the results clearly 
showed the relative effectiveness of MRSI with artillery units starting the firing “direct to 
impact”. In this study, the platoons were set on the map as targets for artillery fire. The model 
with units taking cover was found useful for studying differences between simultaneous and 
traditional use of ammunition.  
 
  46 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1 Results from 3rd International Sandis Workshop by Dr. Åkesson. (Figure 5.3 from 
original publication) 
 
The simulation time for this kind of static analysis was an hour, because parameter data for 
artillery was available. As the artillery model has been in good correspondence with the test 
results [P5], the indirect fire model is useful in artillery studies. 
 
Case 2. Suitability of Sandis Software to Small Scale Military Problems – A Case Study: 
Does the Use of Mortar Reduce Convoy Vulnerability in an Asymmetric Warfare 
Situation? 
By Anna Lindberg, Tuomas Liukko, Juha Arpiainen and Juhani Hämäläinen 
 
In the second case, convoy vulnerability was tested. The units were squad level and a goal was 
to test the Sandis software in a small-scale simulation setting. The situation is presented in 
Figure 4.3.2.  
The ambushing Red had 2 Cells with 6 men each, 4xRPG-7 (light anti-tank weapon) and 6 
assault rifles per cell, 1 Cell with 6 men, two 81 mm mortars, 6 assault rifles. Red had off-road 
vehicles, mines of model TMA4 (anti-tank mine), remote control firing systems, explosives 
(TNT) and basic communication equipment (radios or similar). 
The Blue convoy consisted of 5 Infantry fighting vehicles, 2 main battle tanks, 2 fuel trucks, 12 
other trucks and mortar vehicles in an alternative formation of the simulated scenario. 
  
The difference between the two simulated alternatives materialized after 14 minutes of fighting, 
when Blue gained situation awareness and could start using the mortars effectively. One clear 
difference with the Blue mortars was the ability to counter Red’s 81 mm mortars with accurate 
120 mm Blue mortar fire. As a final conclusion, the mortars turned out to be useful to convoy 
security. 
 
The computational models used in this game were the indirect fire model, direct fire model and 
advanced integration. Distributions and success probability calculations were not used. The 
computational models were useful in this case, but the limitations of the software meant that the 
units had to be circular, and this was found to be a problem. As a remark, the circular unit 
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formation can be changed to any other shape with little software engineering. As a further 
task, a feature should be implemented in the software to enable the use of different shapes 
without the need for Java coding. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2 Convoy and guerillas. The original figure was: “Figure 4.1: The formation of the 
convoy at the 7th minute, after entering the minefield.” 
 
 
Case 3. A Study on Different Tactics for Repelling an Airborne Landing 
 
By Bernt M. Åkesson (team leader), Linus Bosaeus, Juuso Österman, Risto Bruun and Jussi 
Sainio 
In this case an airmobile Red battalion is landing on the west side of a river in order to take a 
bridge defended by a separate infantry company. A Blue mechanized battalion with supporting 
artillery is making a counterattack in order to keep the bridge. Due to the location of the 
artillery, it has to move to a new position in order to support the mechanized battalion in the 
counterattack. The alternatives were to counterattack immediately without artillery support or 
after a delay with artillery support. All pictures are copied from the original proceedings. 
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Figure 4.3.3 Blue battalion attacking from south to north, Red airborne landing on Tarsavaara. 
Local company withdrawing to north. 
 
The units in the game were a Blue infantry company (local guard), a mechanized infantry 
battalion, and an artillery battery. Red had a mechanized battalion with fewer vehicles due to 
hard landing conditions. 
 
The combat time of the simulated fight was 19 hours. The first part of the fight is the Blue local 
company defending the bridge against the landed Red. At this time, the Blue battalion is starting 
attack preparations. Blue can launch an unprepared attack four hours earlier than an artillery-
supported prepared attack. During these four hours, Red can bring reinforcements to Tarsavaara, 
strengthening the enemy forces. 
 
The simulated time was 19 hours and two alternatives were calculated. The workshop time for 
simulations was three workdays, so battalion level calculations can be done in a reasonable 
time. In these scenarios, probabilistic success analysis was not used, and the success analysis 
was based on average losses in Table 4.3.1. In a research environment, more time should be 
spent on these kinds of problems with more options for Red, including at least the worst Red 
action against our plan and the most probable one. The probabilistic approach would show risks 
and help in sensitivity analysis.         
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Table 4.3.1 Results of attack with and without artillery 
 
 
Case 4. Cost Effectiveness Study of Indirect Fire Systems 
By Peter Rindstål, Kosti Jokinen, Esa Lappi and Juho Rutila 
 
In the scenario with different ammunition and indirect fire systems were compared with main 
battle tanks and the results were used to demonstrate cost-effectiveness studies with Sandis. In 
the scenario, the Blue battalion is attacking the Kemijärvi airstrip. The defending company is 
kept in defensive positions, but the Blue unit had three variations to support the attack with the 
same imaginary cost: Tank Company, Mortar Company with anti-tank guided ammunition and 
Mortar Company with cargo ammunition. The starting situation of the war game is shown in 
Figure 4.3.4.  
 
In the game, some problems occur with anti-tank weapon parameters, but in this situation 120 
mm mortars were better against mechanized infantry compared to main battle tanks, because in 
the forest the tanks could not use their main gun before coming into the range of infantry anti-
tank weapons. The mortars were able to support the attacking battalion during the whole 
scenario. Because the Red armor capability had the same problems as the Blue main battle 
tanks, the guided anti-tank ammunition for mortars did not provide a significant advantage to 
infantry anti-tank weapons, but cargo ammunition was effective against both Red infantry and 
infantry fighting vehicles.        
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Figure 4.3.4 Starting situation of the war game 
 
The models were easy to use in a battalion level scenario. The differences between alternatives 
could be analyzed by using the indirect fire model. The infantry fight in the forest seems to 
work properly, also.  As earlier, the three days available in the workshop was not to analyze 
tactical alternatives, such as Red gaming or a proper probabilistic approach. 
 
Further work could include the validation of the calculated results in the field and with other 
simulation tools. 
 
4.3.3. Example of the implementation process of the models using tactical 
simulator “Sandis”. 
 
The computational models were implemented in the Sandis software, which also features other 
models and solutions that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. The modeling of the Sandis 
tool emerged from the expressed needs of the Defense Forces. During planning, an almost 
permanent task is the comparison of different alternatives, using techniques such as cost effect 
analysis. The development of Sandis started from an analysis of the simulation tool 
requirements and of the combat environment in which the tool was intended to be used. This 
preliminary analysis was in certain instances performed with inadequate resources, which gave 
rise to difficulties in the succeeding phases. After the question and environment were clear, the 
models available were studied and the need for independent analysis was discussed. During this 
phase, earlier tools and models were used and the first mathematical models implemented using 
Matlab or spreadsheet tools. 
 
Software engineering started in 2005, when conscript scientist Teemu Murtola programmed the 
first Matlab version, where all Blue and Red unit strengths were calculated against all Red and 
Blue strengths using the method described by (Kangas & Lappi, An Example of Markovian 
Combat Modeling, 2004). In this way the fight between two probability distributions was tested 
and found to be feasible for use in a simulation tool.  
 
With the stochastic model initially coded by Teemu Murtola, the probability of a single entity 
getting hit in a platoon level unit is needed for formula (3.4). The combat losses inflicted on a 
platoon or squad by another shooting platoon or squad with infantry weapons were studied 
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experimentally by the Finnish Defence Forces during the 1950s (Keinonen, 1954). As 
forest conditions and bullets have not changed since that time, Lappi and Pottonen [P6 2006] 
created the necessary parameters for the model from the data on the test shootings from the 
1950s.  
 
In order to estimate the accuracy of the old data, Lappi, Mäki & Vulli [P7 2008] tested the 
results by using live and simulated fire and compared them to the other tests with simulators. 
The test data was in good compliance with earlier studies. Because reasonable parameters were 
available, the computational method could be used. The time step was selected to be one minute 
and platoon size units can be studied for direct fire combat analysis. 
 
The Sandis tool and the models in it were developed using a feedback cycle, in which the needs 
of the customer, the necessary model resolution and presentation of the results were repeated. 
The models and accuracy of the results evolved during the test process. The parameters usually 
improve after modeling during the years when the model is used.  
 
In the Sandis work, the software engineering starts with first models. The programmed draft 
version of the software model decreased the time needed for testing and the preliminary 
methods give results for the customers, thus ensuring that the code fits the most important 
customer requirements. During the final software phase, the model and tool are usually tested 
and validated. 
 
After the models are completed and software engineering done, the research questions can be 
studied using a war gaming procedure. Since part of the war gaming has been done already in 
the testing phase, work on real analysis can begin sooner. During the war gaming, the selected 
scenarios are simulated in order to compare alternatives. The relative difference is used for 
decision analysis. A procedure for using Sandis results was published by (Kangaspunta, Lappi, 
Liesiö, & Salo, 2008) and use of the models in a specific new software and simulation by 
(Laitinen & Lappi, 2008). Another public study of Sandis is the 3rd international Sandis 
workshop proceedings (Hämäläinen, Lappi, & Åkesson, 3rd International Sandis Workshop, 
2009). A non-military simulation was made in IDFW18 (Heath, Dolk, Lappi, Sheldon, & Yu, 
2009). 
 
An example of modeling and medical model development is briefly described in order to show 
the time needed for model upgrades of the Sandis tool. 
 
The created platoon level medical evacuation model was programmed as a part of the Sandis software in Summer 2006. The model 
and Sandis software were presented to Medical General Pentti Kuronen in January 2007. After the presentation, further analysis was 
required by General Kuronen. Mr. Kari Stenius from SOTLK became the contact person between the PVTT modeling and software 
team and the military medical establishment. The needs were discussed during a five-day simulation exercise in February 2007. The 
first computational model was created and the software project plan was ready in March 2007. Software engineering started in June 
after a one-week military exercise for parameter estimation. During the exercise, the details were discussed and the final version of 
the mathematical model written for software engineering. Software engineering was performed by Sami Mäki during the Summer 
2007 and also by Santtu Pajukanta in August 2007. A presentation of Sandis with the new model was held for the military medical 
establishment in September 2007 and the results were published at the 2nd Nordic Military Operation Analysis Symposium in 
November 2008 [P4].      
 
In general, as in the medical example, a half-year process is needed to create a new sub-model in the Sandis or similar tool. Usually, 
the steps start from the needs of the customer, which can be for example purchasing or planning military organization. This input is 
process time t=0. 
1) Modeling phase starts; after preliminary study there is a second discussion with the customer (t= 0-1 months) 
2) Parameter evaluation at least for modeling purposes (t = 0-1 months…years) 
3) Test coding with Matlab or Excel (t=1-2 months) 
4) Programming as a part of Sandis (t=3-5 months) 
5) Verification of software and test use (5-6 months) 
6) Validating parameter data and model with new customer needs during the usage phase (6 months…years) 
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Parameter estimation is a never-ending process, as weapon systems and tactics develop all the time. The models also need to be 
upgraded during the years of use. For example, the current artillery model [P5] has evolved with three different steps. There are 
many topics for future research to improve different models in the September 09 version of Sandis. So far the immediate needs of 
PVTT’s customers have been selected to the top of the to-do list.     
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Simulation software needs mathematical models. The models presented in this thesis are useful 
for three reasons. They can be programmed as a part of simulation software [P1], there are ways 
to obtain parameters for them [P5, P6, P7] and although the validation process is not complete, 
they seem to give reasonable and useful results.  
 
The first requirement, usability in software, is proved with the existence of the Sandis tool and 
Laitinen’s and Kaasinen’s works  (Laitinen & Lappi, 2008), (Lappi & Kaasinen, Genetic 
optimization of tactical parameters in Sandis Combat simulator, 2008).  
 
There are preliminary parameters for a platoon size firefight. They are based on the literature 
and field tests. The medical evacuation simulation does not currently have the best parameters, 
but even with preliminary parameters it gives a better understanding of the combat effectiveness 
of different units and the differences between different medical evacuation alternatives. Data 
farming could be used in order to see whether differences in the parameters cause significant 
differences in the results.  
 
For the indirect fire model [P5], good parameters have been obtained and the field test partly 
validated the model and used parameters of the indirect fire model [P7] [P8].  
 
In the published situations, the software seems to give good enough results for comparative 
analysis (Hämäläinen, Lappi, & Åkesson, 3rd International Sandis Workshop, 2009). In the 
comparative analysis, the research question and the parameters and the model for the question 
should be accurate and the other parts of the battlefield good enough to provide a reasonable 
background for comparative cases.   
 
The mathematical models seem to work properly with the Sandis tool and the models have been 
used in the analysis of tactical scenarios. But there are numerous problems with the use of 
models and Sandis software: parameters, role of game players, the long and labor-intensive time 
needed for analysis and the software engineering. There is a need for further studies, such as on 
models for urban environments, vehicle model parameter testing and improvements concerning 
the terrain effects of indirect fire. 
 
The parameters for the models are still partly inaccurate; for example, the parameters for the 
medical treatment model are still the first estimates used in the September 2009 version of 
Sandis. All new equipment must have their parameters, so constant work is required to update 
the parameter files; this work has just started. Parameter management can be performed with 
Luomu software (Hämäläinen, Hierarchical Parameter Structures for Military Operational 
Analysis, 2008). 
 
The role of the game players is essential for the results. If the forces are not used in a reasonable 
way and invalid tactics are employed, the results from the computational models can be badly 
biased even in comparative analysis. Thus, a log of user actions is an essential part of the use of 
the models and any tactical software.  
The time needed for analysis is rather long, and includes the work of the simulating team. The 
picture from Dr. Åkesson (Fig. 5.1) shows the time and labor needed in Sandis scenarios 
compared to real time when using platoon level units as the smallest entities.   
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Figure 5.1 Time needed for Sandis analysis. The value of 1 for a battalion indicates that a one-
day battle will take one day to be simulated by Sandis. The variations (recalculation of the same 
basic scenario with some differences) for comparative analysis take half of the time. (Figure by 
Dr. Bernt Åkesson.) 
 
The time-consuming gaming part of the simulation process is a clear limitation in the use of 
tactical simulators like Sandis. At this stage, the presented mathematical methods are 
numerically fast enough for the simulation process, as most of the time is used for moving the 
units on the map according to the tactical manuscript. 
 
War gaming is labor intensive and needs both tactical and engineering experts during the 
procedure. For example, three alternatives for a brigade level battle lasting one week take about 
12 man-weeks of work.  
 
In this thesis, a computational model for a platoon or squad as the smallest entity was created. In 
future studies, there will be a need for parameters and gaming procedures for different 
environments. Good enough versions of some essential models are still required, e.g. urban 
terrain models and, for example, some parameters for vehicle duels.  
 
Some of this future work can be achieved using a two-stage approach, where for example tank 
duels are first simulated with FLAMES or other platform entity level simulations and the results 
are taken into the Sandis simulation. If the data from more detailed simulations is not available 
before Sandis simulations, the needed two-stage simulation time can be much longer than the 
estimates in Figure 5.1.  
 
Practical work at headquarters and in the research community requires recorded results from 
other simulators and databanks containing many calculated scenarios and ready to use examples 
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to be used as starting points for new users and in time-sensitive situations. The library of 
different scenarios and parameter tables are to be included in further work. 
 
Although most models are working properly in Sandis, software engineering is also one of the 
future tasks. A master’s thesis by Juho Rutila suggests a new architecture for Sandis (Rutila, 
2009), but the new version of Sandis had not been programmed yet by summer of 2010. 
Furthermore, many subprograms and models have not been optimized with software 
engineering.  
 
On the other hand, the computational models have been used to calculate results for different 
scenarios. These computational models provide a new tool for the Finnish military operation 
analysis environment. The models can be used in tactical analysis and operational planning, and 
it is hoped that they will also serve as a tool for teaching tactics and tactical thinking. 
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Abstract 
Sandis is an operation analysis tool which has been created in Finnish Defence Forces Technical 
Research Centre (PVTT) since the year 2002 and with co-operation with FFI since 2006. It can be 
used for cost-effect and tactical analysis from platoon to brigade level and is used in PVTT.  
The man in the loop is responsible for tactical decisions and Sandis calculates combat losses, 
ammunition consumption and medical evacuation process. 
Sandis is based on state machines, Markovian combat modelling and has fault tree analysis for 
combat operation success probability calculations. The results from Sandis are the strength 
distributions of the units and operation success probability as well as a killer –victim –scoreboard 
and medical situation average values. 
 Weapon models are based on peace-time field tests and literature.  
1. Introduction 
Sandis is a military operational analysis tool for comparative analysis. The work to create an 
operational analysis tool started in 2002 in Finnish Defense Forces Technical Research Center 
(PVTT) and Sandis has been used since 2005 for combat analysis, from platoon versus platoon up 
to brigade versus brigade level. Norwegian FFI has been involved with Sandis since 2006, and 
the radio communication and EW model is the “CalcRadio” from FFI.   
The input of the tool is 1) weapon and communication characteristics, 2) units and their weapons, 
3) fault logic for units and operation success, 4) map and 5) user actions for units in company or 
platoon level.  
The output is 1) the operation success probability [13] and for each minute time step, 2) 
probability for each unit been at state beaten, 3) unit strength distributions, 4) average combat 
losses and the killer-victim scoreboard, 5) ammunition consumption, 6) radio network availability 
and 7) medical evacuation logistics and treatment capacity analysis. 
Sandis has been used for scenario-based comparative analysis, in which a scenario with red and 
blue forces has been calculated with different alternatives, for example an attack with or without 
electronic warfare support or cargo ammunitions for artillery. The differences, not the absolute 
values of results, have been studied for cost-effect analysis or the analysis of different operation 
alternatives.  
2. Model description 
2.1 Overall calculation principles 
Sandis uses Markovian combat modeling [1] and is a state machine -based operation analysis 
tool. The strengths of the units are probability distributions and combat losses are modeled as loss 
probabilities which cause state transitions of the individual soldiers. Thus the results are 
distributions of strengths, not a single value. 
If for example an artillery fire causes average losses of 5% to a 10 soldiers unit, the result in Sandis is a 
binomial distribution of unit strengths with parameters p=95% and n=10 as in table 1. 
Unit strength 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Probability 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.006% 0.096% 1.048% 7.463% 31.51% 59.87% 
 
Table 1. Unit strength distribution for 10 soldiers after 5% average casualties.    
When two platoons have a duel, all combinations (30 versus 30, 30 versus 29 etc.) are calculated 
and weighted with their probabilities to form the strength distributions for the next time step.  
The platoon level combatants have their own state machine shown in figure 1 and all combatants 
with the same state are treated equally. 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Combatant state machine 
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Ready to shoot 
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Move&shoot 
move 
The platoons can be equipped with radios, jamming devices and “weapons”, which have different 
categories: infantry weapons, weapon system, truck, light tank (or infantry fighting vehicle) and 
main battle tank. Weapon system category is for e.g. mortars and guns, truck for unarmored 
vehicles and tank categories for armored vehicles. 
For each direct fire weapon a distance-based hit probability is given for each target category, as 
well as the probability of kill if a hit occurs. The hit probabilities for each weapon depend also on 
the states of the shooter and the target, the terrain and the fortification level of the units. 
The units also have communication states, and there is an option for action states (attack, defend, 
move etc.). These are used for unit action analysis. 
2.2. Infantry light weapon model 
In the infantry light weapon model two models are considered: aimed fire and area fire. The basic 
hit probabilities are calculated for a shot as a function of distance, terrain, fortification and unit 
state. [2] For each light infantry weapon a hit probability is calculated using formula 
P(hit|n shots) = 1- (1- P(hit| one shot))
n
. 
The area fire hit probability per shot is vulnerable area divided by the total area. For a single 
soldier this can be for example 0.2 m
2
 vulnerable area / (3m height times 200m width).    
The aimed fire hit probability is given as a function of distance for each weapon and each target 
action state. The number of shots for each target is distributed between the action states so that 
the firing enemy soldiers are the primary targets with a larger number of shots than the soldiers in 
take cover –state.  
To give a simplified example, let us consider a case where a group of 30 soldiers is the target of 600 
bullets. The soldiers are divided to states shooting (10 soldiers) and take cover (20 soldiers). Then, for 
example, 500 bullets are aimed at the shooters (50 each) and 100 for those taking cover (5 each). Let the 
single shot hit probabilities be p(hit|target a shooter) = 1% and p(hit|target takes cover) = 0,1%.       
P(a shooter gets a hit) =  1- (1- P(target a shooter))
n
 = 1- (1- 0.01))
50
 = 39,5% 
P(hit in a state take cover) = 1- (1- P(hit| one shot))
n 
= 1- (1- 0.001))
5
 = 0,5%. 
So the shooters have 39,5% losses and binomial distribution with expected value of 6 and those who take 
cover suffer insignificant losses. The losses of the platoon will be 4/30 = 13%. 
2.3 Indirect fire model 
In the indirect fire model ammunition characteristics, weapon and fire control deviations and the 
target’s positions are considered. The first part of the deviation is due to the targeting and the 
second from the weapon-ammunition combination used. The fragment hit probability and 
pressure damage probability are calculated as function of distance from the hit point of the 
ammunition. The probability of a fragment hit hit is the product P(ammunition hitting point x) * 
P(target at point y) * P(hit by fragment| target in y and hit point x) (Figure 2). 
  
 Figure 2 Artillery model 
The fragment hit model uses the fragment distribution from [3]. The pressure model is based on 
the TNT equivalent from chemical engineering [4]. The target platoon is divided into a group of 
target points, and an adaptive integration method is used to calculate hit probabilities inside the 
ammunitions effective radius. The model has been validated for mortars in field tests [5]. 
2.4 The soldier state transitions and medical model. 
The state transitions from operational to wounded result directly from the casualty models. Then 
for each wounded soldier n1 soldiers are transferred to state give first aid for a time  t1. Then n2 
soldiers assist to evacuate the wounded to the collection point with time t2, and then the 
evacuation team returns to the fighting formation in average time t3. Parameter values n1=1, t1=5 
min, n2=2, t2=30 min, and t3=20min were determined during one of the field exercise studies by 
major Jari Sormunen. [6] [7]. 
Soldiers under fire have to take cover. There is a rule of thumb from the Second World War: 50% 
casualties in a minute stop all combat action. [8] A partly linear and partly exponential model has 
been created to fit this rule and the risk of getting hit determines the percentage of soldiers taking 
cover. Another solution could be to calculate optimal state transitions by using genetic algorithms 
[9].     
When the wounded reach the evacuation point, the medical evacuation model starts. The 
wounded are grouped in to four categories: minor wounds, mid-state wounds, major wounds and 
dead or hopeless. 
Medical units are devided into “connection type” evacuation units and treatment units. The 
treatment units are arranged in a hierarchy, where patients are gradually transported from 
company-level treatment units to battalion-level and so forth. Each have three slots for the four 
classes of combat casualties: awaiting treatment, in treatment and awaiting transport to the next 
level treatment unit. The medical unit parameters are the number of patients in each category it 
can give treatment to and the respective average treatment times. A queue forms if the number of 
wounded exceeds the treatment capacity or the capacity of the evacuation unit transporting the 
wounded to the next level of treatment.  
Probability of hitting point x from deviations 
Probability of fragment hitting  
target y | ammo hitting point x 
Probability of the target being in point y. 
Evacuation connections have parameters for transporting time and the number of wounded the 
connection can transfer. 
There are state transition parameters for wounds getting worse in absence of treatment during the 
evacuation and treatment process. Thus for example the difference in number of dead can be 
compared with different evacuation alternatives. 
2.5 EW and communication –model 
The communications and usability of EW are calculated with Norwegian (FFI) CalcRadio [10]. 
Using CalcRadio, the state of each unit’s VHF communications is then calculated:  
State 1. Unit has communications to supporting artillery and superiors as well as between 
the platoons of the unit. 
State 2. Unit loses  
a) command connections or  
b) supporting artillery 
State 3.  Unit has no communications between the platoons. 
The effect of the communication state on the combat is decided by the operator, i.e. “the man in 
the loop”. In state 2a the unit does not react to enemy action not spotted by the unit, in 2b there is 
a delay to supporting artillery and mechanized units move with extremely low speed in state 3, 
for example.   
3. Software implementation 
3.1 Subprograms 
Sandis can use the separate parameter management tool Luomu by Insta Defsec. The parameters 
and their sources are stored in the Luomu database. [11] 
Another subprogram is the troops editor for creating the military organizations used in the 
simulation. Units and their weapons and equipment are stored in xml format to be used in the 
wargames..  
The software component for the actual combat gaming is called the “map” program. The units are 
placed on a map, their movement and use of firepower are given as input. Combat losses, medical 
evacuation effectiveness, killer-victim scoreboard, use of ammunition and state of the 
communication connections are produced as the output.  
3.2 Creating a scenario and the gaming 
The use of Sandis requires information about the probable combat situation. The blue units and 
blue battle plan and the red units and the red plan are considered as a basis for the analysis. The 
goals of the operation are considered, and the units’ fault logics are set to follow the operation 
success logic. The unit movements and the use of weapon systems must be considered for each 
company. The overall combat decisions form a background for analysis and can be later revisited 
when revising the feedback from the simulated results.  
The unit losses cause automatic action in the platoon level, but other combat actions require the 
man in the loop. For example, one could first simulate only the first 30 minutes, and then study 
the results before continuing. If the actions of some unit are not realistic, the simulation is backed 
up to the point where the unrealistic behavior emerges, the unit’s actions corrected and the 
simulation continued again. The gaming is a sequence of simulation, results analysis and 
readjustments. 
The gaming is repeated with different actions or parameters to perform comparative analysis.          
3.3 The analysis of the results 
The fastest values gained for comparative analysis are the overall success probabilities of the 
operation and combat losses. The results can be studied in detail for each time step (one minute) 
and the overall scenario results. The result from a simulation coud be, for example, that with the 
support of weapon system A the enemy losses were 4,2%, our own losses 2,1% and the operation 
success probability 62%, but without system A enemy losses were 3,4%, our own losses 3,1% 
and the operation success probability 23%. Usually the difference, not the individual results 
themselves, is used for further analysis. 
The results can be exported to a spreadsheet editor for further analysis. The data contains detailed 
information about all losses: the shooting platoon, the shooting weapon system, the target platoon 
and the target type. The data shows which weapon systems caused the losses (e.g. Mortars 20%, 
artillery 62%, direct fire from tanks 11%, infantry light weapons 7%). Evacuation and 
ammunition consumption are also considered.  
The results can also be used for operation planning. We have two alternatives for operation 
calculated with Sandis. The results are used to help the decision maker to decide between the 
options and improvements to the plan for, for example, the use of supporting artillery between 
different targets or the allocation of resources for medical evacuation. 
3.4. Some cases 
There are two different types of cost effect analysis. In dynamic cases we want to see the effects 
of the studied weapon systems to the whole combat environment and the operation success 
probabilities. In static cases we just compare different shooter target alternatives with different 
weapon systems. 
Sandis has been used in dynamic, brigade level combat analysis since 2006. For example, there 
have been defensive cases with a battalion versus a brigade, a counter-attack with a mechanized 
battle group using different kinds of artillery and EW configurations for cost effect analysis. An 
example has been the MATINE project [12], where Sandis was used as a battle simulator in 
dynamic analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 Example of dynamic calculation used in portfolio analysis [12].  
An example of static calculation is indirect fire. The predicted losses in a target spread in a 500m 
x 700m area are shown in Figure . The pie charts show the average survival probabilities in the 
target area. Detailed distributions of strengths are also calculated. 
 Figure 4 A study on the effects of artillery fire to a 700m x 500m target. A full red circle is 
at 100% strength. 
4. Conclusions 
There is a novel operation analysis tool available for comparative analysis. The software is still 
under construction and has to date been used only as a tool for researchers. In spite of its 
limitations, Sandis has been used by the Finnish Defense Forces since 2006. It has been useful in 
comparative analysis for peacetime acquisition problems. It has also been tested to support the 
military training of staff officers. The first experiences are promising and Sandis will be used in 
military exercises in the future.  
The use of Sandis for operational planning in brigade headquarters is unclear. There is also an 
ongoing research work on the topic at the National Defense University 2008-2009 Staff officers’ 
course by captain Puotiainen. 
In conclusion, Sandis appears a promising tool for brigade level comparative analysis. 
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Abstract 
Usually combat simulations are based on the classical Euler method. Better predictor-corrector 
methods such as Heun’s method are not usually considered in combat simulations. The suggested 
method uses Heun’s method augmented with weapon specific weighting of the predictor and 
corrector steps to solve the differential equations in simulating combat. The method can be 
implemented in the Sandis combat simulator [1][2]. 
Sandis calculates using a time step of one minute, while in actual combat changes can take place 
in just a few seconds. Decreasing the time step increases the amount of time to run the simulation, 
while many models do not scale to arbitrarily short time steps or the available test data for 
parameters has been collected on a much coarser time resolution. The presented predictor-
corrector method can model sub- time step phenomena without decreasing the time step, being 
easy to implement in existing simulators such as Sandis. 
As an example a test case involving mortar fire is considered. The AMOS advanced mortar 
system and a traditional mortar company were compared in a simulation using Sandis. The 
resulting expected casualty rates after a one minute strike in open terrain are presented in the table 
below. 
Calculation Method AMOS Mortar 
Euler 28 % 28 % 
Weapon-selective Heun 27 % 25 % 
Keywords 
Combat models, Sandis, differential equations, step size. 
1. Introduction 
Combat simulation can be considered as numerically solving an ordinary differential equation or, 
to be more precise, a system of differential equations. In combat simulations time is usually the 
independent variable, and we want to calculate combat losses and the end position of the troops, 
which are the dependent variables. The parameters are, for example, hit probabilities as a function 
of distance, terrain, weather, the amount of losses per hit or probability of a kill if there is a hit, 
and lots of technical parameters for the weapons and vehicles in the combat model. As a result we 
have a system of differential equations with lots of variables and parameters.  
 
The initial values are the locations of the military units and their missions and tactics used in the 
battle. The solution shows what happens during the simulated combat and what the end situation 
is. When different tactical manoeuvres, the map and use of different weapon combinations are 
considered, an analytical solution of a combat situation is practically impossible as is a general 
solution of such system of differential equations. However, a simulated solution or a realisation of 
the situation becomes available. The tactics and optimal use and configuration of different 
weapon systems can use “man in the loop” -methods, in which a human player makes some of the 
judgements during the simulation or changes the original simulation using information from the 
previous events of the ongoing simulation. 
 
During the simulation, the lines of sight, speeds, locations, use of weapon systems etc. are 
calculated for a definite situation. The initial situation starts to change as a function of time. After 
every time step we have a new situation, which is the beginning of the next step. The combat 
losses, movements, locations etc. are changed and the next time step is calculated using the new 
values of the combat variables. If the differences between actions of the troops, their locations 
and other combat variables are little, the error with constant variables during the time step is not a 
problem, but if the combat variables change rapidly and the values at the beginning of the time 
step differ significantly from those at the starting point, the simulated values don’t fit reality. 
Mathematically speaking, the Euler method can have a significant error. 
 
Metteri [10] and Lempiäinen [9] wrote about the state of art in Finnish combat simulation 
environment and when the simulation methods were studied, mathematically speaking only Euler 
method is used. Thus there exists a need for improvements. 
2. Numerical Methods for Ordinary Differential equations 
2.1. Basic formulas 
Numerous methods exist for solving differential equations numerically. The basic methods, Euler, 
Heun and Runge-Kutta and their error formulas can be found in almost all mathematical 
textbooks with differential equations. [3, p 942-950][4][5]. For brevity, only the principles and 
basic error analysis is shown here. 
We want to find the function y(t), when the differential equation  
),( tyf
dt
dy
       (1) 
and the initial value y(t0) are given.  
 
In all methods, the calculation starts with the initial value, and the differences are then calculated 
using equation (1) first at the point (y(t0),t0) and then at the next point, which will be the previous 
point + the differences. The methods have different ways to estimate the differences in y during 
the time step t. The function y can be multi-valued, in which case y(t0) is a vector. 
 
In Euler method the difference y is calculated directly from equation (1): 
 
ttyfy
t
y
tyf
dt
dy
),(),(    (2) 
 
and the formula for the subsequent values yn+1 =  y(tn+1) = y(tn+ t) is 
 
yn+1 = yn + t  f(yn, tn).      (3) 
 
The Heun’s method (improved Euler) corrects the results using a predictor value: 
 
y*n+1 = yn + t  f(yn, tn).     (4a) 
yn+1 = yn + ½  t   [ f(yn, tn) + f(y*n+1 , tn+1)]   (4b) 
 
The classical fourth order Runge-Kutta (RK4) method uses 4 values to calculate each step. In the 
formula the first value is calculated as with Euler, but then other values are used. RK4 calculates 
4 estimates for the differences of y during one time step, and calculates a weighted average of 
them as the final step: 
 
k1  =  t   f(    yn             ,   tn      )   Euler step  (5a)  
k2  = t   f( yn,+½ k1  , tn+ ½ t ) Step to midpoint (5b) 
k3  = t   f( yn,+½ k2  , tn+ ½ t ) Second midpoint (5c) 
k4  = t   f( yn,+  k3   , tn + t )  Step using endpoint (5d) 
yn+1 = yn + )22( 43216
1 kkkk  Final step  (5e) 
 
RK4 and other Runge-Kutta methods are widely used in mathematics and engineering. 
2.2. Time steps and error analysis 
The error of the basic Euler method is of the first order, Heun’s of the second order, and RK4 of 
the fourth order. The error formula includes the assumption that the function f is differentiable 
and the values of the second or fourth derivative do not change rapidly. 
 
If that condition holds, the error can be estimated using simulated values. The simulation is 
calculated with time step 2 t with a result y** and t with a result y*. When the step size 
doubles, the error becomes approximately 16 times larger for RK4 and 4 times larger for Heun’s 
method. Thus we have simple error formulas for both RK4 (6a) and Heun’s method (6b). 
 
 *)**(
15
1 yy        (6a) 
 *)**(
3
1 yy        (6b) 
 
If we calculate these two values and the approximate error is less than our error tolerance, we 
have a short enough time step. Because shorter time steps lead to longer simulation times, it is 
desirable to keep the time step as long as possible. An optimal step size yields the desired 
accuracy with minimal computing time. Modern programmatic solvers use adaptive methods to 
optimise the step size during the calculation. [3, p. 959-951] 
2.3 The special features of combat simulation 
When a combat simulation program has been written, the mathematical idea of the simulation is 
in principle rather simple. All knowledge of the units and their tactics and weapons are included 
in the function f and we just solve a differential equation (1) numerically. The simulation and all 
combat effects develop step be step by the rules defined in the simulation code. Thus the use of 
more accurate mathematical methods should not be a problem. 
 
In actual combat, the action of the unit can change in one or two seconds, or it might take hours 
depending on the unit size and equipment. For example, when an ambushing unit starts to shoot at 
the enemy, the situation changes and so do all the values of function f in the combat simulation. 
Thus the function f  is not differentiable at those situations and basic error analysis for differential 
equations cannot be applied. Thus the traditional methods and their step size controls are not 
directly usable.  
 
To avoid this problem, we present a modified Heun’s method with weapon selective weights for 
the start- and end point values for each time step. The formula for the weapon selective predictor 
corrector method is: 
 
y*n+1 = yn + t  f(yn, tn).      (7a) 
yn+1 = yn +   t   [ ws  fi(yn, tn) +  we fi(y*n+1 , tn+1)],   (7b) 
 
where ws is the weight of starting point of the time step and we the weight of the end point of the 
time step; ws + we =1. Weights are calculated using field tests and other simulations. 
 
If e.g. an artillery unit fires grenades so that all the ammunition hits the target at the starting point 
of the time step, all the combat damage is calculated using the state of the troops at the starting 
point of the time step: ws = 1 and we = 0. If the same amount of ammunition hits the target during 
the whole time step, the troops can take cover during the time step. This can be incorporated into 
the integration algorithm by using weapon selective weights at both ends of the time step, 
corresponding to the distribution of the weapon’s effects along the time step.   
3. Example 
Consider a simulation comparing an advanced mortar system (AMOS) company and a traditional 
mortar company, both firing 96 120mm grenades at an infantry company. We wish to calculate 
the loss probability (shaded area in Figure 1). The “slope” of the loss probability p is a function of 
the states of the model, which are known only at the beginning of the time step (t=t1).  
 
Figure 1 
 
First, we execute the calculation using the values (state and strength distributions of the troops) at 
the beginning of the time step (forward Euler, Figure 1). Since Euler’s method does not take into 
account the change in the target function during the time step, there is a significant error (shown 
in red in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Calculation of the prediction value with Euler’s method 
 
This is the “predictor step”, resulting in a prediction of the integration result and the resulting 
states. In the corrector step, the same calculation is repeated with the results of the prediction step 
as the starting values, or the “slope” of the predicted loss probability at t=t2. This yields a 
corrector result, i.e. the effects of the weapon systems as if at the end of the time step. 
  
Figure 3 Weighted average of the predictor and corrector values 
 
Finally, we obtain the final result by using the weapon selective parameters as the weights in the 
Heun’s method formula (7b) for each weapon, adding up the resulting effects of different 
weapons and updating the model states. The traditional mortar fire is (in this example) evenly 
distributed along the one minute strike, while first of the grenades fired by the AMOS company 
hit the target simultaneously at the beginning of the time step. This sub-time step behavior is 
incorporated in our model by each weapon systems parameters ws and we. Table 1 shows the 
(dummy) parameters used for this example and the simulation results in Sandis.  
 Weapon system ws we h f(t1) hf(t2) h(ws f(t1) + we(f(t2)) 
AMOS 0.8 0.2 0.285 0.205 0.269 
Mortar 0.5 0.5 0.285 0.205 0.245 
Table 1 
 
Although this example only shows the calculation of one loss probability, calculation of the other 
parts of the simulation proceeds in exactly the same way. 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Decreasing the time step 
Decreasing the time step would increase the time to run the simulation. The method presented 
herein roughly doubles the amount of calculations compared to using Euler. 
1
 With the same 
budget, the time step could, at most, be halved, which does not address the problem of e.g. the 
simulation of AMOS in our example. Also, required lengths of time steps vary, and taking the 
minimum would mean enormous amount of time steps. An adaptive time step length could be 
used to help with this. 
4.1 Higher Order Methods 
Higher order methods, such as the popular 4
th
 order Runge-Kutta, require calculation of more 
points along the used interval, in effect more time steps. This would either require shortening the 
time step (see above) or averaging the result over several longer time steps, while our original 
problem are the weapon effects that take place inside a fraction of a time step. The discontinuity 
of the system thus discourages the use of higher order schemes with the same time step. 
5. Future Work 
Parameterization, namely finding the values for ws and we in (7b), has to date been done in a 
straightforward manner by considering the timescale of the different weapon systems. However, 
not a lot of empirical data can be found about e.g. about how a platoon under indirect fire initially 
takes cover. This leaves the need for empirical data for parameterization and especially validation 
of the implicit assumption that the parameters are independent from time and of other weapon 
effects. 
                                                     
1
 The method doubles the computation time asymptotically, as every time step is calculated twice. 
However, several computationally intensive parts of the calculations of a time step need not be calculated 
again in the corrector step, e.g. hit probabilities from shrapnel to troops in different states. 
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Abstract 
 
A model to evaluate evacuation of wounded and its effect on military units 
battle value has been created. When the number of battle casualties 
(wounded and dead) is known, the evacuation model calculates the average 
number of soldiers, which are needed to give first aid to the wounded, to 
carry them to the collection point of the wounded and returning to the battle 
formation. Thus, during the time of evacuation process the effective battle 
value of the unit (platoon or company) is less than number of non-wounded 
soldiers and we have two strengths for each unit as function of time: nominal 
strength and effective strength.   
 
The overall model was based on finite state machines and created by a 
Markov chain with state transition matrix of size 25 times 25. Because of the 
lack of battle loss and other parameter data, a simplified model was created 
and implemented in Sandis, a operational analysis software tool created in 
PVTTEIOS. The simplified model has also been used in cost-effectiveness 
analysis of different evacuation methods.  
 
The model was created and tested during a company-level research project 
led by major Jari Sormunen from Army Academy. 
  
Keywords: battle value, evacuation, wounded, combat models, 
Markov chain, finite stete machine, effective strength 
 
1     Introduction 
 
The battle casualties are mainly wounded and need first aid and to be evacuated. 
Thus the medical care and evacuation needs manpower, which is not available to 
the battle during the evacuation process and then the effective strength of the unit is 
not equal to the nominal strength.  
 
The topic of this paper is a calculation model to estimate platoon level combat 
effectiveness as function of time and battle losses, when evacuation of wounded is 
considered as a part of military action. The model is based on discrete state 
machine analysis of the soldiers, and uses Markov chains and n-step transition 
probabilities. Two models have been created. In the first model number of states is 
25 and the battle casualties are separated to dead and four levels of different 
injuries. The evacuation time and the personnel needed to evacuation process vary 
between the states. The second model is a simplified one with only one average 
type of wounded soldiers. 
 
2     The combat environment 
 
The combat environment of the analysis is infantry in battle. The analysis level is 
platoon and company level. When a soldier is wounded, the nearest comrade gets 
the injured out of fire and gives the first aid. Then medics continue medical care 
and platoons own soldiers carry the wounded to the collection point, from where 
the support platoon transports the wounded and the soldiers of the fighting platoon 
returning to the battle formation.  
 
In Finnish tactics, separate platoons can be beyond roads in forest area, and 
evacuation of wounded starts by hand. The distance to the collection place of 
injured can vary from few dozens of meters to kilometres. Thus battle losses and 
evacuation times are varying a lot. In order to evaluate platoons combat 
effectiveness during a battle, a simulation model was created. The simulation 
model can be used for both effectiveness analyses of different evacuation and 
medical material and methods and as a part of larger battle simulations. The combat 
situation gives parameters for the model: battle loss rates, average evacuation times 
and time of returning from evacuation mission to fighting formation. 
 
3     The Markov model 
 
Observations showed the great importance of different evacuation plans and 
methods to combat effectiveness. In order to calculate the true battle values of the 
platoons, a Markov model of platoon was created. In the model each soldier has a 
discrete state. 
 
As in all Markov type models, a result is a probability distribution. Probabilities of 
the states are usually in vector form: the first state’s probability as first value, 
second as second etc. The probability vector P(t) is a function of time. If we want 
to calculate probability distribution P(t+∆t) after time period ∆t, we need state 
transition matrix Pt, whose components Pt(i,j) are the state transition probabilities 
between states i and j. Matrix multiplication 
 
)()( tPPtttP ⋅=∆+     (1) 
 
gives directly the next probability distribution. If we let ∆t→0, we end up with a 
system of stochastic differential equations. If state transition matrix Pt is constant, 
the system of differential equations is linear, and has analytic solution  
 
P(t) = eAt P(t0).    (2) 
 
In the equation (2) matrix A is state transition matrix for the differential equation, 
which can be easily calculated from matrix Pt. [1, p.201]   
 
If we consider step ∆t, after n skips a probability distribution at the time  
 
tntt ∆⋅+= 0      (3) 
 
with the result 
 
)()( 0tPPttP
n ⋅=     (4) 
 
In both cases, P(t) is easily calculated for any time interval tb-ta. If combat 
conditions and thus state transition matrix is changing during the time, we can 
simulate the results by using time or event stepping. 
  
If we have the states and the state transition matrix for evacuation process of 
fighting platoon, we can calculate expected values of soldiers in each state as a 
function of time t.  
 
4. Description of the developed model 
 
The states of the intrododuced model for evacuation are: 
  
1. Fighting soldier 
 
2a. Injured (artillery weapons) 
2b. Injured (bullets) 
 
3. Knock out (not medical care needed, recovers automatically after a while) 
 
4a Minor injure,  
4a1. at field,  
4a2. first aid,  
4a3. during evacuation,  
4a4. at collection point   
 
4b Injure,  
4b1. at field,  
4b2. first aid,  
4b3. during evacuation,  
4b4. at collection point 
 
4c Major injure,  
4c1. at field,  
4c2.  first aid,  
4c3. during evacuation,  
4c4. at collection point 
 
4d Serious injure,  
4d1. at field,  
4d2. first aid,  
4d3. during evacuation,  
4d4. at collection point 
 
5. Dead 
 
6 First aid personnel: 
6a. Soldier getting injured from fire 
6b. Soldier giving first aid to injured 
6c. Soldier carrying injured to collecting point 
6d. Soldier returning to battle formation 
 
In the model, every soldier is in one of these discrete states. The corresponding 
state transitions depend on the combat situation. Probability of state transition from 
a soldier to either class of injured during time ∆t is a parameter given by other 
calculations or observations. Transition probability from injured (artillery) or 
injured (bullet) to the four seriousness levels of injuries is based on statistical 
analysis of injuries of different weapons [2], [3]. 
 
Further analysis of medical evacuation model is based on the observations and 
estimates of the times of each action. If an evacuation-connected action (for 
example rescue) is estimated to take time T(i,j), the transition probability is 
  
),(
),(
jiT
tjiP ∆= .    (5) 
 
The model has forced state transitions: a number of a single soldier giving first aid 
to a single wounded must be the same as the number a single wounded getting first 
aid from single soldier. The expected value E(i) of soldiers from unit size N for the 
state i is 
 
)()( iPNiE ⋅=     (6) 
 
This has been taken account in the simulation code by fixing number E(i) equal for 
connected states.   
 
The model was coded to matlab with preliminary parameters. The exact parameter 
values and field tests to get them would need further studies.  
 
A simplified model was also made, because of the instant need of results for 
training purposes, cost-effectiveness analysis and to be used as a part of combat 
simulation code “Sandis”.  
 
In that model only one class of injuries was used, and a rough average of carrying 
personal per one average wounded was used. In field four men were carrying the 
badly wounded, and some could walk and needed only one soldier to escort them. 
Thus only two men were used to carry the injured and the time of carrying was also 
estimated.  
 
To get the model available for larger users, an Excel spreadsheet was also made by 
author and Mr. Teemu Murtola for the simplified model. The simplified 
spreadsheet-model has also been further developed in PVTT. 
 
5     The results 
 
The important values are the effective strength and nominal strength. The effective 
strength describes the true combat potential of the forces. The nominal strength is 
the amount of non-wounded soldiers of the unit.  
 
To demonstrate the analysis a few cases are calculated. The figure (1) was created 
by using simplified Matlab code during a military exercise in October 2004. The 
evacuation times were 40 minutes and returning times 20 minutes. Loss rates for 
wounded carrying soldiers were 2% of those in fight. 
 
The loss rate and evacuation times are from exercise lead by major Jari Sormunen. 
Observations by the author and detailed data collected by Mr Kari Stenius and Mr 
Pekka Kiiski. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Calculation results from loss data of an attack exercise. Time is in minutes and 
55 soldiers initial value. Black line is effective strength and blue nominal strength. Narrow 
red line is total number of battle casualties and bold red line wounded that are on the field 
and bold blue line number of soldiers carrying the injured    
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Calculation results from more effective evacuation.  
 
The calculated results demonstrate the crucial meaning of effective evacuation 
methods and equipment. The first attack would have stopped after 30 minutes, 
when all soldiers were carrying their wounded comrades to the evacuation point. 
 
Results show also the difference between the nominal strength and the effective 
strength and the importance of such calculation for combat simulation codes.  
 
The Excel spreadsheet can be used for comparative analysis. The user sets 
parameters for evacuation times for combat and gets a result as a chart. The 
parameters can be chanced for comparative analysis by any user. 
 
The sheet has event stepping for different combat situations of the platoon and 1 
minutes time stepping for state transitions.   
 
 
Eri taisteluvaiheiden ajat haavoittuneen hoitotoimenpiteille/min  
ensiapu/min kanto/min paluu/min tapahtuma aika 
10 10 5 tulivalmistelu alkaa 1
10 10 5 tulta lähialueelle 2
10 10 5 eteneminen 3
10 55 37.5 kohtaaminen 33
20 60 40 vihollisen ryhmitys 38
10 40 30 Toipuminen 48
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Figure 3. Calculation sheet. A result from spreadsheet analysis (in Finnish) used for cost 
effectiveness analysis. 
 
The method have been used to cost-effectiveness analysis of different evacuation 
methods and equipment. The battle value of infantry units using for example 
different evacuation carpets and vehicles can be calculated in numerical form. Thus 
comparative analysis can be conducted and results used. 
 
Other use of the method has been training. Often during the military exercises with 
simulators, the wounded and first aid are not considered. The need to avoid battle 
loses is demonstrated by using these calculations. Results from simulated combat 
can easily be used as input parameters for excel calculations and results presented 
to the soldiers after the trill. 
 
6     Discussion 
 
The presented calculation method is a simplification of the actual combat situation. 
It considers platoon as a homogenous unit with equal parameter values. Its 
parameters need to be more accurate and assumption of exponential distribution for 
first aid, evacuation and returning times cause some error. The results haven’t been 
verified with historical data. Thus the method and especially the results using 
current model and current parameters are probably not accurate.  
 
On the other hand, in Finnish research environment the calculation method has 
been a clear advance compared to older calculation methods. The method is 
numerically effective and uses simple linear matrix operations. Thus, the method is 
numerically fast. It has been written in easy to use form (spreadsheet) and delivered 
to the users. These features are superior to Monte-Carlo methods and codes 
simulating individual injured.  
 
The medical model gives a new practical method to evaluate break points inside 
other combat simulations: the unit stops to fight, when the number of effective 
fighters equals zero. At the simulations, the fighting effectiveness is weakened by 
battle losses. These features are part of PVTT’s operational analysys software tool 
Sandis (“Sannolikhet distribution basered strid simulation”). This is a clear 
improvement to traditional calculations: for example Lancaster equations have 
been used with break point as certain percentage of battle losses (30-50%) [4, p.9-
13]. 
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Abstract 
On the battlefield there are fighting units, different levels of medical facilities and a need for transportation 
between them. This paper presents a state machine -based model for simulation of evacuation and medical 
treatment of battle casualties.  
The model inputs are battle losses from the combat model, medical units and the transportation connections 
between units. The combat model gives the battle casualties and their triage classes. Evacuation units and 
treatment facilities have different waiting and treatment parameters for different triage classes. The model 
outputs are the number of patients in each facility and transport unit as a function of time for each triage 
class. Based on these simulated results it is possible to identify bottlenecks in the evacuation and medical 
treatment process.  
The model has been implemented as part of operational analysis software Sandis [1]. A simulated example 
will be presented. This model could be used to support the Nordic Battle Group.  
1. Introduction 
Sandis is a software tool for operational analysis, which has been developed in collaboration between the 
Finnish Defence Forces Research Centre and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It can be used 
for simulating brigade-level combat operations. A description of Sandis can be found in [1]. 
Sandis calculates battle losses and it is possible to pinpoint the time and place where they occur. Therefore it 
is also well suited as a tool for analyzing medical treatment and evacuation of casualties from the battlefield. 
The medical model in Sandis was developed with two goals in mind: firstly, to create simple methods for 
studying the relationship between combat ability and effectiveness of medical treatment and secondly, to 
evaluate the evacuation of wounded from platoon level through company, battalion and brigade levels to the 
evacuation hospital. 
The evacuation is performed in two phases: first at platoon level and then from company level onwards. In 
the first phase the wounded are taken to the company aid station. This part of the medical model was 
implemented in 2006 and has been described in [2].  
In the second phase of the evacuation the wounded are moved from platoon level onwards. This model was 
implemented in the summer of 2008. The wounded are divided into four categories (triage classes) based on 
the severity of the injuries: minor, non-critical, critical and dead or dying. Based on these categories a state 
machine was developed that takes into consideration the average transportation time and the performance of 
the treatment facilities. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Evacuation at platoon level 
The numerical model used to evaluate the combat performance of a platoon is based on a state machine, in 
which the states of a single soldier are shown in Figure 1. 
The combat losses are calculated in the combat model, in which the losses are affected by the firing weapon 
systems and ammunition, the state of the troops, their fortification level and the terrain and the firing 
distance. When a soldier is wounded, the soldier next to him pulls him out of the fire and gives immediate 
first aid. Next, a number of soldiers evacuate the wounded to the evacuation point and return to combat 
afterwards. Each of these steps takes a certain amount of time. Since soldiers from fighting platoons 
participate in evacuation, the combat ability of the platoon is lowered by more than just the number of 
casualties. Thus the criterion for the platoon being beaten can be obtained directly from this model.  
The model is realized as a Markov chain and a state machine. A similar method has been used in fire safety 
evaluations [3]. The average time for each step is obtained through field tests [5]. 
2.2 Transport and medical treatment model 
The evacuation of the wounded from platoon level to company level and onwards is handled by two types of 
units. The first unit type is the evacuation unit, which contains the unit strength and vehicles as part of the 
troop database. The operator sets the evacuation connections during simulation and gives the average 
Soldier 
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Medical action Combat action 
Pulling wounded out 
of fire and giving 
first aid 
Evacuating 
wounded to 
collection point 
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Firing 
Moving and firing 
Moving 
Being evacuated or 
receiving medical 
treatment 
Triage 1 
Triage 2 
Triage 3 
 
Triage 4 
 
Figure 1. The state machine for a single soldier. 
evacuation time and standard deviation for the connection. The times include the return trip. The evacuation 
units can suffer losses from weapons fire. Losses to the evacuation units affect their evacuation capabilities. 
The second unit type is the treatment facility, which can be located on any unit level. Its inputs are the 
average treatment times and the standard deviations for each category of severity (minor, non-critical, critical 
and dead or dying) and the number of simultaneous patients. If there is unused capacity for treating critical 
injuries it is used to treat less severe injuries. The initial percentages of wounded in each triage category are 
based on literature and field tests [4]. 
At each treatment facility there are three basic states: “waiting for treatment”, “in treatment” and “waiting for 
transportation or return to the combat formation”. Each state is further divided into four variables, one for 
each category of severity. If treatment is delayed or the waiting times become very long, the condition of the 
wounded deteriorates. 
The model can be represented as a Markov chain, where the patients move from one state to the next through 
the evacuation chain. This contains the state transitions for both treatment and state changes without 
treatment.  Given the average time μ and the standard deviation σ of the time the number of states can be 
calculated as N = (μ/σ)2. However, the number of states is set to be at least 2 and at most μ/σ. 
The evacuation connections are derived from a generic connection system, which is also used for describing 
communications and command connections. The system is described in [6]. 
3. Results 
The model described in Section 2 has been implemented as a part of Sandis. The software can be used to 
evaluate medical logistics from platoon level to the evacuation hospital. The operator sets up the evacuation 
connections between the medical units and enters the parameter values (average transportation times and 
standard deviations) 
The parameters for the treatment facilities are also set by the user. Parameters related to the treatment of 
patients are capacities, average treatment time and standard deviations of treatment times for each triage 
class. The user can also set the rate at which the condition of patients waiting for treatment of transport 
deteriorates. In addition, there are parameters for describing how the conditions of the patients improve after 
treatment, i.e. the percentages of patients in each triage class that move to a new class after treatment. After 
the simulation the user can study the situation in the treatment facilities and then make the necessary changes 
to the scenario and rerun the calculations.  
A simulated example, in which a motorized infantry brigade attacks a mechanized infantry battalion, is used 
to illustrate the features of the evacuation model. The evacuation and medical treatment process of the 
brigade is studied. Figure 2 depicts the strength distribution of a single platoon at a specific moment. Figure 
3 shows a screenshot of the battlefield, with the evacuation connections shown as red lines, whose thickness 
indicates the number of patients being transported. Two new views related to the medical model have been 
added to Sandis. The first view, shown in Figure 4, gives an overview of the medical situation in all medical 
units in the scenario. The second view gives more detailed information of the situation in each medical unit. 
This view is seen in Figure 5.  
 Figure 2. The output from Sandis for each unit. The upper graph shows the unit strength distribution 
for the selected time step. The lower graph shows the strength development as a function of time for 
the duration of the simulation. The red line in the graph represents the nominal strength and the blue 
line represents the effective strength. The difference between the two values is the number of men 
performing evacuation. 
 Figure 3. A fictitious example. A motorized brigade attacks an advancing mechanized infantry 
battalion. The evacuation connections are shown as red lines. The evacuation hospital is to the south, 
outside of the current map view. 
 
Figure 4. Overview of all medical units in the scenario. The upper table shows the situation at each 
medical unit at a given moment. Each column contains the number of wounded waiting for treatment 
and being treated. The lower table shows the corresponding cumulative numbers. 
  
Figure 5. Simulated situation at a company first aid station about one and a half an hour after the 
company has been hit by an air strike. Some of the critically injured have already been evacuated, 
while patients with non-critical and minor injuries are still waiting for treatment. The upper table 
shows the number of patients waiting for treatment, being treated and waiting for transport to the 
next facility. The lower table shows the cumulative number of treated patients. The bar visualizes the 
number of patients waiting for treatment.  
4. Conclusions and future work 
The modelling and implementation work has resulted in a software tool that can be used both to evaluate 
how well organized medical treatment affects the combat ability of troops as well as to evaluate the 
evacuation of wounded in order to evaluate and study the action. The results can be used in education, 
optimization of procurement and as support for operative planning. 
The effective use of the model necessitates finding accurate parameter values. This requires field tests and 
consultation with medical experts.  
Furthermore, the user interface and model development require further work. 
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Abstract 
A numerical model for fragmenting ammunition has been presented previously [2].  This model has been 
extended to include direct hits and shockwave damage and it has been implemented in operational 
analysis software Sandis [1]. The kill probability is calculated using adaptive integration around the target 
unit, where the integration range from the target to the maximum distance is determined by the armor 
thickness and blast resistance of the target. Each fragment grenade produces fragment fans containing a 
specific number of fragments following a given mass distribution. 
The model can be validated using field experiments by, for example, preparing a 100 m x 100 m target 
area containing cardboard and metal cylinders. The cardboard cylinders are used to calculate the number 
of fragments and the metal cylinders are used to calculate the number of effective fragments. There was a 
good correspondence between the model predictions and actual field tests.  
1. Introduction 
The simulation of indirect fire in Sandis is based on the model proposed by Heininen [2]. This report 
describes the details of applying the model in practice. More information about Sandis can be found in 
[1]. 
2. Calculating the mass of an effective fragment 
The perforation capability of a fragment is, according to Rilbe’s Formula [2], 
  
where q is a coefficient depending on materials of the fragment and the target (39 x 10
-6
 skg
1/3 
for steel 
hitting steel), v the velocity of the fragment and m its mass. 
The velocity at distance s is [2] 
  
where v0 is the initial velocity, v2 and c1 constants describing the deceleration (c1 = 17,51m, v2 = 17m/s 
by default) and mref the mass of the reference particle (mref = 0.4g). 
An increase in mass increases the perforation capability of a fragment directly, as seen in formula (1), and 
indirectly by increasing the velocity according to formula (2). We want to find the smallest possible mass 
for an effective fragment, i.e. one with enough perforation capability to damage the target. Unfortunately 
the result can’t be expressed in closed form, so we have to resort to numeric calculation. 
Let q, s and all constants be given. Let x = m
1/3
. The perforation capability of a fragment is 
  
so we define 
  
where  = c1
-1
 mref
1/3 
s > 0, and we want to solve the equation f(x) = y, where y is the required perforation 
capability. A natural limit for f’s domain is gained by requiring x to be large enough that the fragment’s 
velocity isn’t negative, meaning 
  
Thus f is defined in {x   | x ≥  / ln((v0 + v2)/v2)}, and f(x) ≥ 0 in the whole domain. 
By differentiating we gain 
  
  
Differentiating further we gain 
  
  
Because f 
n
(x) > 0 in the whole domain and f ´(x) for the smallest value in domain, f ´(x) > 0 in the whole 
domain. As f’s first and second derivatives are both positive in the whole domain and f’s smallest value is 
0, for each y ≥ 0 exists a unique solution which can be found with Newton’s method: 
  
The initial value x0 must belong to f’s domain. One possible choice is the domain’s smallest value, 
/ln((v0 + v2)/v2). 
3. Calculating the grenade’s effective distance 
We want to find the largest distance where the grenade’s fragments are still effective. 
The mass distribution for naturally fragmenting grenade’s fragments follows Mott’s distribution [2]: 
  
where Nm is the number of fragments with mass at least m, and mavg the average mass of fragments. 
Continuing with Mott’s distribution, the greatest mass for fragments is gained from the condition Nm_max = 
1
1
, meaning 
  
The fragment with the greatest mass also has the greatest effective distance. A fragment is effective at a 
range s, if 
  
where gmin is the smallest perforation capability required for a fragment to be effective. Thus the greatest 
distance where the fragments from a grenade can be effective is gained from equation 
                                                     
1
 Here we consider the mass distributions of fragments to be deterministic, even though it might be more natural to 
consider the Mott’s function as a probability distribution. It’s easier here though to interpret the mass distribution as 
deterministic, which should give us an approximation good enough. 
  
and the largest distance is 
  
4. An overview of the method and miscellaneous improvements 
Several formulas in the previous chapters are for fragments specifically. Before going further, it should be 
noted that while these work for most ammunition with only different constants, the formulas for fragment 
deceleration and mass distribution, for example, can easily be replaced. 
In the indirect fire model in Sandis, the locations of the targets and grenade impact points both have 
probability distributions. We integrate over both distributions. If the distance between the grenade and the 
target is greater than the largest effective distance given by formula (15), the grenade doesn’t cause any 
damage. Otherwise we calculate the smallest mass an effective fragment can have as described in section 
2, and then with Mott’s distribution the number of effective fragments. Once we know the number of 
fragments, the area they are spread in and the area of the target, calculating the probability of destroying 
the target is straightforward (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The basics of hit probability calculation 
While all of our distributions are continuous in theory, the numeric calculations are discrete by nature. 
Instead of trying to divide the whole area into sufficiently small steps, the units are modelled with a 
limited number of calculation points – seven in the current model, the one in centre having larger weight 
Probability of hitting point x from deviations 
Probability of fragment hitting  
target y | ammo hitting point x 
Probability of the target being in point y. 
than the others (see Figure 2). Now we can solve the problem by integrating cyclically around these 
points. 
 
Figure 2. A Sandis screenshot from a simple example with a platoon being targeted, calculation 
points set visible 
It doesn’t matter much which numeric integration method is used, but incorporating adaptive integration 
is essential to get accurate results around points where calculation really matters, without wasting time in 
regions where no damage is done. In short, adaptive integration means splitting the integrand recursively 
until the pieces are small enough to have both absolute and relative errors stay within a satisfactory 
margin. This results in a sparse division in regions where the function is nearly constant and vice versa 
(see Figure 3). 
  
Figure 3. Splitting the integrand into sectors 
For each calculation point, we split the area into a few sectors. Finally, the calculation is carried out by 
integrating over those sectors and recursively splitting them into smaller ones until the error has settled 
below the desired margin. 
This solution to the problem has been found successful, but it is not the only one by any means. One 
example of an alternative approach is to use discrete locations for the targets, such as a rectangular or 
hexagonal grid, and a loss probability for the targets inside the polygon on the condition that the polygon 
is hit. [5]  
4.1 Direct hits and effects of the shockwave 
In addition to fragments, Sandis also calculates the probabilities for direct hits and getting damaged by the 
shockwave. Here we simply calculate the probability of grenades hitting within a certain radius from the 
target.  For direct hits we get it directly from the target’s area. For the shockwave the radius depends on 
the explosive material in the grenade and the target’s pressure tolerance according to data presented in [3, 
Figure 26-9, p. 26-18]. From the chart, linear regression gives us 
  
where sd is the largest distance with lethal pressure, m the explosive mass in the grenade, p sufficient 
pressure to kill the target, and k = 32.87 the determined slope. 
Usually these effects are both negligible but, for example, against heavily armoured targets they might 
mean the difference between zero and nonzero kill probabilities. 
4.2 The distribution of troops within a unit 
The error caused by the use of calculation points instead of simulating a continuous distribution depends 
on the area occupied by the target unit relative to the spread of the strike. In practice this does not usually 
matter, but it becomes a problem if we have units covering large areas, like a defending platoon spread 
within 20 hectares. 
This can be counteracted to a certain degree by carrying out the calculations separately for each point, as 
if a certain fraction of the unit’s strength actually resided at that point. This way bombing just a fraction 
of the unit’s area can only cause as much damage as there are troops in the target area. If this strength 
distribution changes due to losses, it starts to slowly converge towards the initial state. 
So far this model is only used by the artillery model, but work to extend it to the direct fire model, where 
it would also affect the unit’s firepower, is in progress. Another planned improvement is making the 
number of calculation points scale with the unit’s area, which would eliminate the previously mentioned 
problem. 
5. Validation 
Several measurements have been performed to validate this model, some of which are discussed in detail 
in paper [4]. A part of the experiment was recreated in Sandis, which produced very similar results. A 
comparison between observed and simulated results is presented here. During the test the casualty rate 
was determined to be 35.4%, while Sandis’s result was 37% (see Figure 6). If the probability of hit is 
35% with 100 targets, the standard deviation σ = (npq)1/2  ≈ 5, so 35±5% is the ideal accuracy for the hit 
probability in a single test. 
The field test recreated in Sandis is presented in Figure 4. The detailed numeric data from the firing is 
classified, so only a colour-coded table is presented here (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4. The setup recreated as a Sandis scenario. The center point and deviation of the grenade 
impacts were determined from the notes of the original test. 
 Figure 5. Overlay of the original notes and Sandis simulation results. Pie charts represent the 
probability of hit calculated by Sandis. The colours for each square represent the number of 
fragment hits recorded. Red corresponds to a large number of fragment hits, yellow an 
intermediate number and blue a low number. In the white squares there were no hits. 
 
 
Figure 6. The resulting strength distribution in Sandis. 
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Abstract
We introduce a stochastic combat model and present a method of calculating
effectiveness parameters for different weapons in a way compatible with the
model. These calculations are performed by using some old test results as
initial data.
Keywords: stochastic combat model, parameter estimation
1 Introduction
Sandis is a operational analysis software tool with a probability distribution based
brigade level combat model. It estimates battle loss distributions and operation
success probabilities. In this work we present a method for calculating parameters
for the combat model used in Sandis.
The parameters in question describe the effectiveness of fire. For example, in
the Lanchester equations (see e. g. [4])
dB
dt
= −λ1R (1)
dR
dt
= −λ2B (2)
λ1 and λ2 are analogous parameters. The values of these parameters depend on
several factors such as shooting skill of troops, weapons used, terrain and weather
conditions. We shall now concentrate on the dependence of the parameters on
weapons.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the capabilities of
Sandis in greater detail and briefly introduces the combat model. In Section 3, the
relevant parameters are calculated. Section 4 considers possible further research
on the subject.
2 The Combat Model
The Sandis application calculates probability distribution for the outcome of a
brigade level combat given by the user. The user needs to enter the strengths
and armament as well as missions and locations of companies. No smaller or
larger entities than companies may be directly manipulated. Sandis calculates
the success probability of the overall mission as well as probability distributions
for the strength of each platoon.
To further illustrate the capabilities of Sandis, let us consider a battle in which
a blue company is repeatedly attacked by red forces. The expected strength of
the blue company is depicted in Figure 1. The figure illustrates both nominal
strength and actual strength. The actual strength is obtained by deducing from
the nominal strength the soldiers who are assisting their wounded comrades [3].
Figure 1: Expected strength
However, the expected strength alone does not suffice to describe the outcome.
Additional insight is provided by Figures 2, 3 and 4, which depict the probability
distributions of nominal and actual strength of the blue company after one, two
and three attacks, respectively.
In figure 5 the development of expected strength of blue forces and their prob-
ability of being defeated in another combat are illustrated.
Although companies are the only entities visible to the user, the model cal-
culates probability distributions of the strengths of platoons. Platoons are not
divided to any smaller groups. Thus, we need a way to calculate casualty distri-
butions for firefights between platoons. Rest of this section describes the model
used for this task.
Assume that a red fighter has the probability p of hitting a blue fighter with a
single aimed shot. In this case we say that p is the basic hit probability of the red
fighter. If we assume that different shots are independent, the probability that
the blue fighter is wounded by at least one of n shots is
1− (1− p)n, (3)
regardless of whether the n shots were fired by one or several red fighters having
equal skill and weapons.
Figure 2: Probability distribution of blue strength after the first attack
Figure 3: Probability distribution of blue strength after the second attack
If there are total m blue fighters, on average n/m shots are fired at each of
them. Thus we argue that each of the blue fighters has probability
1− (1− p)n/m (4)
of getting hit. For simplicity, we assume that the events of different blue fighters
getting hit are independent.
The model easily extends to the case in which red fighters have different kinds
of weapons. If n1, . . . , nk shots are fired with weapons having the basic hit prob-
abilities p1, . . . , pk, the total probability of any blue fighter getting hit is
1− (1− p1)n1/m · · · (1− pk)nk/m. (5)
Above only point fire was considered. If the shots are not well aimed, i. e.,
in a case of area fire, the probability of a single blue fighter getting hit does not
Figure 4: Probability distribution of blue strength after the third attack
Figure 5: Expected strength and probability of being defeated
depend on the number of blue fighters and the the total probability of a blue
fighter getting hit is
1− (1− p1)n1 · · · (1− pk)nk . (6)
Note that the basic hit probabilities pi depend on circumstances such as shooting
distance and whether the shots are aimed or not.
3 Calculating parameters
Since unclassified reports concerning the effect of infantry fire are few and far
between, the calculations on this paper are based on a more than 50 years old re-
port by Finnish Defence Forces [1]. At that time the primary weapons of Finnish
infantry were submachine guns, rapid-fire rifles, (non-automatic) rifles and semi-
automatic rifles.
On field tests a platoon (36 men armed as in Table 2) inflicted 45% casualties
during one minute of shooting to dummies at a distance of 100 m [1, p. 23]. On
distances of 200m and 300m the casualties were 14% and 6%, respectively. The
Table 1: Infantry weapons [1, p. 23]
Weapon Firing speed (shots per minute)
Submachine gun 100
Rapid-fire rifle 60
Rifle 8
Semiautomatic rifle 20
Table 2: Armament of an infantry platoon [1, p. 23]
Weapon Count
Submachine gun 20
Rapid-fire rifle 4
Rifle 8
Semiautomatic rifle 4
targets were located in a forest of medium density but open ground lay between
shooters and targets. The targets were lying on an area of 100m × 100m and
presumably there were 36 of them.
Based on the field tests, we wish to calculate the basic hit probabilities for
different weapons, but additional information is needed for this task. Fortunately,
this information can be found in the same report and is included in Table 3.
Table 3: Relative effectiveness of infantry weapons [1, p. 8]
Weapon 0m 50m 100m 200m 300m 400m 500m
Submachine gun 148 140 67 15 3 0 0
Rapid-fire rifle 109 105 50 15 12 10 9
Rifle 18 18 13 8 5 3 3
Semiautomatic rifle 33 33 26 10 8 7 7
Light machine gun 106 105 85 45 24 20 19
Assume that one fighter armed with a weapon of relative effectiveness of 1 has
the probability p0 of eliminating an enemy during a minute fight. When enemies
are at distance of 100m, the relative effectiveness of a platoon is 1748 (this is
easily computed from Tables 2 and 3). Thus a platoon confronting m enemies
eliminates on average the fraction
1− (1− p0)1748/m (7)
of them during the minute fight. Since we already know that the damages inflected
on a enemy platoon are 45%, we have
1− (1− p0)1748/36 = 0.45, (8)
which implies
p0 ≈ 0.0122. (9)
For a weapon with relative effectiveness of x and fire speed n shots per minute,
the probability that a single shot eliminates a single enemy is
1− (1− p0)x/n. (10)
By using this formula, we get the parameter values for Table 4.
Table 4: Basic hit probabilities of different infantry weapons
Weapon 0m 50m 100m 200m 300m 400m 500m
Submachine gun 1.81% 1.70% 0.82% 0.18% 0.04% 0 0
Rapid-fire rifle 2.21% 2.13% 1.02% 0.31% 0.25% 0.20% 0.18%
Rifle 2.73% 2.73% 1.98% 1.22% 0.77% 0.46% 0.46%
Semiautomatic rifle 2.01% 2.01% 1.59% 0.61% 0.49% 0.43% 0.43%
Light machine gun 0.43% 0.43% 0.35% 0.18% 0.10% 0.08% 0.08%
As a sort of verification we calculated the casualties which a platoon inflicts
in a minute on an enemy platoon at distances of 200m and 300m based on the
data in Table 4. The results were 14.7% and 6.0%, which are in agreement of the
original test results.
4 Conclusions
We have shown a rather simple method of calculating the necessary parameters
with few additional assumptions. It should be noted that the parameters are
calculated in such a way that they yield results conforming to input data in
firefights between platoons, which are of interest, but may not yield accurate
results in firefights of much larger or smaller scale.
Unfortunately, we had to resort to old test results which did not include mod-
ern weapons such as assault rifle. In order to obtain more useful results, new tests
are required.
Another problem is the assumption that all fire is point fire when in fact a
combination of point and area fire would be better model. Unfortunately, pro-
portions of the combination are unknown. Also this problem could be solved by
performing new tests in which the number of targets vary. Simply varying the
number of shooters does not suffice, since the formulae 5 and 6 have the same
functional form as functions of nk. To further illustrate this point and the differ-
ence between point fire and area fire in general, let us consider the probability that
a single target gets hit in different cases. In each case the probabilities are calcu-
lated based on the fact that during one minute a platoon eliminates on average
45% of an enemy platoon.
Figure 6: The probability of getting hit when the number of targets fixed
If the number of targets is fixed but the number of shooters vary, the point
fire and area fire models predict equal hit probability as depicted in Figure 6.
If the number of shooters is fixed and the number of targets vary, the prob-
ability of getting hit by area fire remain fixed, but the probability of getting hit
by point fire increases as the number of shooters decrease as depicted in Figure 7.
However, the expected number of casualties tends to increase when the number
of targets increase. This is only logical: when several shooters shoot an a single
target, it is probable that the single target gets hit, i. e., that 100% of the targets
get hit. Should there be several targets, probably not all of them get hit, but more
than one do. In this case the relative casualties are lower but absolute casualties
higher.
Figure 7: The probability of getting hit when the number of shooters is fixed
If the numbers of targets and shooters are equal, the probability of getting hit
by point fire remains fixed, for every shooter has a distinct target and equal hit
probability. However in the case of area fire the probability of getting hit increases
as the number of targets increase, see Figure 8.
Figure 8: The probability of getting hit when the number of targets equals to the
number of shooters
As a final remark we conclude that new test shootings are a good chance to
validate the model. Thus the number of shooters as well as number of targets
should be varied.
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Abstract 
An infantry squad firing at another squad was tested with conscripts. The primary objective of the test 
was to gather parameter data for Sandis OA –software. The second objective was to compare results from 
“TASI” combat simulators and real ammunition in winter conditions.      
Seven squads shot same test field with five target dummies placed in the firing zone. The average distance 
from the shooters was about 150m. The dummies were at positions, where they could have been shooting 
at the squad, but at the same time were using the cover of the terrain. 
The TASI –simulators gave similar results as the real ammunition in winter conditions and the results 
were about the same as data from [1] with recalculated values from [3]. 
1. Introduction 
The Finnish defense forces have a need for cost effectiveness analysis and operational analysis research 
methods. PVTT, Army Academy and the Jaeger Brigade executed a research test firing as a joint project. 
The research firing was carried out concurrently as a part of a Jaeger Brigade conscripts live firing field 
exercise. 
We conducted a routine squad defensive firing drill in a research setting. Targets were human dummies 
(“Anne-nukke”). Firing distance was approximately 150 meters. The experiment was carried out as part 
of conscript training. Hence an infantry defensive firing drill was combined with an experimental research 
firing.     
The research project had multiple objectives: 
1) to gather data on the effectiveness of infantry light arms fire in winter conditions 
2) to compare results from experimental test firing carried out in the 1950’s [1], which are the 
source data for the parameters defining the effectiveness of light arms fire in the SANDIS-
program [2] against new, contemporary data [3] 
3) to compare the results of live firing with results of combatant simulator (TASI) firing. 
4) to obtain probabilities of casualties induced by infantry fire in different conditions. These are 
needed for the Sandis software. 
Data based on research in winter conditions is not available. Hence, both the reducing effect of snow on 
light arms fire and the effect of snow on the corresponding simulator results were speculative. Therefore, 
the tests carried out in winter conditions produced basic data required for the planning of further research.   
The estimates publicized on the efficacy of assault rifle fire were contradictory. According to the textbook 
“Todennäköisyys- ja ampumaopin perusteet” 1984 [4 p. 175] a single shot probability of a hit was stated 
as 63.3%. The value is obviously inconsistent with probabilities (1-2%) provided by Keinonen [1]. Since 
the textbook [4] did not present a description of the test setting, on which the estimate of the effect of fire 
was based, further research was crucial. 
There is simulator data for research purposes from various exercises. However, the usefulness and 
credibility of the data is not clear. A small-scale experimental firing to assess the quality of the available 
simulator data is needed in order to compare the results of simulator fire with the results of live 
ammunition fire. 
The firing experiment supports the Army Academy to improve the TASI simulator and develop the next 
generation of simulators. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Description of the firing exercise 
The research was carried out at the Kyläjärvi firing area during the Jaeger Brigade conscripts’ live firing 
exercise 26.-30.3. 2007. Four squads from an anti-tank company fired at 28.3.2007, and three squads of a 
platoon from an infantry company fired at 29.3.2007. The targets were plastic human dummies (“Anne-
nukke”). In front of some of the dummies were small electric flash-bangs. In the TASI test firing the 
dummies wore combatant simulator laser indicator vests and head gear. The test firing took place in the 
Kyläjärvi shooting range, in Akkalanselkä. The weather was sunny and the temperature varied between 
+2°C and +10°C. 
For the firing, a squad took positions in foxholes, keeping the terrain ahead under surveillance. They had 
orders to open fire immediately if the enemy opens fire. The opening of fire by the enemy was 
demonstrated by detonating the flash-bangs in front of some of the target dummies. 
2.2. Preparations and target elements 
Before the firing Senior Lieutenant Vulli checked the aiming of the TASI weapons at about 40 meter 
distance. Checking took place in the surrounding area of Kyläjärvi Johtola. An aiming check board was 
used and the beacons, 30 cm by 30 cm, were tested. Batteries for the vests were placed in and checked in 
the beginning of both firing days. 
The TASI weapons used in the firing were numbered and placed in the shelter position in such manner 
that each individual weapon always fired from the same foxhole. TASI weapons were issued in the 
beginning of each experimental firing, and afterward gathered for the next firing. An inspection 
performed after the firings revealed that only one weapon with a laser emitter (number 5) had lost aim 
during firing.  
The firing test took place at the top of Hill Akkalanselkä (N 67
o
 21’47.9’’, E 26o 24’ 29.1’’). The 
direction of fire was westwards. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hill Akkalanselkä and the direction of fire. The point of the arrow points at a vehicle 
track, which is one of the “ditches”  referred to later in the report 
We positioned the dummies in shallow ditches created by vehicles in the following way: a member of the 
research team ducked down and searched for a fighting position where he could fire on the enemy in the 
foxholes. Next, the research team member was replaced by a dummy. Hence the dummies emulate a 
stationary enemy force lying on the ground, firing at the defenders. A firing position selected by a trained 
soldier and emulated by a human dummy provides a more realistic target than the traditional piece of 
cardboard placed in the firing area. Hence spotting the dummies was not easy. The dummies were 
covered with newspaper and the heads were covered with Pirkka-brand garbage bags of light yellow 
color. The newspaper represented a snow camouflage uniform. It also made recording hits and quickly 
fixing the holes possible. 
 
Dummies were numbered from one to five. The closest dummy on the left had number 1, the closest 
dummy in the middle (in a ditch concealed by a bush) had number 2, the closest dummy on the right in a 
ditch had number 3 and the dummy about five meters behind dummy 3, laying in the shadow of a tree 
stump, had number 4. Dummy number 5 was ten meters further, covering behind a tree stub.  
The positioned dummies can be seen in Figures 2-7. 
   
 
 
Figure 2. Dummy number 1 wearing TASI gear. 
 
  
Figure 3. Dummy number 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Dummy number 3 at the end of a ditch in the shadow of a bush.  
  
 
Figure 5. Dummy number 4 in the shadow of a stump with roots, feet in a snowmobile track.  
 
  
Figure 6. Dummy number 5 in the cover of a tree stump. 
 
 
Figure 7. Dummy targets 1-4 as seen from behind. 
The dummy targets represented ducked enemies who were using the cover of the terrain to present as 
small a target as possible to the direction of the defending force. Figures 8 and 9 show the dummies from 
the defenders’ point of view. 
 
Figure 8. Target dummies as seen from the front. Arrows pointing upwards reveal target dummies 
1, 2 and 3, from left to right. The horizontal arrow on the right indicates the position of dummy 
number 4. The arrow downwards is pointing at dummy 5.  
 
  
Figure 9. View from behind a foxhole, distance to target dummies 150m 
The dummies were fired upon from foxholes on top of a hill. Every dummy was not visible from every 
defender’s position. However, from each position, at least one dummy with location indicated by a flash-
bang could be spotted. 
    
 
Figure 10. Foxholes as seen from the firing zone. 
2.3. Description of the test firing 
Shooting was carried out as follows:  
15 second firing 
Two magazines we filled: one with 10 tracers and another with 30 regular rounds. Next the squad leader 
gave standard defense orders. Each fighter was escorted to his/her foxhole and given an order defining the 
firing sector and (most relevantly for the study) rules for opening fire: open fire either if the enemy 
approaches over a defined line or fire back if the enemy opens fire first. 
60 second firing 
The second (the 60s firing) started at the shelter position as the squad leader ordered “Asemaan!” (“Battle 
positions!”) 
When either the squad leader had guided the fighters to their fighting positions (the 15s firing) or the 
squad had run to take their positions (60s firing), the firing supervisor gave the following orders: 
Orders with live ammunition 
a) The 15s test firing, continued as a normal defensive firing drill  
   “valojuovalipas kiinnitä!” -  (insert the magazine with tracers!) 
“lataa!” –     (load!) 
“tähystä!” –    (scan your sector!) 
The small electric flash-bangs were detonated 
15 s of firing 
“lipas!”    (replace magazine + cock the rifle)  
This order ended the test firing at the dummies.  
The drill continued as normal defense exercise: the fighters replaced the tracer 
magazine with the magazine with 30 regular rounds.  
Next, mobile targets rose up time after time until all rounds had been shot.  
“tuli seis!”   (cease fire!) 
The tracer magazines were collected in order to count the number of rounds fired 
at the dummies. 
b) 60s of firing: 
   “asemaan!” –    (take positions!) 
“lipas kiinnitä!” –   (insert magazine!) 
“lataa!” –   (load!) 
“tähystä!” –    (scan your sector!) 
Flash-bangs were detonated,  
60s of firing  
“tuli seis!”    (cease fire!) 
 Orders when shooting with TASI simulators 
a) 15s firing 
   “lipas kiinnitä!” –   (insert magazine!) 
“lataa!” –    (load!) 
“tähystä!” –    (scan your sector!) 
 Flash bangs were detonated 
 15s of firing 
“tuli seis!”    (cease fire!)    
b) 60s firing: 
   “lipas kiinnitä!”   (insert magazine!) 
“lataa!”   (load!) 
“tähystä!”    (scan your sector!) 
Flash bangs were detonated 
 15s of firing 
“tuli seis!”   (cease fire!) 
When the TASI combatant simulator system was used the magazines were filled with 10 blanks for the 15 
seconds firing and with 30 blanks for the 60 seconds firing. 
The results of each firing test as well as any special conditions, such as non-exploded flash-bangs and 
reusing them are included in the results file of Appendix 1.  
2.4 Documenting the data 
After the test firing we counted the number of unused rounds in each fighter’s magazines, and calculated 
the total number of shots fired. When the weapons had been checked for safety, the research team got 
permission to enter the firing zone.  
After the weapons had been checked and rounds counted the research examined the dummies and then 
fixed the bullet holes.    
After shooting with live rounds we counted and documented four different kinds of hits: hits in the arms, 
head, legs and torso. Vulli, Lappi and Papinniemi examined the dummies and Mäki recorded the hits on a 
form presented in Appendix 2.  
Senior Lieutenant Vulli read the hits recorded in the TASI simulators. For that task no other research 
personnel were needed. After each experiment firing the results of the TASI firing test were recorded 
using a dedicated data recording device into a Panasonic notebook computer using the data recording 
program AAR. A file containing the results was saved as a separate file for each individual vest.  
Some of the hits were apparent and easily detected. However, others were only small holes. Often the exit 
hole was larger than the entry hole. For every hit the trajectory of the bullet inside the dummy was 
examined. The same bullet may have first touched the head slightly and then entered the torso. Such hits 
were counted as head injuries, even though they also made a hole in the body.  
 
 
Figure 11. A hit in the arm. 
 
 
  
Figure 12. A headshot. 
3. Results 
 
The results are combined in an Excel sheet in Appendix 1. The most relevant results for each dummy are 
presented in table 1. “Indicated” (“ilmaistu”)  means that a flash bang was detonated in front of the 
dummy when the firing started.   
 
 
Table 1. Probability of destruction (hit) for each individual dummy. 
Indicated, not hit 
Indicated, hit 
Not indicated, not hit 
Not indicated, hit 
P(hit)  if indicated 
P(hit)  if not indicated 
Maalit
1 2 3 4 5 Yht 15s 60s tasi kovat
Ilmaistu, ei tuhottu 13 0 10 14 0 37 22 15 17 20
Ilmaistu, tuhottu 8 0 12 8 0 28 13 15 12 16
Ei ilmaistu, ei tuhottu 7 26 5 3 27 68 33 35 38 30
Ei ilmaistu, tuhottu 0 2 1 3 1 7 2 5 3 4
Tuhoamis% kun ilmaistu 38.10% ei 54.55% 36.36% ei 43.08% 37.14% 50.00% 41.38% 44.44%
Tuhoamis% ei ilmaistu 0.00% 7.14% 16.67% 50.00% 3.57% 9.33% 5.71% 12.50% 7.32% 11.76%
According to the data, the probability of a casualty outcome for an enemy fighter who is firing is about 
fourfold compared to that of a fighter not firing. If a fighter is actively taking cover, the casualty 
probability can be assumed to be even smaller.  
Another significant parameter value for the Sandis direct fire model is the hit (elimination) probability of 
a single shot. For the complete data the probability of an effective hit is 1.05%. If the last five test firing 
sets with less flash-bangs are omitted, the results are approximately the same for both dummies wearing 
TASI simulators and for live ammunition.  
The results - namely the single shot hit probability - of the anti-tank company were 1.13% for the TASI 
dummies (shot first) and 1.17% for dummies shot with live rounds after that. There was a shortage of 
electric flash-bangs with the infantry company, so their results are not quite comparable. The hit 
probability for infantry company fire was 1.12% for the live rounds shot first. However, for the TASI 
dummies, which where fired last, the shortage of indicator flash-bangs decreased the average single shot 
hit probability: it was only 0.68%. 
As an extra observation, by observing the tracers and according to bullet marks on the snow it was 
concluded that the bullets missed the dummies mainly because of flying too high, over the targets. There 
were multiple marks in the snow behind the dummies, but only few in front of them.     
In addition, fire was concentrated at the stump with protruding roots, not at the dummy fighter 4 in the 
shadow of the stump.  
  
Figure 13. The fire that hit the stump with protruding roots, not the dummy fighter in the shadow 
of the stump. 
4. Conclusions 
Because of the small size of the experimental data, the results can only be considered preliminary. 
However, according to the data obtained, TASI simulator results are of the same magnitude as the results 
obtained using live ammunition. Therefore, simulators seem applicable in winter conditions for both 
applied fire practice and battle emulating firing exercises. Hence more versatile exercises can be 
developed, since shooting with simulators doesn’t require extended safety zones and complicated safety 
arrangements. 
The presented test firing had a small data set and studied only two platoons in winter conditions. Hence, 
further research is required to increase the amount of the data and to allow taking diverse terrain 
conditions under consideration. In that case, variables should include different firing distances, different 
environments, the number of shooters, the number of targets, and a variety of weapons, e.g. the light 
machine gun which in this experiment wasn’t analyzed at all. 
In addition, there is a further need for cost-effectiveness analysis for simulator use. Results from Sandis 
calculations and field experiments can be combined for such analysis. 
The results of this research are of the same magnitude as the results of the research by Keinonen [1]. 
Based on the results presented in [1], Lappi and Pottonen [3] calculated the hit probabilities of single 
shots for different weapons for Sandis. The hit probability obtained for a semi-automatic rifle was 1.59% 
for a distance “over 100m”, and 0.61% for a distance “over 200m”. In both cases the targets were placed 
on an area covering 1 hectare (= 100m x 100m = 10 000m
2
). 
Most likely the distance “100m” refers to the distance to the closest targets. In that case the 100m result 
corresponds to our results presented here, since the medium distance to a target is 150m. If, however, the 
distance stated in [1] refers to the centre of the one hectare target area, then 150m on our results matches 
the experimental result in [1] since linear extrapolation of the probability gives us 1.1%, which matches 
the presented research test firing exactly. 
Parallel further research on more detailed level (various distances, diverse positioning, different terrain, 
different seasons and weather, a different number of shooters and targets) is also needed in order to 
improve the parameters used in the Sandis software. In any case, we can conclude that using the public 
data from the 1950’s as the first estimate of infantry fire for the Sandis operational analysis software was 
obviously a functional solution. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
Ampumapäivä 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07 28.3.07
13:20 13:35 13:50 14:00 14:15 14:25 14:40 14:50 15:10 15:45 16:00 16:15 16:25 16:40 16:55
T T T T T T T T K K K K K K K K
15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m
Pää 1 1 1 1 3
Vartalo
Käsi
Jalka
Tuhottu 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Ilmaisin X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Pää 1
Vartalo
Käsi
Jalka
Tuhottu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ilmaisin
Pää 1 1 1 3 1 1
Vartalo
Käsi 1 1 1
Jalka
Tuhottu 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Ilmaisin X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Pää 1 4 1 1 2
Vartalo 1 1
Käsi 1 1 1
Jalka
Tuhottu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Ilmaisin X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Pää 1
Vartalo
Käsi
Jalka
Tuhottu 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ilmaisin
Pää 2 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 7 3 0 1 1 2 2
Vartalo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Käsi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 2
Jalka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 18 0 25 8 30 10 30 10 30 2 30 10 30 10 30
2 1 29 0 16 7 30 10 30 10 26 5 30 10 30 4 30
3 4 27 0 11 10 30 10 30 10 30 4 30 10 30 10 30
4 2 30 0 30 2 30 10 30 10 30 4 30 10 29 10 30
5 10 30 3 13 3 30 6 30 10 30 5 26 10 30 8 27
6 8 30 1 30 10 30 9 30 9 30 8 30 10 30 10 30
7 10 30 0 30 0 30 10 30 9 30 10 28
8
Laukauksia yht. 37 194 4 155 40 210 55 180 69 206 37 206 70 207 52 177
P 5.41% 1.55% 25.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.95% 1.82% 0.00% 0.00% 3.40% 8.11% 0.00% 1.43% 0.48% 3.85% 1.13%
V 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.49% 0.00% 0.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
K 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.45% 0.97% 0.00% 0.00% 1.43% 0.00% 0.00% 1.13%
J 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
5.41% 1.55% 25.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.95% 1.82% 0.00% 1.45% 4.85% 8.11% 0.49% 2.86% 0.48% 3.85% 2.26%
5.41% 1.55% 25.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.95% 1.82% 0.00% 1.45% 0.97% 2.70% 0.49% 2.86% 0.48% 3.85% 1.13%
1
2
3
4
5
Osumat 
maaleihin
Osumia yht.
Osuma%
Kokonaisosuma%
Laukauksia
TASI/Kova
15s/1min/muu aika
Ryhmän numero
Ammunnan numero
Päivä/Yöammunta
Ampuma-aika
Tuhotut
Tuhottuja/laukaus
Final results 
 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Kaikki yht.
5 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 6 6 7 7
P P P P P P P P P P P P
29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07 29.3.07
8:30 8:45 9:00 9:15 9:40 9:50 10:05 10:20 10:35 10:45 10:55 11:05
K K K K K K T T T T T T
15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m 15s 1m
1 1 9
0
1 1
0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
X X X X X X X
6 7
2 2
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 1 1 11
1 1
1 4
0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 13
X X X X X X X
2 3 2 1 17
1 1 1 5
3
0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 11
X X X X X X X
1
0
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 1 3 2 6 2 1 0 1 0 1 45
0 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 30 10 14 10 23 7 30 10 30 6 30 17.32143
10 30 5 12 10 28 10 30 10 14 9 30 16.64286
9 30 10 18 10 23 10 30 6 30 10 30 17.57143
8 25 10 21 10 30 3 26 5 20 10 30 17.32143
7 11 10 30 10 30 6 30 9 30 10 30 17.28571
10 30 10 19 10 30 10 30 10 30 4 30 18.85714
10 27 8 27 10 30 3 30 5 30 8 0 16.875
64 183 63 141 70 194 49 206 55 184 57 180 3345
0.00% 1.09% 1.59% 2.13% 2.86% 3.09% 4.08% 0.49% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.56% 1.35%
0.00% 0.55% 0.00% 1.42% 1.43% 1.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.71% 0.00% 0.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 35
0.00% 1.64% 1.59% 4.26% 4.29% 4.64% 4.08% 0.49% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.56% 1.82%
0.00% 0.55% 1.59% 2.13% 1.43% 1.03% 4.08% 0.49% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.56% 1.05%
49 206 55 184 57 180 1606
2 1 0 1 0 1 15
4.08% 0.49% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.56% 0.93%
2 1 0 1 0 1 15
4.08% 0.49% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.56% 0.93%
64 183 63 141 70 194 1739
0 3 1 6 3 9 46
0.00% 1.64% 1.59% 4.26% 4.29% 4.64% 2.65%
 Appendix 2 Data collection form  
 (Prepared by corporal Sami Mäki) 
 
Ammunnan tiedot Ammunnan numero:
TASI Ampuva ryhmä (nimi ja numero):
Kovat Ampujien määrä:
Ammunta-aika:
Päivä Ammuntapäivä:
Yö
15 s
1 min
Muu
Pää Vartalo Jalka Käsi Ilmaisin
Laukauksia yhteensä:
Ase
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Lisähuomautuksia ammunnasta:
M
A
A
L
I
T
OSUMAT
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
Laukauksia
Ammutut laukaukset
3
2
1
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Abstract 
Field tests were performed to find the firepower of mortar units and injury profiles from mortar fire. The 
injury profiles provide information for preparations for medical action on the battle field and parameters 
for simulators.  
In five tests ten lying dummies were randomly placed in a 100 m x 100 m target square and in three tests 
only five dummies were used. After each firing the dummies were examined and the locations of the 
injuries and fragment sizes were determined. The dummies were categorized into five classes based on 
their injuries: no hit, light, moderate, severe and dead or dying. The impact point of each grenade was 
marked and the coordinates were recorded.   
The locations of the fragment hits and the injury class as a function of the distance to the nearest impact 
point were studied. The hit location distribution was similar to data from Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the 
number of lightly wounded was smaller in the tests.  
1. Introduction 
The aim of the measurements was to determine the effectiveness of mortar fire and consequential injures 
on a dummy target unit. The dummy unit was representing a person lying on the ground taking cover.  
The results will be used in different fields. Combat training simulators as well as military operational 
analysis tools like Sandis [1] need parameter data like fragment hit probabilities. Evacuation models and 
medical training also require parameters. Injury profiles provide additional information to predict the 
procedures and activities required to treat and evacuate the wounded. The new data will make future 
programs simulating tactical field medicine more useful and realistic. 
2. Materials and methods  
The experiments were carried out in the Rovajärvi firing range during field firing exercises on November 
19
th
 - 30
th
, 2007 (winter conditions) and on May 19
th 
- 30
th
, 2008 (summer conditions)  
Three one hectare (100m x 100m) fields of target units were constructed for both winter and summer 
conditions. Each had 100 cardboard cylinders as targets.  
In addition, in November there were 10 human figure dummies (“Anne first aid dummy”) and 10 metal 
cylinders made of 1mm aluminium plate in one of the fields. In May there were two fields with additional 
targets in addition to the paper cylinders: one field with 10 metal cylinders and 10 Anne-dummies, and 
another with 10 metal cylinders and 5 Anne-dummies. Metal cylinders are used to obtain the ratio 
between high energy fragments and low energy fragments. Anne dummies are used for injury profile and 
hit probability studies between cylinders and dummies. 
The firing took place in Outovaara in the Sarriojärvi firing area. 
 
  
Figure 1. A map presenting the firing area and the target fields. 
 
2.1 Preparations and target units 
In order to locate the fragment hits the Anne-dummies were wrapped in newspapers and masking tape and 
the heads of the dummies were covered with blue plastic bags. Hence the “mummified” figures appear 
different from real people, regardless of viewing distance. 
The dummies and the metal cylinders were placed in same fields. The ratio of the number of fragment hits 
on the dummies and the cylinders was used to evaluate the validity of using a cylinder to represent a 
human body. The ratio of the number of hits on the metal cylinders and the cardboard cylinders was used 
to estimate the penetrating power of the fragments. The combination of the fragment hit profile on the 
dummies and the fragment penetrating power on dummies was used to estimate the severity of injuries 
caused by mortar fire. The dummies were positioned laying flat on the ground, each one beside a metal 
cylinder, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The targets mimicked combatants laying on the ground to take cover. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. There was a large blue plastic film in the centre of the target field for the artillery 
observers.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Target units were positioned in lines. The distance between adjacent target dummies was 
10 meters. 
 
2.2 Recording the data  
After the shelling the fragment hits in each cylinder were counted. Fragment hits in the human figure 
dummies were recorded and classified as hits in the arms, head, legs or torso. After each bombardment 
the target objects were inspected and each fragment hit was marked with a marker pen and, if needed, 
covered with masking tape. Fragment hits on the Anne-dummies were classified according to estimated 
injury severity and rated in triage classes 1-4. 
    
 
Figures 5 and 6. Hits were marked and counted. 
 
 
Figure 7. An explosion in a tree above the target unit. 
 
 
Figure 8. An explosion next to a cylinder. 
 
 Figure 9. Injures were classified according to severity. 
 
 
Figure 10. Nearby hits cut down branches from trees on the targets. 
2.3 Medical measurement methods 
The human figure dummies made it possible to take anatomy into account in the evaluation of injuries 
caused by fragment hits in different parts of the body. For each fragment hit, the size of the fragment and 
the trajectory of the fragment from the point of explosion were estimated and the point of hit was marked 
on the human figure dummy. Penetrating hits in the chest, in head and in the abdominal cavity were rated 
as class (1) or as class (4) injuries. The classification was done on the spot. Hence the distance from the 
point of explosion and energy of the explosion could be taken into account. The number of fragment hits 
was also taken into consideration when classifying the wounded. A single fragment penetrating an 
anatomically critical part of the body could result in classifying the dummy as a patient in class (4) 
(fatally wounded or dead). A metal cylinder placed next to the dummy was used to show the penetrating 
energy of the fragments at the spot.  
3. Medical test results 
3.1 Location and distribution of injuries 
In the experiment fragment hits and injuries of 65 Anne-dummies were evaluated. There were a total of 
338 fragment hits in the dummies and they were distributed between different body parts as shown in the 
following figures. 
 
 
Figure 11. Fragment hit distribution (number of hits).  
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Figure 12. Fragment hit distribution (percentages).  
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The Anne human figure dummies performed well as target units. They made it possible to make a reliable 
estimate of the injury severity class of the wounded. They also provided reliable data on the location of 
the injuries. Results of the tests turned out to be in line with results from reference literature.  
3.2 The relationship between the distance from the point of explosion and the 
nature of the injuries 
 
 
Figure 13. The positions of the Anne dummies in the target field and the impact points of the shells.  
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Figure 14. Quantity of victims in each injury urgency class relative to the distance (meters) from 
the point of explosion. 
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Figure 15. Urgency classes of the injuries as percentages at different distances (in meters) from the 
point of explosion. 
At a 1-5 meter distance from an explosion no target figure remained uninjured. Dead or dying comprised 
60% of them. At a 10-meter distance one target figure remained uninjured, the rest of the victims getting 
mainly severe injuries. This can be explained to some extent by the fact that in forest terrain trees and 
ground contours shield a person seeking cover on the ground. Severe injuries requiring urgent care were 
found at distances up to 35 meter from the explosion. The effect of stray fragments was illustrated by the 
fact that fragment hits were found up to the distance of 55-60 meters from the points of explosion (3 hits 
at 55m-60m).  
3.3 Typical injuries 
Piercing wounds from large fragments caused the most severe injuries regardless of which part of the 
body (limbs, torso, head) they hit. Target dummies near the point of the shell explosion had multiple 
injuries, i.e. they had fragment hits all over the body. An injury caused by a single fragment depended 
mainly on the part of the body the fragment hit. 
Single hits in the limbs resulted mainly in a triage class 3 injury, provided that the loss of blood could be 
stopped immediately by first aid by the wounded himself or a fighter next to him/her. 
  
 
Figure 16. A Penetrating injury in the chest. Instant death. (IV) 
 
 
Figure 17. A Penetrating head injury. (IV) 
  
Figure 18. Multiple fragment hits in the leg, no other injuries. (III) 
 
 
Figure 19. Fingers pierced by a fragment. 
  
Figure 20. A hit in the foot. 
 
 
Figure 21. A superficial scratch on the chest. (III) 
4. Conclusions 
According to comparison with the Anne-dummies, the cardboard cylinders provide a fairly good 
approximation of human figures thrown on the ground to seek cover. In addition, the number of 
penetrating hits in the cardboard cylinders and metal cylinders were compared. The ratio demonstrated 
nicely the effective fraction of the projectiles hitting the cylinders. 
The anatomic distribution and the severity of the injuries are to a large extent in line with corresponding 
numbers in the reference literature. A major part, 50%, was in the arms and legs. Hence stopping the 
bleeding as fast as possible would have been the primary first aid. With proper field dressing, using a 
pressure dressing and/or a tourniquet, many of the injuries could have been treated by a medic or a fighter 
next to the victim. Injuries caused by shell fragments either in the abdominal cavity or in the chest require 
fast evacuation to a dressing post and/or to a dressing station and immediate surgical procedures in order 
to halt the internal bleeding and sustain breathing.   
The pressure effects of explosions cannot be demonstrated by this method. To estimate the pressure 
effects a different method should be developed. Model figures wearing a helmet and protective vests 
should also be tested in order to evaluate the effect of protective gear on the injury profiles.  
The field medical analysis on this test setting provides data for the development of operational analysis -
based simulation methods for field medicine (e.g. [1]).  
The data set obtained from the measurements in these live firing tests was small. Only three types of 
terrain were studied. Hence further research is necessary in order to increase the amount of primary data 
and to enable analysis in different terrain conditions. Variables requiring further study include different 
distances from the point of shell explosion, different kinds of terrain, different mortar and artillery 
weapon systems and a set of different target troops using different protection methods and equipment.   
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Probabilistic Risk Analysis in Combat Modeling
Lauri J. Kangas and Esa Lappi
PVTTEIOS
P.O. Box 10
FIN-11311 Riihimäki
Abstract
Probabilistic approaches are breaking ground in the assessments of military
scenarios. Stochastic combat models give the probability distributions of the
force strenghts. From this information it is possible to derive the probability
of the unit being unoperational. Certain scenario is composed, among other
things, of several units and the missions both sides have. Each mission deter-
mines a fault logic for the units included in the scenario. With probabilistic
risk analysis methods combined with operability probabilities provided by a
stochastic combat model we get fair good risk assessment of the situation.
Additionally, we can outline the operability of forces as a whole and calculate
the success of a certain mission that includes lots of forces.
Keywords: Combat modeling, probabilistic risk analysis (PRA),
fault logics
1 Introduction
Military battle assessments have been important since wars started to take place.
Finnish Defence Forces use many methods to evaluate a certain tactical situation,
one of the most important being Quantified Judgement Method [1](QJM) -based
analyses. These methods try to describe the potential damage a weapon system
can affect. Basically, they score weapon systems and then compare the total scores
of forces.
These kind of analyses omit some relevant issues that need to be considered,
most importantly the probabilistic nature of war. This paper suggests that prob-
abilistic approach to battle combined with probabilistic risk analysis provides
tremendous benefits to the situation assessment. Stochastic combat modeling
gives measures for randomnesses and uncertainties. Probabilistic risk analysis
helps to see that the success constructs from the lower level performance and to
identify the weak components of a system.
Stochastic combat modeling issues have recently been under research and
probabilistic assessments have been made available [2], [3] in Finnish Defence
Forces Technical Research Center (PVTT). This research has led to the develop-
ment of a operational analysis software tool, Sandis, created in PVTTEIOS.
The probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) provides methods to evaluate system
success (and fault) probabilities. It has now been used in process engineering for
few decades. PRA is both qualitative and quantitative analysis. It helps to assess
the risks that a system includes and to measure them.
Both the stochastic combat modeling and probabilistic risk analysis are based
on probabilistic approach. In this paper we demonstrate how these two can be
combined in an entirely novel way that produces solid judgement of the situation.
2 Stochastic Combat Models
Combat models try to describe the events of a battle trough mathematical formu-
lation. Deterministic combat models give a point estimate of result, in form or
another - stochastic combat models take into account the “chaotic” and probabilis-
tic nature of battle. In stochastic combat models, events are thought random, and
this leads to probability distributions. Most intuitively, losses within a certain time
interval can be thought as random variable, and then the force strenghts become
random variables. Figure 1 demonstrates the idea of force strenght distribution
(on right) and the faulting probability (on left).
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Figure 1: On left there is an example of a unit’s faulting probability with respect to time.
A unit can regain its operability because of reinforcements, first aid given etc. On right
there is an example of force strenght distributions. Blue has at high probability bigger
strenght than Red.
PVTTEIOS has been working with stochastic combat models for some time
now and the research done has led to a development of a Sandis software. This
software is based on a scenario based battle model designed lately [7], and it cal-
culates the force strenght distributions for every company included in a scenario.
It includes a model for first aid and evacuation of the wounded, described more
closely by [5]. It also calculates the operability probabilities for each company.
The mathematical methadology of this model is more described in [3] and the
application possibilites of the software have been considered in [4].
3 Probabilistic Risk Analysis
3.1 Background
Probabilistic risk analysis has become a common engineering tool. The methods
are taught in technical universities and the senior author has been working in the
field for a decade before joining the military research center. This PRA-section is
based on HUT teaching material by Dr. Urho Pulkkinen [9], Perry’s Handbook of
Chemical engineering [8] and practice used in Turvallisuusarviointi TA Oy (Safety
Evaluation ltd).
Probabilistic risk analysis can be used, if the system and its functionality can
be modeled and probabilities of success, failure or malfunction can be estimated
for each modeled part. This can be done using statistics and observations. The
statistics can be from systems or subsystems. For example the insurance companies
have fire statistics, which showed 5% failure probabilities to automatic sprinkler
systems. Thus we can use 95% probability for successful suppressing, if there are
standardized sprinkler systems. On the other hand, we might know, that water
pump failure probability, detection system failure probability, pipeline operability
and calculate the failure probability of that special system form the parts. Also
detection system can be divided to subsystems etc.
The probabilistic risk analysis can be devided into separable steps that are
taken. There are various sets of steps in the literature that differ a bit of each
other. Turvallisuusarviointi TA Oy (Safety Evaluation ltd.) uses the following
steps based on [8]:
1. Define goal
2. Describe system
3. Identify risks and hazards or weak points
4. Estimate consequences and their probabilities
5. Model risk situations and name initial failures
6. Estimate probabilities of the initial failures
7. Calculate overall failure probabilities
8. Estimate the losses for failure situations.
9. Calculate expected values for further actions
10. Decisions and Future action.
3.2 Cut Sets
Cut set is such set of components that if every component in a cut set fail, the
whole system fails. Following simple example explains the idea.
b
a
c
Figure 2: Simple system with components a, b and c.
For the system to work component c is essential and either component a or
component b must work properly. Cut sets are {a, b, c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c} and
{c}.
Minimal cut set is a cut set, where one cannot take any component out of the
cut set without the system become operational. Mathematically, a minimal cut
set does not have a subset that is a cut set.
Thus, in example we examined, minimal cut sets are {a, b} and {c}. If we
want to calculate system failing probability, minimal cut sets are usually used in
calculations. Let us denote the whole system by abc and the subsystem composed
by a and b by ab (see figure 2).
For each minimal cut set the failing probability is a product of each components
failing probability, in this example
P (′ab fails′) = P (′a fails′) ∗ P (′b fails′) (1)
Now the failing probability of the whole system is
P (′abc fails′) = P (′ab fails′ or ′c fails′)
= P (′ab fails′) + P (′c fails′)− P (′ab fails′ and ′c fails′) (2)
If failing probabilities are near zero for all components, we can neglet the term
−P (′ab fails′)P (′c fails′) as a second term object, and failing probability can be
estimated to be the sum of cut sets failing probabilities.
Generally, if the operability of a system T can be modeled with fault logics and
the set of all minimal cut sets {Ci}
n
i=1 is separable, that is i 6= j ⇒ Ci ∩ Cj = ∅,
the fault probability of the whole system is [9]
P (′T fails′) = P
( n⋃
k=1
′Ck fails
′
)
(3)
=
∑
k1
P (′Ck1 fails
′)−
∑
k1<k2
P (′Ck1 fails
′ ∩ ′Ck2 fails
′) +
∑
k1<k2<k3
P (′Ck1 fails
′ ∩ ′Ck2 fails
′ ∩ ′Ck3 fails)− . . . (4)
The first term approximation of this equation is similarly the sum of the cut
sets’ probabilities, which is a good approximation if all the probabilities are near
zero.
3.3 Fault Trees and Event Trees
If a success or failure can be modeled with separate events, event tree analysis
can be used. A simple example of event tree below describes operation with two
steps. If the first step succeeds in second step there are tree options: complete
success, minor failure (a fails) or major failure (b fails). If the operation starts
with a failure (for example artillery fails to support an attack) recovery operations
might save the system (attacking tanks use direct fire to support advancing forces
etc.), but if that fails, the operation ends with a disaster and system is lost. (Our
forces loose the battle.)
The probabilities of each consequence are calculated as a product of all
probabilities on the path from initial state to the consequence. When measure of
the cost or the profit of each consequence is multiplied with the probabilities, we
get expected values of each path and adding them together we get the expected
value of the whole operation.
Figure 3: Event tree with expected value calculation.
Fault trees are used, when system success or fail is built from the components.
The success (or failure) comes with and/or gates ending with top event. The fault
tree is commonly used, and there are commercial software tools available for this
kind of analysis. For example Finnish defense forces have ELMAS software from
Tampere University of Tecnology and later Artekus Oy [6].
4 Fault logics and Use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis in Operational
Analysis
We now introduce a more general fault logics port: a k/n -port. It means that for
an ensemble of n components k must be operational for the whole ensemble to be
operational. It can easily be seen that k/n -port actually includes the and-gate
and or -gate. This kind of port is more convenient in military analyses, because
we often define the fault logic in the k/n -form, e.g. “at least two of these units
must keep their position”.
Let us examine the following example (see figure 4): there are three roads
to the attacker’s target area, and there is a defending unit blocking each road
and also a fourth unit defending the target area. Let us assume, that operation
needs first breaking trough with any road and then taking the target area (e.g.
paratroops could not keep the are without support and maintenance via the roads).
Figure 4: Analysis
In this imaginary situation the success logic for the units that defend the road
is 3 of 3: every unit has to succeed in keeping its area. If these units form cluster
no. 1, and the fourth unit forms cluster no. 2, the success logic for these two
clusters is 1/2: at least other of the two has to succeed.
More generally, let us examine a scenario with the perspective of stepwise PRA,
discussed in page 4. In military operational analysis, we have to define the goal
of a mission, and to describe the scenario (steps 1 and 2). Thereafter, we have
to identify what could go wrong, that is, which subtasks of a mission are at most
risk to fail (step 3). Consequences of such events have to be estimated (step 4)
and the failure of subtask has to be decomposed to initial failures (step 5). This
means that we define a desired success logic for units involved. After that, we
need to estimate the probabilites for certain units to fail (step 6) and furthermore
to calculate the fault (or success) probability of the whole mission (step 7). Then
we have to estimate what losses would a failure inflict (step 8) and to calculate the
estimated values for possible actions (step 9). Finally, we can use this information
to make our decision how to proceed.
If an operations analyst defines the scenario and the mission with fault logics
conserning the units in the scenario and also defines the cost of the mission to fail
(steps 1-5), the Sandis software will provide the units’ faulting probabilites and
the whole mission’s faulting probability (steps 6-7) and also provides additional
information about the losses (e.g. remaing forces’ strenght distributions). After
that the analyst can estimate the losses related to the failure and calculate the
expected values for all possible actions (steps 8-9). Finally he can compare the
alternative actions and conclude to some decision among them (step 10).
5 Conclusions
We have introduced what similarities stochastic combat modeling and probabilis-
tic risk analysis have in the way they approach problems. We have shown that
they are closely linked to each other and can be combined in a way that richens
the analysis of a tactical scenario. Probabilistic risk analysis methods fit well in
the area of military operations research, especially if stochastic combat models are
used.
We have presented a way an operations analyst can use PRA-methods in sce-
nario based analysis. With a given scenario, mission and fault or success logics of
the units, the success probability of the whole mission can be calculated with the
help of Sandis software.
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Abstract 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis can be used as a tool in military operation analysis. It has been 
implemented in the Sandis code developed and used by Finnish Defence Forces Technical 
Research Centre. (PVTT). In the probabilistic combat calculations, a probabilistic network 
warfare model can be implemented using methods by Sarvi et al. [9] 
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1. Introduction 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) provides methods to evaluate system success 
probabilities. The communications and the reliability of the communication networks are 
essential for the military units to function effectively.  
 
When considering our own forces, the stepwise methods of the PRA need only little 
modification in order to be used in Electronic Warfare (EW) and network analysis. The 
enemy action only affects the failure probabilities, not the structure of the system as a 
reliability problem.  
 
When planning our own electronic warfare, the goal is to cause maximal harm to enemy 
operation. When a risk analysis model of the enemy is available, our own action can be 
selected to cause optimal damage with the best probability-consequence combination to fit 
our battle plan and other military action. 
 
The methods to estimate the battle value of EW action have been discussed in papers [1], 
[2], [3] and the Sandis simulation software tool in [4]. The Sandis software has been 
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developed in the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (PVTT), and it uses 
state machines and Markovian combat modelling for battle loss analysis.   
 
The software is being developed further, and the work in PVTT continues in order to 
include new weapon systems and features to Sandis. – For a description of Sandis, see e.g. 
[10]. 
 
For accurate operation success and battle loss calculation there is a need to estimate 
communication network availability. 
2   Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) used with Sandis 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis is an established engineering tool. Its methods have been taught 
in Helsinki University of Technology for 20 years. The information is commonly available 
in textbooks, for example [5], [6], [7].  
 
The use of the PRA methods for military solutions has been discussed by Kangas & Lappi 
[8]. In combat modelling, event tree type analysis can be used, as described in [8].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Defending battalion with a cluster with 3/3 fault logic 
 
The future is estimated by using a number of alternative paths of events with a probability 
estimate for each of the paths. These different alternative future outcomes must be 
Cluster 3/3
Cluster 1 of 2
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calculated separately using different combinations of beaten units from the branching point 
of the simulated scenario. 
 
As an example, let us consider a defending cluster with 3/3 fault logic. The Sandis code 
gives failure probabilities for individual units (companies) and the resulting failure 
probability of a 3/3 unit cluster (a battalion) as a function of time. These values can be 
used for further analysis using event trees. 
 
An example with dummy parameters is shown in figure 2. Eight Sandis simulations would 
be needed to get the initial probability values for this event tree. 
 
Accurate analysis         
           
       Probability Casualties   
Initial state Battalion defence successful   Expected value
Lower 
limit 5% 
Upper 
limit 95% 
1.0   0.6         0.6 18% 3% 27% 
            
            
  Fail  A failed | battalion failed    
  0.4   0.6     0.24 20.3% 5.0% 29.0% 
            
    B failed  | battalion failed    
    0.3     0.12 22.32% 7.27% 31.27% 
            
    C failed | battalion failed    
    0.05     0.02 24.72% 9.27% 33.54% 
            
    AB failed | battalion failed    
    0.02     0.008 26.99% 11.54% 35.54% 
            
    AC failed  | battalion failed    
    0.01     0.004 29.79% 13.54% 37.81% 
            
    BC failed  | battalion failed    
    0.015     0.006 32.06% 15.81% 40.08% 
            
    ABC failed  | battalion failed    
    0.005     0.002 34.06% 17.81% 42.08% 
 
Figure 2. Event tree of 3/3 battalion. (dummy values) 
 
If all the scenarios are calculated, the simulation time and the work needed is growing with 
n2. In scenario with two battalions the number of different combinations is 82 = 64. Thus 
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there is a need to simplify analysis. Figure 2 shows a simplified event tree, in which only 
two Sandis simulations are necessary for one cluster and 22 = 4 for two clusters. 
 
 
Fast analysis         
           
       Probability Casualties   
Initial state Battalion defence successful   Expected value 
Lower 
limit 5% 
Upper 
limit 95% 
1.0   0.6         0.6 18% 3% 27% 
            
            
  Fail  A failed      
  0.4   1     0.4 20.3% 5.0% 29.0% 
           
           
    
 
Figure 3. Fast analysis version of 3/3 cluster analysis (dummy values) 
 
 
In this example, the probabilities of all event paths which result in failure are collapsed 
into the one which the greatest likelihood of failure. There are other options to simplify the 
analysis, e.g. choosing the worst case. 
 
When certain units are selected to be beaten or not beaten in scenario based analysis, the 
Sandis strength distributions need to be adjusted before further calculations. Two 
alternative strength distributions are calculated as conditional probabilities. 
 
(1a) P( strength n | beaten) = P(strength n) / P(beaten),  
 
if the unit is beaten with strength n and else 
 
(1b) P(strength n | beaten) = 0.  
 
Because the sum of first states is not in general equal of the probability of being beaten, in 
code the probability of being beaten in distribution calculations will be changed to the sum 
of the first m states, where m is the smallest value for which the condition  
 
(2) ∑
=
≥
m
i
beatenPip
0
)()(   
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holds. The same method is used from the original strength towards zero when calculating 
the conditional probability of the unit been not beaten in the other branch of the event tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Probability distribution from Sandis 
 
For example, we can have two branches of event tree with different weather, new set of 
weapon systems available or not, use of electronic warfare (EW), air attacks, special 
ammunition etc. These distributions calculated by Sandis can be used in probabilistic 
analysis and cost effectiveness calculations.   
 
3. Network warfare 
 
The communication systems are part of the military machinery. If we want a realistic battle 
loss and outcome analysis, we need the communication network analysis as one part of the 
process.  
 
In the ongoing analysis in PVTT, unit states include communication state probabilities. In 
many cases the result of the battle depends on the ability of unit A (for example artillery) 
The strength distribution 
used when the company is 
not beaten. 
The strength distribution 
used when the company is 
beaten. 
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to support unit B (for example attacking infantry). Thus one of the features to be included 
in the Sandis software is communication network analysis.  
  
A traditional communication system is based on direct radio links between A and B. If unit 
A can receive messages from B, A can support B.  
 
In these cases the cut sets for communication are easily solved, thus number of possible 
radio links is limited to 1–5.  A simple example is given in figure 5.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 A simplified example of a military network 
 
An artillery unit supports a defending battalion. The communication links available to a 
defending company by which they can reach the artillery are a direct link using the 
artillery network frequency, and a relay through battalion headquarters with another radio 
network and frequency. 
 
The cut sets for the communication are {a,b} and {a,c}. To find the probability of 
successful communication, we need to calculate the probabilities of the individual links 
working and combine them. 
 
If an automatic network system is working, unit A can reach unit B using different paths. 
The neighbouring companies and other units (not shown) can relay messages. Thus the 
network has lots of paths from the infantry to artillery. In real cases the number of nodes 
can be 20, and one node can relay data between 4 or 5 nodes. As the number of paths 
increases, the cut set analysis becomes impractical.  
 
Supporting Artillery
a
b
c
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If we need an overall picture of the network and its availability, we should simulate all 
communications and traffic in the network using specific tools for network analysis. This 
is possible within peacetime time constraints. It may be possible for operation analysis 
with lots of scenarios or EW operational planning in the field in the future as computers 
will be faster. 
 
As a result a faster method must be found. One way of analysis is to use average failure 
probabilities of the network and use of them in a simplified simulation. The parameters can 
be obtained from field exercises or simulated data. These average values can be used in 
Monte Carlo simulation and thus a probability of link A-B working can be obtained from 
this simulation data.  
 
 
 
EW event tree.         
          
      Probability Casualties   
Initia
l 
state EW cut connection, no enemy artillery  
Expected 
value 
Lower limit 
5% 
Upper limit 
95% 
1.
0   0.7       0.7 4% 1% 7% 
           
           
  Defensive artillery       
  0.3      0.3 20% 17.0% 23.0% 
          
          
    
  
Figure 6. Event tree with EW as diverging point. The enemy cannot 
use its artillery, if EW cuts the communication network with probability 
p = 0.7.Two separate Sandis simulations are needed for the analysis. 
 
 
This kind of simulation has been tested by project [9], in which Sarvi, Saloheimo, Niemi  
& Heimo analysed a theoretical network of a brigade with dummy parameters. The project 
work showed that Monte Carlo type of network simulation could be used for network 
analysis. The Monte Carlo simulation time using Matlab was reasonable and the EW 
network calculations can be used in analysis with for example 30 minutes time stepping 
while the combat losses are calculated with 1 minute time steps. Also event stepping is 
possible for further use. For example, when a new unit enters or leaves the combat zone, 
network probability is recalculated. 
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The way of using PRA with probability information of network working probability can be 
used in two different ways. First method is expected value based, the second event based. 
When network dependent weapon systems are used, the probability of communication 
available makes two different cases: dependent system can be used or not. In expect-value 
calculations the combat losses of network dependent weapon systems are directly 
multiplied with the probability of the network been operational. This can be used, if the 
battle losses from supporting weapons are little compared with other weapon systems. 
If the supporting weapon systems have strong effect to the target unit, the expected value 
method is not useful. If for example a platoon is hit with an air strike, the unit could be 
beaten, if attacked, and fully operational, if not. In this case analysis must be done using 
event tree analysis and separate braches simulated with working network and without 
communications.  
 
The event tree type simulation gives probabilities and the outcome, which can be used for 
further analysis.   
 
 
4 Conclusions and future work 
 
The success probabilities of the communication networks are essential for operation 
analysis and overall operation success analysis.  
 
The Sandis code provides a novel tool for overall combat loss and operation success 
calculations. It has basic tools for PRA and the further development will make the 
simulation data more available for PRA calculations.   
 
Probabilistic data can be calculated for radio networks. A fast enough method has been 
presented and the used calculation methods with Monte Carlo simulation are described in 
[9]. Thus probabilistic network data is available for military operation analysis with PRA. 
 
The Sandis code does not have a built-in model for network simulations. The traditional 
radio connection analysis will be added to the Sandis during co-operation project with FFI 
(Forsvarets Forskninginstitut, Norway), but until August 2007 analysis of different 
scenarios is time consuming, when a scientist must use both the Sandis combat model and 
radio calculation computer programs separately, and then combine the results by hand.  
 
After the co-operation project the reliability of radio networks each separate 
communication can be calculated, but the probability calculations of entire automatic 
network remain beyond Sandis. Thus traditional EW calculations can be done with the 
same tool as operation success probability and combat losses calculations, but not the 
probability calculations for future automatic networks. So the analysis time remain long 
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for future automatic networks, because two different simulation codes must be used and 
the results combined by hand.  
 
Thus further development of the Sandis code and other simulation models are needed in 
order to have ability for real time operation analysis with EW and complex automatic 
communication networks.  
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Abstract: When simulating direct fire between units of different sizes in brigade-level combat
simulations, there is often a need to automatically determine the ratios of fire directed at different
possible targets. We construct a simple and effective rule for dividing fire between different
targets, which takes into account the effects of different weapon systems on each other and the
need to target not only the most valuable objectives, but also the enemy units which pose an
immediate threat. The proposed model will be implemented in Sandis operation analysis tool.
Keywords: simulation, operations research, decision making, military operation analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern military operation analysis tools include combat
simulators for wargaming. Such simulators exist for various
scales of both time and the number of troops or weapon
systems. When analysing brigade-level operations, the
number of smallest simulated units on the map is in the
order of hundreds. Sandis is designed to handle scenarios
of this size with the input of weapon and communication
characteristics, units and their equipment, fault logic for
the units and operation success, the map, and user actions
for the units at company or platoon level [1][2]. An example
of such scenario is shown in figure 1.
Fig. 1. A screenshot of a typical scenario in Sandis map
view, with a blue brigade. A brigade may have 7000
soldiers and over 1000 vehicles distributed in an area
of over 1000 square kilometers.
This poses no challenge for the computational resources,
but instead the ability of the human operator to manage
the actions of the units. However, when the battles actually
take place, several units will concentrate to a small area
(such as in figure 2), and the user needs to make detailed
decisions about their movement and use of firepower.
Fig. 2. A screenshot of a local battle within a larger
operation. The terrain and roads force both sides to
concentrate on this choke point.
To handle these low-level problems intelligently inside a
large framework without placing a large burden on the
user, practicality demands that the units make decisions
on small immediate matters based on a general rule set,
rather than the operator first setting up all possible
weapon-target pairs by hand. An simplified example of
different choices of targets is shown in figure 3.
An example of such logic would be for the troops to open
fire on any enemy unit closer than a set distance. As a
general rule it is a good starting point, but it does not
address, for example, how the available firepower should
be divided between several enemy units or how much
resources to conserve if the target is weak or unimportant,
or if the weapons are relatively ineffective against it. Also
the enemy units which pose immediate threat should be
targeted in order to minimise losses in our own most
important weapon systems.
Fig. 3. A screenshot of Sandis map view. The solid lines
are target relationships set by the operator, i.e. the
companies are defined as each others targets. The
dotted lines show the momentary choices of targets
which are automatically determined by the model
during each time step.
When both sides optimise for the minimal losses by se-
lective targeting of the opposing force, the situation leads
to a game-theoric problem, which we do not attempt to
tackle here. Optimizing the distribution of firepower has
been studied by Kr˚akenes [3], where the coefficients in a
target value function (TVF) were optimised using a genetic
algorithm, and the values of different targets were used
in allocation decisions. Kaasinen [4] has used a genetic
algorithm to optimise the tactics of a unit on a broader
scope, including advancing, taking cover and firing in order
to achieve an objective. Here we take a simpler approach
by combining the most important decision criteria into a
TVF which determines the use of firepower for a single
unit, and whose parameters are the properties of the own
and opposing unit. The aim is to model the fast decision-
making of a squad leader in combat situation, and hence
the scope of our TVF is the local fire fight between units
rather than the whole scenario.
1.1 Unit-level model in Sandis
Here we will call the lowest level of the troop model hier-
archy the ”unit”. Under usual circumstances, the smallest
unit is a platoon with some special units modelled as
squads, and units of higher order consist of these. However,
since a platoon can realistically be spread over a large area
relative to weapon ranges, the internal structure of an unit
has been added to the model in Sandis. A unit is modelled
a distribution inside the circular unit with radius r, which
is for calculation purposes discretised into seven or more
points, as seen in figure 3.
A weight vector w corresponding to each unit represents
the ”probability mass” of troops residing at a point inside
the unit (Figure 4). The weights wi sum up to 1 and are
used as multipliers when calculating weapon effects on dif-
ferent parts of the unit, or the available firepower at a given
location. The weight distribution changes throughout the
simulation as a result of weapon effects and ”cooling down”
towards the initial distribution as a function of time, rep-
resenting the reorganisation of the troops inside the unit.
The goal isn’t to accurately model the behaviour of the
unit’s soldiers or vehicles, but to give reasonable accuracy
when the simulation is run on a large scale.
Weapon effect
�1
��
Fig. 4. Weapon effects are weighted by the weights of the
points they affect. Thus the weapon effect pictured
will not wipe out the unit, however high the kill
probability is inside the effect radius.
In parallel to dividing the troops by location, they are
also divided by weapon classes, i.e. a platoon’s infantry
and assault vehicles are handled separately for purposes of
both firing and being fired at, even though they are parts
of the same unit. This is important, as different weapons
are efficient against different targets.
2. THE TARGET VALUE FUNCTION
We construct the TVF which we use to rank the available
targets in order of importance. One of our objectives is to
maximise enemy losses, so we make the TVF proportional
to the expected number of losses our fire inflicts on the
target. We denote value by Lenemy. If we have a choice of
multiple weapons, we need to scale this number according
to the fire rate of each weapon. Even though we use a single
symbol to denote this, it is practical to separate it to the
value of a single shot and the fire rate of the weapon.
We use the concept of unit ”value”, which is the value
of a soldier, vehicle or other system in our platoon or
other organisation, and denote this value by V . We divide
the ”value” of a destroyed enemy in two components. The
”material value” is a generic value arbitrarily assigned to
different types of soldiers or vehicles on the battlefield,
as eliminating a main battle tank or a mortar system
is obviously preferable to eliminating a foot soldier, for
example. This component also serves to assign a nonzero
value to strategic targets that are not weapon systems, and
can be varied if the operation requires focusing on specific
targets. We denote this by Venemy
The other component ”immediate value” is due to the loss
of firepower threatening our own unit, or the thus avoided
losses in value. We define it as the losses the enemy unit
could inflict on our own units, and denote it by Vown. Our
TVF then takes the form
TV = Lenemy × (Venemy + Vown) (1)
When simulating the behaviour of troops, it is important
to keep in mind that troops on the battlefield do not always
make globally optimal decisions. In the heat of the battle,
even an experienced fighter will prioritise first his greatest
immediate threats, even if focusing on some other unit
would be more important for their strategy as a whole.
This can to some extent be taken into account in the
term Vown, but we can easily enough separate the two
effects - the perceived threat to the platoon and that to
the individual squad.
To incorporate this to our model we add a new term
Vpersonal to describe the losses to the firing unit itself.
To make this value significant enough, we use a special
constant for the units’ own value for themselves, which
should be set higher than any real unit’s value. The revised
function ends up as
TV = Lenemy × (Venemy + Vown + Vpersonal) (2)
2.1 Dividing the firepower of a unit
If a unit has several targets of near equal target value, we
will want to divide our firepower between them. Also, if
there is a single target small enough that concentrating
all fire on it would be overkill, we will want to determine
how much firepower to spend on it. This can be achieved
by running the calculations for all the weapons in the unit
separately, instead of the whole unit’s arsenal at once, and
iterating the choice of targets over the unit’s weapons. On
the first step of the iteration we assign some amount of fire
to the unit’s best target, and update the damage potential
to describe how much we gain from additional resources.
This will result in diminishing returns, eventually forcing
the iteration to switch to the originally second best target,
or stop completely if no target stays above the defined
threshold.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
A short description of Sandis’s direct fire model can be
found in [1]. To implement the method described above
in this framework, we utilize the existing manner of
simulation in a much ”predictor-corrector”-like fashion.
First, we iterate over all the units which have been assigned
targets, and calculate the losses each unit could cause to
each other. We use the results as the Lenemy in (2) and
calculate the target value for each target of each unit.
Then, for each unit, we sort the list of targets according
to their target value, and proceed to iterate over them as
described in the previous section. the result is the amount
of firepower allocated at each target for each weapon. We
then proceed to ”fire”, that is, calculate the effects of the
allocated weapons on their targets, producing the final
result. Presenting this as pseudocode:
foreach Troop
potentialTargets = calculateTargetValues()
foreach Troop
while weapons left
bestTarget = findMaxValue(potentialTargets)
if value(bestTarget) > threshold
assignFire(bestTarget)
updateLossPotential(bestTarget)
fire()
where function calculateTargetValues returns a list of tar-
gets, which includes the potential losses to the enemy and
its value. As our model simulates targeted direct fire by
calculating the loss probability for one shot and repeating
for the number of shots, updating the loss probability here
similarly gives us an accurate approximation. The amount
of firepower assigned in one step is a tradeoff between
increasing the number of iterations or losing accuracy by
treating a larger number of shots as equal, but using a
number of shots equal to the amount of targets balances
these fairly well.
Sandis uses a time step of 1 minute for the combat sim-
ulations. The error caused by the long time step can be
compensated by using the predictor-corrector-algorithm
described in [5]. The predictor-corrector method is also
naturally combined with the algorithm described in this
paper, as both include making an initial round of simu-
lation and then refining the calculation using the initial
result.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The principal weakness of the algorithm presented herein
is the difficulty of validating it experimentally. Instead,
validation most likely needs to be done using military
personnel’s expert opinions on the validity of results.
Obviously such opinions can vary greatly.
While the algorithm was developed for Sandis, it is quite
generic and offers many possibilities in adapting it for dif-
ferent platforms. With little modifications the behaviour
of units could be easily shifted to spread, concentrate or
regulate fire, for example. Alternatively, discarding the
terms Vown and Vpersonal leaves us with a very lightweight
algorithm to provide a threshold for opening fire and some
logic for targeting, while still retaining the option for
previously mentioned alterations.
Test arrangements with limited options of weapon systems
and scale could be arranged as a part of military exercises
using electronic weapon simulators, such as the TASI
vests used by the Finnish Defence Forces, which record
hits along with the origins of the hitting shots. Such
experiments could be used to provide validation data of
e.g. a platoon vs. platoon fire fight.
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Abstract 
This paper presents the electronic warfare model used in Sandis, a software tool for operational analysis 
research, developed in collaboration by the Finnish Defence Forces Research Centre and the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment.  
One of the uses of Sandis is investigating the capabilities and influence of electronic warfare (EW) 
equipment in brigade-level scenarios.  A major challenge for the operator has been to keep track of events 
that change the state of communications of the units and decide how the units react to the change. 
The electronic warfare model consists of three components: the radio wave calculations, the links for each 
unit and the action model, which determines how loss of communication affects each unit. The action 
model incorporates rules for actions to be taken in various situations. This is intended to ease the 
workload of the operator and to allow consistent handling of EW events in the scenario.  
1. Introduction 
Command and communication systems are essential in modern warfare. Furthermore, the use of 
electronic warfare (EW) is a part of modern military operations. Hence there is a strong need for 
analytical methods for evaluating the capabilities of electronic warfare systems and their impact on the 
outcome of the battle.  
An initial attempt at EW analysis at the Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research Centre (PVTT) was 
presented at the Nordic Military Operational Research Symposium in October 2004 [7]. The analysis was 
initially carried out using a method based on the Quantitative Judgment Method (QJM) [8]. It was 
realized, however, that a QJM-based analysis was not accurate enough for operational analysis purposes 
and the method was abandoned. Work was instead focused on developing a probability distribution-based 
combat model for brigade-level simulation. This combat model was developed into a software tool which 
became later known as Sandis.  
The idea of collaboration between PVTT and FFI was discussed at the first Nordic Military Operational 
Research Symposium in October 2004. It was noted that collaboration would be beneficial to both parties, 
the purpose being to develop a software tool for EW analysis. The project plan for the collaboration 
project was accepted in August 2006. The software for radio wave calculations, called CalcRadio, was 
provided by FFI and incorporated into the combat model provided by PVTT. A general description of 
Sandis and its use in operational analysis is given in [9].  
Sandis relies on the operator to make decisions concerning unit actions. The process of creating a scenario 
can become very time-consuming for the operator, especially when radio links are included. The 
development of a rule-based artificial intelligence system was started in 2007, with the purpose of easing 
the burden on the operator. Rules can be set up for sets of units, such that certain actions are taken when 
certain events are triggered.  
This paper is organized as follows. CalcRadio is presented in Section 2. The rule system is described in 
Section 3. Finally, some conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
2. Description of CalcRadio  
2.1 CalcRadio radio wave calculations 
In 1994 the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (PT) purchased a system for frequency 
planning which uses Picquenard‟s model [1] for calculating radio wave energy loss by obstructions, such 
as mountains and hills. 
One of the authors, at that time working for PT, conducted a measurement campaign in order to check the 
validity of these radio wave calculations over different types of terrain and mountains, using measured 
levels of FM signals from main broadcasting towers in southern Norway. A van was equipped with 
advanced receiver equipment for automatic recording of measurements, and a GPS receiver was 
integrated in order to attain precise navigation. In this way a total of about 2 million signal level 
measurements were obtained, one for every meter travelled. The amount of data was then averaged down 
to 115614 different estimates (one every 40 meters), corresponding to 115614 different terrain path 
profiles.  
The results have later been analyzed by the same author at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI), taking propagation and antenna patterns into account. The antenna diagrams of the 
broadcasters had previously been measured from helicopter, and the detailed antenna diagrams were used 
in the analysis and comparison of the measurements with the Picquenard model. It has been shown that 
the original Picquenard method, taking all obstacle contributions (approximated as „knife edges‟) into 
account, strongly overestimates the propagation loss. However, by restricting the calculations to the most 
important contributions, a new, much more successful method, has been constructed. We have named the 
improved method Picquenard 1,67 because it calculates the most dominant diffraction obstacle loss and 
then adds the loss of the second most dominant obstacle loss multiplied by 0,67.  More details of the 
measurements and the improved wave propagation model are found in [2]. 
In order to further assess our model we have compared it with an international standard, and discussed the 
deviations between model and measurements in terms of expected accuracy of the experiment. 
Firstly, we have compared this new model to the current model recommended by the International 
Telecommunication (the ITU model, [3]) and found that the new model performs considerably better in 
practice than the ITU model, at least for the Norwegian terrain paths that we have investigated (See Table 
1 and Figure 1). Table 1 gives a good indication of the absolute performance (RMSE, root mean squared 
errors) of the different models investigated, whilst Figure 1 gives a useful comparative indication of how 
good the average predictions are. Small deviations from 0 in figure 1 means good average performance. 
TABLE 1: RMSE (IN DECIBELS) FOR THE ITU MODEL, THE GENERAL PICQUENARD MODEL AND  THE  PICQUENARD 1,67  MODEL 
RMSE 
(dB) 
ITU 
model 
Picquenard 
(all diffraction 
terms 
included) 
Picquenard 
( 1,67 
diffractions 
included) 
Number of observations 
line-of-sight 9.1 8.5 8.5 10920 
1 obstacle 11.5 8.2 8.3 27742 
2 obstacles 11.6 12.5 9.1 35345 
3 obstacles 12.2 23.9 9.5 23696 
4 obstacles 12.5 37.5 9.6 11333 
5 obstacles 13.1 51.8 9.4 4501 
6 obstacles 13.3 65.9 9.5 1506 
7 obstacles 13.4 82.0 8.7 411 
8 obstacles 12.7 95.7 7.8 118 
9 obstacles 14.7 112.7 6.8 37 
Overall  11.7 22.9 9.0 115614 
 
 Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of predicted propagation loss relative to an arbitrary threshold, 
minus the cumulative distribution of measured loss relative to the same threshold. 
Secondly, the expected standard deviations of the difference between the Norwegian Digital Terrain 
Elevation Data (DTED) and true heights have been deduced from a Norwegian Master‟s thesis [4], and by 
using the Okumura-Hata height-correction term [5], a frequency dependent expected uncertainty in 
received signal strength has been calculated from uncertainty in height. Such calculations have shown that 
the new method performs within the expected uncertainty of the experiment, whilst the ITU model 
contains additional discrepancies which we have not been able to explain.  
For these two reasons the FFI improved model (Picquenard 1,67) is used by the CalcRadio software. 
2.1 Radio calculations performed in Sandis 
The above mentioned propagation model is applied between all communication units in Sandis. The 
effect of using directive antennas is also incorporated, as long as the antenna beam diagrams are known 
and provided in an appropriate format.  
CalcRadio is used to perform emitter–receiver pair calculations between communication transceiver units. 
In addition to calculating the signal levels between units that are meant to be communicating, CalcRadio 
is also used to calculate interference with friendly and enemy receivers. Finally, and most important, 
CalcRadio is used to calculate whether enemy units are being jammed or not. More information on how 
CalcRadio works is found in [6]. 
 Simulated troops in Sandis can have an arbitrary set of communication equipment (transceivers, jammers, 
and antennas). The equipment set defines the radio frequencies and the emitter power a troop is able to 
use.  
Desired radio links and jammers are set up manually. The user can decide whether a particular link or 
jammer is active at a particular time. Inactive links are not included in the calculations. This way a 
jamming unit may move into position while remaining inactive and then be activated by the user at a 
certain time. Currently, antennas are positioned automatically directly towards the opposite 
transmitting/receiving troop, and the antenna height is fixed on the ground level.  
After running the calculation, the status of a radio link can be one of the following: successful, jammed, 
disrupted by foreign radio link or totally broken. The resulting radio links between troops are represented 
with coloured arrows on the scenario map. A textual link list can be also used for observing the results. 
Figure 2 shows a view of the map window in Sandis illustrating the colour coding of radio link status. A 
Blue Force jamming unit in the northeast corner of the map is disrupting the communication between the 
two Red Force units, with the jammed links shown in red. Two civilian units are also included, shown in 
green. One of them is affected by the jamming, while the other one is transmitting on the same frequency 
as two Blue Force units. The interfered links are shown in yellow. The mountainous terrain in the 
southern part of the map causes the links between two Blue Force units to be broken, shown in purple. 
For two more Blue Force units the link in one direction is broken. Links in different directions can 
operate on separate frequencies as in the case with the civilian units.  
 
Figure 2. The map window of Sandis showing colour coded radio links. Green means the link is 
OK, red means it is jammed, purple means the signal-to-noise ratio is too low and yellow means the 
link is interfered by a foreign transmitter. Inactive links are not shown on the map. A fifth colour, 
blue, is used to denote links that have not been calculated (not shown on map). 
 
When provided with a map of digital terrain elevation data (DTED) in an appropriate format, Sandis will 
use this terrain model for radio link propagation calculations in CalcRadio. Usage of real physical 
coordinate data is supported in the model and thus the simulation and simple analysis of real world radio 
communication scenario is quite straightforward. 
3. A rule system for assisting the operator 
In November 2007 the EW simulation capabilities of Sandis were evaluated in a joint session between the 
Finnish and Norwegian ends of the project. At that time it was noted that while Sandis performed well in 
specific calculations, managing the EW of an entire battle required too much manual work that made the 
process very time-intensive. For example, when an attacking unit notices that its communications are 
being jammed, it would probably halt their movement, switch to a secondary frequency or take other 
actions to compensate for the jamming; in Sandis as of 2007 the operator would need to manually identify 
this situation and have the unit act accordingly. 
To alleviate this problem it was decided that a way to automate the behaviour of units on the battlefield be 
developed.  One of the authors laid the groundwork for such an artificial intelligence and another took up 
the task of software design and implementation in the Sandis software. 
Figure 3. An abridged class diagram describing the entities and relations between them in the rule system. 
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As a first step towards this artificial intelligence for EW a rule-based automation system was 
implemented. In the rule system the behaviour of a unit is described in terms of rules, and each rule 
consists of a trigger and an action. Rules are associated with units and they apply to that unit and its 
children. These rules are checked at the end of each time step and whenever the conditions set by the 
trigger are met, the action is executed. The triggers and actions both operate on sets of units instead of 
single units; whenever a trigger is fired, the set of triggering units is passed as input to the action. The 
structure of the rule system is illustrated in UML notation in Figure 3. 
The rule system has been designed to be extensible so that trigger and action types can easily be added. 
As of August 2008 a handful of triggers and two action types have been implemented. Among the 
implemented trigger types are “being jammed” and “beaten”. The “being jammed” trigger is fired 
whenever any of the monitored units is experiencing jamming on any of their radio communication links, 
whereas the “beaten” trigger is fired when the probability of a monitored unit being beaten (that is, having 
their effective strength reduced to zero) rises above a set threshold. The two implemented action types are 
“do nothing” and “interrupt and alert the operator”, the latter of which interrupts the simulation, describes 
the circumstances leading to the interrupt and awaits further input from the operator. 
Many new trigger and action types have been proposed, such as the “communication to upper echelon 
lost” and “enemy at firing distance” triggers and “top movement”, “retreat”, “open fire” and “cease fire” 
actions. The current set of triggers and actions enables evaluation and prototyping of the rule system. 
Figure 4. An abridged class diagram describing the entities and relations between them in the connection 
model. 
Abridged Class Diagram for Connectionspackage Sandis [   ]
...
+getState()
...
CommunicationConnection Ev acuationConnection
...
...
CommandConnection
TransportationModel
-capacity
-transportTime
...
...
RadioLink
-frequency
-equipment
...
+getState()
...
DeployedUnit
...
...
Connection
-id
...
...
{disjoint, complete}
source
1
1
target
1
1
reverseLink
1
1
forwardLink
1
1
model
Certain desired, more specific trigger types, such as “A unit loses communications to its upper echelon”, 
were found to require more information about the units than was readily available in the existing Sandis 
data model. The model was lacking information about how the units interact with each other. Many types 
of interaction between units on the battlefield can be identified; to name a few, units receive orders from 
their headquarters, issue artillery orders to supporting artillery units and ship their wounded to designated 
field hospitals. 
To describe such ways of interaction, a generic connection system was added to the Sandis data model. 
The connection system is designed to overcome certain architectural challenges imposed by the design of 
the Sandis data model. Using object-oriented programming methods, this is done in a generic way that 
reduces code duplication and facilitates reuse of code. The structure of the connection system is illustrated 
in UML notation in Figure 4. 
Each connection belongs to a connection type that defines a set of parameters and also whether 
connections of that type are symmetric or asymmetric. The connection types implemented as of August 
2008 are “command” and “communications”; new types can easily be added by the programmer. The 
“command” type of connections represents command structure: a command connection between two units 
states that the source unit (usually headquarters) commands the target unit. The “communications” type of 
connections represents radio communications between two units and stores parameters required by the 
radio propagation model that has been discussed earlier in this paper. 
While initially developed for the needs of EW simulation, the connection model was also reused and 
extended in the field medical model that was being developed at the same time. The field medical model 
simulates the evacuation and treatment of wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The evacuation 
infrastructure – from the battlefront to the hospital – is expressed in the model in terms of evacuation 
connections. The field medical model is described in detail in [10]. 
Preliminary testing has shown that the rule system already reduces the burden on the operator. Future 
work will include finding common behaviour patterns for units on the battlefield and formalizing them in 
the terms of Sandis into an “operator's handbook”. This process will help identify the new features that 
would be of most use to the users of Sandis, be it certain new trigger or action types or something 
completely different. 
4. Conclusions 
Operational analysis software Sandis includes a model for communications EW, which allows the user to 
set up links between units on the map and monitor the states of the links during the course of the scenario.   
A rule system for managing unit actions has been introduced. It can be used to alert the operator in case of 
important events in the scenario, where operator input is required. Although setting up the rules for 
critical units takes time, it will be of great benefit in large scenarios. Furthermore, rules can be stored and 
then duplicated to units of the same type. In addition, this artificial intelligence system contains no “black 
boxes”. 
In future work the electronic warfare model will be developed further. In addition, an “operator‟s 
handbook” will be developed, detailing unit actions in various situations. This will in turn allow the rule 
system to be extended to handle additional situations. 
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